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Smuggling has been an important problem in American-Canadian relations. Yet
the nature of smuggling is little understood; it is by definition an elusive, secretive, and
subtle practice. This dissertation explores smuggling as a social force within a border
community on the United States-Canada boundary. Smuggling almost always involved
the illicit crossing of political boundaries, and as such can be used as a means of studying
popular attitudes toward the creation of national borders. Moreover, because smuggling
is directly related to the transition to modem capitalism, this study sheds light on the
roots of both American and Canadian economic developn~ent.
The Passamaquoddy region that straddles the border between Maine in the United
States and New Brunswick in what is now Canada offers an ideal example of borderlands
smuggling in the years following the American Revolution to the end of the War of 1812.
During this period, the international border running through Passarnaquoddy was

extremely ill-defined and subject to periodic military action and diplomatic correction.
By 1783, two oppositional groups settled Passamaquoddy. Loyalist adherents to the
British Crown settled the New Brunswick side of Passamaquoddy Bay, while republican
Americans settled the Maine side. Despite the ideological differences of these two
groups, and various laws that often prohibited trade between them, Passamaquoddy
residents engaged in a lively smuggling trade even when the United States and Great
Britain were fighting the War of 1812.
The accommodation between Loyalists and Americans at Passamaquoddy
provides an opportunity to compare the historical experience of Canada and the United
States, both of which have developed extensive frontier mythologies. The theoretical
basis for this study is "borderlands theory," which emphasizes modes of accommodation
rather than conflict on the North American frontier. Smuggling thus provides a means to
analyze the creation of the border between the United States and Canada, to compare the
American and Canadian frontier experience, and to understand the transition to
capitalism.
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INTRODUCTION

Smuggling has been an important problem in international relations; yet the
nature of smuggling is little understood. It is by definition an elusive, secretive, and
subtle practice. This dissertation explores smuggling as a social force within border
communities, using the Passamaquoddy region on the border between the United States
and Canada as a model. Like other forms of social banditry, smuggling can be used to
analyze social economies, attitudes towards violence, and the rise of governmental
authority in the decades following the American War of Independence, both in the
American republic and the neighboring British colonies to the north. Moreover,
smuggling almost always involved the illicit crossing of political boundaries, and as such
can reveal popular attitudes toward the creation of national borders. Borderland
smuggling is one means of analyzing the creation of the border between the United States
and Canada, and of comparing the American and Canadian frontier experience.
This work argues that smuggling was inextricably linked with the process of
border formation, compelling the state to exert considerable efforts to control its borders.
Government efforts to control boundaries often created an equal and opposite effect
anlong border residents, who resisted state-created boundaries through a variety of
actions, including smuggling. This constant struggle between the state and smugglers
played out in areas like Passamaquoddy, where the boundary line between the United

States and British North America was not yet permanently fixed, the local populace on
both sides of the boundary was often sympathetic to smugglers, and state powers were
diminished by the region's remoteness. Often the smugglers won these contests; the
American embargo of 1807-1809 failed because of rampant smuggling at places like
Passamaquoddy; the American government also failed to stem smuggling there during
the War of 1812. Passamaquoddy's smugglers also successhlly defied British colonial
officials, most notably in 1817 and 1820 when New Brunswick attempted to halt the
illicit plaster trade.
The result of these struggles were persistent efforts by American and British
officials to control the region, and the rise of an ambivalence to state authority on the part
of the region's inhabitants who united in defying regulations that restricted cross-border
trade. This struggle was not unique to Passanlaquoddy; throughout the Western world
and even beyond, smugglers and govenlments engaged in a constant battle. In many
cases, this struggle was linked both to an increasing commercial impulse related to the
rise of capitalistic economic systems, and the growing needs of the state to control its
borders to tax and regulate commerce. Smuggling at Passamaquoddy thus offers an
insight into how border formation affects local populations.'
The most common form of smuggling involved secretly introducing goods across
a border to evade high taxes imposed by the state or other regulations. Other smugglers
attempted to move goods out of a jurisdiction in violation of the law. Individuals rind
groups engaged in smuggling for varied reasons. Some sought quick profits, others

merely to support their families, and some because of tradition or hostility to the state
apparatus. For the purposes of this dissertation, a broad definition is used: smuggling
was international trade conducted by illegal means.2
The idea of illegal trade of course begs the question: who made the trade illegal?
The answer to this is the state, as defined by the intellectual heirs of Max Weber, who
considered the state as " a set of organizations invested with the authority to make
binding decisions for people and organizations juridically located in a particular territory
and to implement those decisions using, if necessary, f ~ r c e . "This
~ definition is the most
satisfactory because it considers the means by which governments enforce their laws, and
places government control within a set geographic area, or jurisdiction. But can the state
expect people who live in a peripheral region with indeterminate jurisdiction to obey its
laws? Are those who live at the edges of a jurisdiction equally bound by the rules the
state asserts, and how is the state's authority enforced on its periphery, or in a contested
region also claimed by another power?
Passamaquoddy, a region claimed by both the British and Americans after 1783,
offers an ideal terrain to explore these questions. This study examines Euro-American
settlers who conducted illegal trade at Passamaquoddy despite the sometime considerable
efforts of the state to halt it, even through use of force. Passamaquoddy's inhabitants,
primarily Loyalist refugees who settled in what became the British colony of New
Brunswick and American settlers seeking a new start in eastern Maine, a part of
Massachusetts until Maine statehood in 1820, quickly forgot their differences after the
American Revolution and established an amicable relationship based on their common

North American frontier experience. These people were not extraordinary; it is their very
ordinariness that makes border people important to scholars attempting to understand
their relationship with the often troublesome imaginary line that divided New Brunswick
from Maine. The only extraordinary aspect of these people is that they lived near a
border and that the state often considered it a crime to conduct trade across that invisible
line.
Recapturing the experiences of the settlers who flooded into the Passamaquoddy
borderland poses some challenges. Neither American nor Canadian historiography does
an adequate job of understanding North America as a whole; instead, most scholars who
study the period after 1783 tend to segment their research to confom~to the physical
borders and national mythologies of both Canada and the United ~ t a t e s .The
~ exceptions
are those scholars who adhere to a borderlands model that suggests that the international
boundary was a "remarkably porous d i ~ i d e . "Given
~
these obstacles, how is a
borderlands scholar able to reconcile the historiographical differences between American
and Canadian scholars that separate the interpretations of everyday life in a region that
spanned the border?
One answer is to look for the experiences common to both Canada and the United
States and to compare the interpretations of these events. In the case of the
Passamaquoddy borderland, the two common qualities that loom largest in both national
historiographies are the frontier and the legacy of the American Revolution into the early
nineteenth century.

To better understand these peoples, the borderlands model as defined by Lauren
McKinsey and Victor Konrad has been used: a "borderlands is a region jointly shared by
two nations that houses people with common social characteristics in spite of the
boundary between them." This approach emphasizes how neighboring societies sought
mutually beneficial accommodations to resolve their disputes. For McKinsey and
Konrad, borderlands theory explains how different political communities blend into each
other where they meet at a boundary; the product of this blending is "an area in which
interaction has a tempering effect on the central tendencies of each society."6 In the case
of Passamaquoddy, the most obvious interaction was illegal trade, or smuggling, an
interaction that certainly tempered borderland residents' attitudes toward the state.
The intellectual framework of this study is social history, or what Georges
Lefebvre referred to as "history fiom below." Social history emphasizes the what, who,
how, and why of historical events, with an emphasis on the who and why.' Many social
historians study crowd protest, attempting to give the ordinary men and women engaged
in protest a face, and focus on the conflict that existed between social needs, community
demands, and individual ambitions.* Often these conflicting needs, demands and
ambitions led to social unrest and violent collective action against state agents who too
strictly applied regulations on an uncooperative populace. British scholars such as E.P.
Thompson, George Rudk, Chstopher Hill and their intellectual heirs, such as Peter
Linebaugh and Marcus Rediker, have deeply influenced contemporary understanding of
crowd protest and its relationship to market economies. This work applies some of their
models to bear on the North American f r ~ n t i e r . ~

Illicit trade has not loomed large in recent American or Canadian historiography.
In the United States it is generally most touched upon as a colonial phenomenon, part of
the growing American resistance to British rule before the American

evolution.'^

Geographically, chronologically, and in tenns of subject, this study is akin to American
historian Alan Taylor's Libertymen and Great Proprietors, but instead of focusing on
squatters and their role on the American frontier, it compares illicit frontier commerce
from both sides of the United States-Canada border." In Canada smuggling has played
an even less prominent historiographical role. Smuggling occasionally rises as a topic
among historians of New France or Acadia, but among Anglophones smuggling tends to
invoke memories of the rampant rum running of the 1920s and 1930s.I2 In terms of
Canadian historiography, this work is most closely connected with the works of George
Rawlyk, who analyzed Nova Scotia planter society before and during the American
Revolution, especially in terms of how evangelical religion shaped colonial society.
Even more significantly, Rawlyk was one of the few Canadian scholars willing to link
Canadian history with American, avidly pursuing cross-border themes to explore
transnational, North American history.I3

In the North American context borders are strongly linked to the idea of a frontier.
This study is not about the concept of the frontier in American and Canadian history;
rather the term frontier here simply refers to a region experiencing the transition to
pennanent Euro-American settlement. The consideration of Maine as a frontier region
after the American Revolution has recently acquired some historiographical importance
due to the writings of Laurel Thatcher Ulrich and Alan ~ a ~ 1 o rThese
. l ~ historians,
studying the life of a midwife and land squatters respectively, have made major

contributions to the profession's understanding of ordinary people in the early republic.
Canadian scholars, too, have impressively analyzed the same period in the Maritimes in
studies of Loyalists by Anne Goman Condon, Neil MacKinnon and Margaret Conrad's
efforts in the field of Planter Studies, which includes Native Americans (First Nations in
Canada), Acadians, and the Yankees and so-called "foreign protestants" who inhabited
the Maritime Provinces before 1783.15 But American historiography largely ignores
Canada after 1783, with the exception of the War of 1812, and Canadian historiography
has a tendency to downplay the importance of the post-Revolutionary experience in favor
of the more triumphant story of Confederation in 1867. Yet both American and Canadian
scholars can learn from one another; Ulrich's midwife was a Loyalist; Taylor's
"Libertynlen" often fled to Canada for rehge; Condon's Loyalists were virtually all
Americans; and Conrad's Planters retained strong ties with New England for generations.
The frontier experience was truly North American. It must be studied not as purely
American or exclusively Canadian, but compared on a regional or continental basis to
fully comprehend it. This study attempts to understand the frontier experience of settlers
who lived on the United States-Canada border, and how the international boundary
influenced their daily lives.
Historians have hotly contested the importance of the North American frontier
ever since Frederick Jackson Turner proposed his frontier thesis over one hundred years
ago.16 One of the most useful ideas to evolve out of the frontier debate was Herbert
Eugene Bolton's "borderlands" model that emphasized frontier accommodation over
conflict." One form of accommodation was trade, despite governmental efforts to limit,

control, or eliminate commerce between various borderlands groups. Officials usually
deemed this illicit trade smuggling, and rightly perceived it as a threat in the peripheries
where governmental authority was already weak.
The Passamaquoddy region offers an ideal example of borderlands smuggling in
the years following the American Revolution to the 1820s. During this period, the
international border running through Passamaquoddy was extremely ill-defined and
subject to periodic military and diplomatic correction. By 1783, two theoretically
antagonistic groups settled Passamaquoddy. Loyalist adherents to the British Crown
settled the New Brunswick side of Passamaquoddy Bay, while republican Americans
settled the Maine side. Despite the ideological differences of these two groups, and
various laws to prohibit trade between them, Passamaquoddy residents engaged in a
lively smuggling trade even when the United States and Great Britain were fighting the

War of 1812. The scale and persistence of illicit trade at Passanlaquoddy resulted in
copious diplomatic, military, and law enforcement documentation that provides a wealth
of detail concerning the dynamics of smuggling. In addition, the accommodation
between ideologically opposed groups at Passamaquoddy provides an opportunity to
compare the historical experience of Canada and the United States, both of which have
developed an extensive frontier mythology, one based on peace, order, and good
government, the other on "rugged individualism" and violence.
Professional scholars have long noted the presence of a borderlands community at
Passamaquoddy. The first major monograph on the subject was Harold A. Davis's aptlynamed An International Community on the St. Croix (1604-1930), published in 1950.18
Since then scholars in a variety of disciplines have written a number of articles, essay

collections, and conference papers on the "Northeast

orderl lands."'^

Yet problems with

the borderlands model exist as well. Some Canadian nationalists find the borderlands
model threatening, and insist that locals knew who belonged on what side of the border.*'
Furthermore, the borderlands model is difficult to distinguish from the idea of a
"frontier," and those differences have yet to be satisfactorily ~ettled.~'In addressing
issues of the frontier experience and borderlands accommodation, this dissertation seeks
to understand the paradox of ideological enemies engaged in illicit trade at the expense of
their respective states.
But these frontierhorderlands smugglers were elusive even then; how can a
scholar determine the details of smuggling centuries after the fact? Finding smugglers
who do not want to be found was always a difficult task for customs officers; finding
smugglers two hundred years later would seem to be an impossible task for a scholar.
Yet smugglers seldom attempted to break the law on both sides of the border, and
generally preferred to appear to conduct trade legally. A comparison of customs records
uncovers inconsistencies that indicate smuggling. For example, American ships that
cleared through customs at Halifax, Nova Scotia, during the War of 1812 clearly engaged
in illicit trade with the enemy, and thus may be deemed smugglers. Legal records and
sometimes even correspondence among merchants and with officials can yield
information about smuggling.
The foremost source of smuggling data comes from law enforcement agencies,
and above all from court records. Yet a number of concerns have recently arisen over the
use of judicial and other legal archives. Some historians fear the " seductive influence of
the archives" might cause historians to unwittingly falsify or distort the subject they

study; another concern is that scholars attach too much meaning to primary documents,
simply because they exist.22 Others such as George RudC fear that since officials created
and controlled archives, the written record is biased against the masses, based on the
presumption that those in power are inherently inimical to the interests of ordinary
people.23 Michel Foucault lamented the terseness of the official record concerning
people driven to crime as having "lives of a few brief lines or pages; misfortunes and
mishaps without number, all bundled together in a handful of words."24
Judicial officials certainly wielded power, and could and did abuse that power.
But written records are a two-edged sword. In fact, smugglers were very adept at using
the written record against officials. Sometimes smugglers were able to use their control
or sympathy of lower courts to frustrate federal district or colonial vice-admiralty courts.
Whenever possible, the use of court records has been checked against newspaper
accounts, manuscript journals, and correspondence. Comparing Canadian versus
American, and local versus higher jurisdiction court sources has also revealed a number
of contradictions that assist in understanding the often complex smuggling schemes
resorted to by borderland residents.
While the written record is incomplete concerning smugglers, by combining
American and colonial records from New Brunswick and Nova Scotia a wealth of details
emerges. American federal court records provide a detailed account of smuggling,
including the names of smugglers and their place of residence, the type of materials
smuggled, and the methods both smugglers and law enforcement officials employed.
Depositions and affidavits, even transcriptions of verbal examinations, are sometimes
available in the records of Maine's federal district court. British colonial vice-admiralty

court records provided a less substantial picture. New Brunswick's vice-admiralty court
records have not been found, but Nova Scotia's vice-admiralty court records contain
substantial records concerning smuggling in the Bay of Fundy. Collectively, these
records provide a sufficient body of evidence to compare with United States federal court
records. A database conlpiled from court and other records pernlits the tracking of
individuals who frequently crossed the border. For example, Stephen Humbert appeared
in New Brunswick legislative papers as a "preventative officer" who pursued smugglers
at Passamaquoddy in 1820; but American legal records revealed that federal officials
accused Humbert of smuggling in 1808.
Court records certainly have pitfalls. There is the possibility that they reveal only
unskilled or unlucky smugglers, and thus skew the study away from successful
smugglers. But to sophisticated smugglers, who manipulated the legal system to their
own ends, getting caught often presented an opportunity to legitimize the presence of
their contraband goods. Smugglers often informed against themselves as a tactic to
illicitly introduce goods into the United States, but such tactics were seldom required in
British North America, where customs officials tended to ignore most smuggling
altogether. Smugglers also frequently testified on behalf of other smugglers in court, or
could be confident that a jury of their peers would simply refuse to prosecute them in
American courts. Far from putting an end to smuggling, legal prosecution could be used
as a means to safely introduce contraband into a forbidden market.
Because smuggling often closely resembled legal commerce, another form of
legal record frequently involved snlugglers: the lawsuit. Just as licit traders often sued
one another, smugglers also sought redress in lower courts. Both Maine and New

Brunswick county-level court records demonstrate details of borderlands accommodation
not found in American federal and British vice-admiralty court records. Of particular
interest are records that indicate business transactions across the border during times
when the law forbade commercial intercourse, such as during Jefferson's embargo. By
cross-referencing local court records with higher courts and comparing court records
across the border, a more complete picture of borderlands smuggling emerges. The
judicial record is thus rich in resources for the scholar of smuggling.
Some correspondence of known smugglers survives. Sometimes found in legal
files, but more often within the correspondence collections of fellow merchants.
Smugglers, after all, were businessmen, and had to communicate closely with their
partners. The references are often subtle, such as a request to keep someone's name out
of a business transaction; but sometimes they are blatant, as when one Maine merchant
wrote directly to the governor ofNova Scotia during the War of 1812 requesting
permission to smuggle.25
In organizing and analyzing the surprisingly large amount of infom~ationon
Passamaquoddy smuggling, a topical, rather than chronological approach has been
utilized. This work is ten chapters long, including six thematic chapters, three chapters of
case studies, and a conclusion.
Chapter One considers smuggling as a world-wide historical phenomenon,
placing Passamaquoddy's smuggling in global perspective. This chapter also considers
the importance of smuggling in the debate over the transition to capitalism in Western
society. This chapter also introduces Stephen Humbert, a Loyalist merchant from Saint

John, New Brunswick. A smuggler, hymn writer, and sometime customs officer,
Humbert embodied most of the essential virtues and vices of merchants trading at
Passamaquoddy.
The next chapter considers Passamaquoddy within the framework of borderlands
theory. It establishes borderlands values as a set of pragmatic attitudes shared
throughout North American frontier society. These values concentrated at the geographic
limits of state authority due to the dynamic created between governments attempting to
assert their sovereignty and locals with an ambivalent or anlbiguous attitude toward the
state, and outsiders who attempted to manipulate Passamaquoddy's ill-defined border to
their own purposes. Toward that end, a fairly detailed geographical description of the
region is included, as well as a consideration of the Euro-American settlers who arrived
at Passamaquoddy after the American Revolution. The idea of borderlands theory is
personified in the life of Lewis Frederick Delesdernier, an American customs officer who
generally sympathized with smugglers.
Chapter Three considers the problems the United States government had in
enforcing anti-smuggling laws at Passamaquoddy. The laws governing commercial
intercourse were extremely complex, and thus are explored in some detail. Locals often
resented efforts to enforce those laws, thereby creating a tension between state officials
and local individuals. One byproduct of this tension was corruption among customs
officials, a crime even more well concealed than smuggling. Local sympathy with
smugglers, even at the official level, was a major factor in the creation of borderlands
attitudes, as was antipathy towards officials who rigidly enforced commercial laws.
The fourth chapter is a comparative analysis of American federal customs

administration and the British imperial customs system. While the systems were similar
in many respects, there were important differences that underscore the changes wrought
by the American Revolution. Attitudes toward officeholders and using violence to
pursue smugglers were markedly different in Loyalist New Brunswick than they were in
republican Maine. Yet official corruption, especially in tolerating smuggling at
Passamaquoddy, was a problem in British North America, just as it was in the United
States. The problem was keenly felt both in New Brunswick and Nova Scotia.
Smuggling scandals frequently divided the elites of both colonies, resulting in political
feuds and, on one occasion, in a famous duel in Halifax. The same can be said of Maine,
where the state's first governor became involved in a scandal based on his own
smuggling during the War of 1812.
The fifth chapter considers the evolution of borderlands values among
Passamaquoddy7sEuro-American inhabitants after the American War of Independence.
The local conlponent of the borderlands dynamic reveals that despite the calamities of the
American Revolution, American citizens and British subjects continued to regard one
another as essentially the same people. Cross-border cooperation came easily to peoples
united by language, culture and experience, especially if it meant mutual profit.
Untangling these connections is a vital part of rediscovering the commonalities between
Canada and the United States, thus reducing the temptation to consider each as a sealed,
separate identity without influence or effect on the other.
Chapter Six considers the influence of economic adventurers and governmental
enforcers in creating a borderlands dynamic. Young merchants, often outsiders, men
determined to make their fortunes even if it meant defying the law, were the most

dangerous smugglers. These adventurers strongly resembled the sort of smugglers Adam
Smith described in his Wealth of ~ a t i o n s These
. ~ ~ smugglers defied the law and created
considerable disturbances within the border communities, yet locals and even customs
authorities often tolerated, and even encouraged their presence. Unraveling the secrets of
the adventurers and enforcers and why so many came to as remote a region as
Passamaquoddy reveals that borderlands attitudes were not restricted to border regions,
but merely concentrated there. Individuals disgruntled with the state, especially its
commercial laws, flocked to Passamaquoddy with expectations of local sympathy and
possibilities unavailable in areas with stronger government institutions. Conversely,
because so many people at Passamaquoddy were unhappy with state controls,
governments sent bureaucrats and military units to control their behavior.
Chapters seven; Eight, and Nine present case studies of borderland conflicts
centered around smuggling. Contemporaries described these conflicts as wars, and
indeed the second was a declared war: the War of 1812. The first of these confrontations
was Jefferson's embargo (1 807-1809), a complete American cessation of trade that
produced the "Flour War." The failure of the embargo, despite the allocation of huge
resources to stop smuggling at Passamaquoddy, demonstrated not only the weakness of
the fledgling American government, but also the strength of the American commercial
instinct. The second conflict, the War of 1812, which is considered in Chapter Eight,
unfolded at Passamaquoddy largely as a struggle over smuggling. Initially this illegal
intercourse was encouraged by British colonial officials to undermine the American war
effort, but New Brunswick authorities soon found that they had to contend with their own
smuggling problem. Chapter Nine explores the degree to which British commercial

policy promoted smuggling after the War of 1812, especially during the "Plaster War" of
1820. Years of official laxity, combined with American encouragement, produced a
border conflict that proved just as violent and ineffectual as Jefferson's embargo. The
con~plexinteractions among the state, outsiders looking for quick profits, and locals who
maintained cross-border ties weave throughout all three chapters and produced a
borderland dynamic that emphasized cross-border tolerance over ideological concerns.
Chapter Ten differs from the previous ones in considering how the facts of
smuggling were remembered and forgotten in the region. How did locals and others
remember smuggling as a part of their past? Given the fact that smuggling was a furtive
activity, pinning down its menlory can be difficult, but at Passamaquoddy illicit
commerce was so massive and important it could not be ignored. Analyzing the halftruths, distortions, and outright lies that borderlands residents fabricated, and comparing
those myths against documented facts are an important way to evaluate the subtler
dimensions of borderlands thought. It also poses a serious challenge for the historian
attempting to untangle fact from fiction. This final chapter also serves as an epilogue,
drawing together the study's arguments about borderlands theory and why smuggling and
other border-related crimes offer a new insight into how neighboring states interact at
their boundaries. These include the ongoing nature of smuggling, which continued at
Passamaquoddy into the twentieth century. All of these ideas exist on a backdrop of
borderlands theory, which can be a powerful tool for breaking history out of the national
boundaries that usually constrain it.
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CHAPTER 1:
THE GLOBAL'CONTEXT OF SMUGGLING

Introduction
Eighteenth- and nineteenth-century accounts of smuggling often provide
conflicting views on the subject. Dr. Johnson's definition of a smuggler as a "wretch
who, in defiance of the laws, imports and exports goods without payment of the customs"
is very typical of contemporary feelings towards those engaged in smuggling, at least
among those who allied themselves with the rising authority of the nation-state.'
Certainly smuggling threatened the standing order and undermined deference to political
and social leaders. A telling example of how smuggling eroded deference is shown in the
journal of Methodist missionary Joshua Marsden, who stumbled across some smugglers
one night in Digby, Nova Scotia and recorded the following:
Digby is given up to smuggling, and at night, when the
smugglers came on board, to carry their contraband goods
ashore, we were greatly disturbed with their profane and
worldly conversation; they continued to grow worse, and at
last we reproved them, but this brought upon us a flood of
reproach and invective: one of them, to show his
importance, quoted a scrap of latin, but upon my calmly
telling him we did not deal in scraps, his h r y became
ungovernable; and I believe, had it not been for fear of the
consequence, they would have murdered us both.2

This account is representative of how those in power reacted to smuggling. Marsden was
a Methodist missionary and an outsider, and probably did not understand initially that
these men working on the Sabbath were smugglers. The smugglers themselves remained
anonymous, but at least one had some education, and while violence was not their first
choice, they were clearly prepared to harm Marsden. This incident represents not only a
chance encounter between missionary and smuggler, but also a very small part of the
struggle between those in authority and common people that was unfolding in the Atlantic
world throughout the eighteenth and well into the nineteenth c e n t ~ r i e s . ~
Marsden defies the assumption, however, that he was a priggish upholder of the
status quo. He actually came from modest origins, and had sailed before the mast as a
common sailor. Nor was Marsden ashamed of his common origins; he wrote about them
quite freely in his published autobiography.4 Marsden was rather more circumspect in his
handling of the deacon who worked under him in the Saint John, New Brunswick,
Methodist church, a pious Loyalist named Stephen Humbert. Marsden made no mention
of the deacon in his autobiography, whom he snubbed on the grounds that Humbert
engaged in the smuggling trade, thereby creating no small amount of tension within the
Saint John Methodist community between the missionary and the deacon.' Thus on both
sides of the Bay of Fundy Marsden ran into problems with smugglers, a uniquely
interesting phenomenon given the fact that Methodists were a Christian sect with specific
injunctions against smuggling. Methodism's founder, John Wesley, deemed smuggling
as bad as highway robbery, and discouraged his congregations in Comwall and Dover
from engaging in the practice.6

Methodists are an interesting group because their values were particularly well
adapted to the social transformations that were creating a new liberal order in western
society. Methodist emphasis on self-discipline and sobriety fit well into the rise of an
industrial society. British Methodist missionaries in the West Indies played an important
role in the abolition of slavery, one of the great early liberal achievements that proved the
viability of social progress.7 Methodists also disapproved of smuggling, one of the great
scourges of mercantilist commercial policy, and smuggling rapidly died away as
principles of free trade came to increasingly dominate the British commercial
consciousness. Methodists thus placed themselves at the heart of the great controversies
and events of the early nineteenth century, not only in Canada, the United States, and
Britain, but throughout the Atlantic world. Their role has not been easy to track;
apparently Methodists neither supported nor undernlined the status quo, and even the
notable Marxist historian E.P. Thompson has accused the Methodists of robbing the
proletariat of their anger against those who would be their

master^.^

Methodists in British

North America, even in the relatively isolated colony of New Brunswick, shared the same
set of internal contradictions with their brethren elsewhere. Pious Methodists like
Stephen Humbert engaged in the forbidden but common practice of smuggling, yet at the
same time many Methodists were fierce defenders of the status quo, of which many could
claim membership. Humbert's sins and crimes intertwined inextricably with his
achievements and merits. Among these was the fact that he had proven his loyalty to the
British crown during the American War of Independence, yet Humbert, a Loyalist rehgee
fiom New Jersey, traded both licitly and illicitly with the old American foe. How are we

to understand the seeming contradictions between his professed devotion to Methodism
and the British monarchy and his sinful and illegal activities as a smuggler?
Humbert's paradoxical behavior bears examination, for it touches on some of the
major themes in the early nineteenth century, especially the rise of free trade. The region
surrounding the Bay of Fundy was one of the great smuggling centers of the Atlantic
world in the first decades of the nineteenth century.9 An understanding of smuggling will
help us better understand Humbert's actions, and in turn may shed some light on the
conlmercial connections that linked Canada's Maritime Provinces to New England
despite the political boundary that technically separated the two regions into separate
political and economic spheres.

Understanding Smuggling
While lexicographer Samuel Johnson and other members of the privileged class
denounced smuggling, other contemporary accounts leaned in the opposite direction. h
addressing the new United States Congress in 1789 on the problem of smuggling, Fisher
Ames stated, "The habit of smuggling pervades our country. We were taught it when it
was considered rather as meritorious than ~riminal."'~Ames referred back to the time
before the American Revolution, when British imperial attempts to curb smuggling had
helped to spark the spirit of revolt. Ames addressed the fact that the Revolution was
partly initiated by angry crowds engaged in direct protest against anti-snluggling policies.
These actions resulted in the burning of the revenue cutter Gaspee and other
demonstrations of popular will.

But smuggling was far more than an ideological statement, or a struggle between
the haves and the have-nots. It was an activity participated in eagerly by all levels of
society. Future British Prime Minister Robert Walpole himself used an admiralty barge
to smuggle wine up the Thames, thereby avoiding heavy duties.12 The political elite of
both Nova Scotia and New Brunswick engaged in smuggling; accusations of smuggling
resulted in a duel in Halifax in 1819 between the son of the provincial attorney general
and a local merchant.13 Similarly, Maine's political and economic leaders actively
participated in smuggling.14 Smuggling in North America was in fact "big business," as
Francis Jemings has pointed out.'' Those charged with enforcing anti-smuggling laws
found it a daunting task not only because of violent resistance, but also because of apathy
or resistance from above.16
Sympathy for smugglers surfaces in surprising places. Adam Smith, the famed
political economist and a customs officer himself, wrote extensively about smugglers in
his Wealth of Nations, the book that forms the basis of western liberal economic thought.
He insisted that smugglers were essentially honest citizens but that unjust laws "made
that a crime which nature never intended to be so."" Smith's answer-free

trade-was

the force that ended smuggling as a significant social and economic phenomenon. Free
trade involved removing as many trade restrictions as possible, including the taxes and
trading restrictions smugglers found so onerous. It should therefore be little surprise to
learn that smugglers in both Britain and Passamaquoddy referred to themselves as ''free
traders," putting into practice the very concepts that Smith advocated, even if they were
illegal.

The debate on illicit trade was not restricted to these few examples. Smuggling
afflicted societies worldwide, but everywhere it had a persistent unique quality-smuggling always involved crossing a border. The Bay of Fundy was one such border
region that became notorious for smuggling after the creation of an international
boundary on the region's southern edge in 1783. In the decades that followed, smuggling
continued despite efforts to curb it by governmental forces on both sides of the border.

International Examples of Smuggling
An understanding of illicit trade on a global scale places smuggling in the Bay of
Fundy well within the nonnal commercial impulse of the Atlantic world. Virtually all
societies engaged in evading commercial regulations, including groups as diverse as First
Nations women carrying furs into New York from New ~rance,"Acadians trading furs
, ' ~Philadelphians smuggling French rn0lasses,2~British
with Massachusetts ~ a ~colonial
merchants introducing textiles illicitly into New ~ranada?'Yankee smugglers trading
,~~
merchants landing tobacco at night on the Irish
with South ~ m e r i c aAmerican
Loyalists from New Brunswick and Nova Scotia bringing gypsum to eastern Maine, 24
and even the introduction of contraband slaves into the United States via ~ l o r i d aThe
.~~
scale was enonnous. While economic historians John J. McCusker and Russell R.
Menard have attempted to downplay smuggling as "a tiny fraction of all goods handled,"
other historians have vehemently asserted that smuggling was not only an enormous part
of colonial trade, but also intrinsic and necessary for colonial economies.26

Smuggling existed throughout the Atlantic basin, at many levels and in different
societies. For the struggling poor the problem was to wrest a living, while for political
leaders the problem was how to better control national wealth to strengthen the state. At
first glance one might place smuggling within the tradition of proletarian struggle against
the standing order as outlined by neo-Marxists such as E.P. Thompson, and more recently
Peter Linebaugh and Marcus ~ e d i k e r . ~But
' while smugglers engaged in all the tumults,
riots, and traditional forms of comn~unityprotest that excite neo-Marxist scholars and
others, these "fair traders" also seem to have collaborated with the rising middle class and
actively -even enthusiastically- engaged in the new market economy. Out of this
confusion one may surmise that smuggling played a significant role in the transition to a
capitalistlmarket economy.
This struggle between smugglers and governments played out all over the globe.
Smuggling had the potential to seriously undermine the authority of the state. The
wildest example of this is in Qing Period China between 1521 and 1566, when smugglers
defied the emperor's authority in fleets that sometimes numbered in the hundreds.28
Consider also the famously violent French smuggler Louis Mandrin (1725-1775), who in
the mid-eighteenth century gathered a small army that smuggled goods and persecuted
customs officials until the French military finally intervened and captured him.29 Even
the indomitable British Admiral Horatio Nelson found himself unable to stop smuggling
in Antigua in the late 1780s, one of the few defeats in his naval career.30 These struggles
were not necessarily class struggles, but they were clearly a struggle between the state and
its inhabitants. Some of the fiercest struggles occurred in the first state to enter the
market and industrial revolutions: Great Britain.

Britain, the foremost commercial nation of the eighteenth- and early nineteenth
centuries, and the first to enter the industrial revolution, suffered an astonishing degree of
smuggling that threatened both the government's revenues and its authority. British
smugglers fiequently operated in large, well-armed gangs that openly defied customs
officers and even military units. Smugglers broke into customhouses, murdered
informants, intimidated the legal system, bribed officials, and even rescued compatriots
fiom London's Newgate prison. This struggle between smugglers and the government
occurred not only in isolated coves in Comwall and Sussex, but even on the docks of
London, where a small army of bureaucrats and enforcement officers attempted to
regulate and tax goods imported fiom Britain's growing empire.
Illicit trade and smuggling-inspired violence required that the Crown mount a
sustained and expensive effort to suppress it, often when the government was fighting
wars overseas that required the very revenue that smuggling denied. In 1767, the British
Crown employed 2,687 men to stop smuggling; in 1783 it employed 4,235, and boats in
proportion; yet Parliament reckoned that smugglers introduced twenty million pounds of
tea and thirteen million gallons of brandy into Britain between 1780 and 1783.31
Parliament reported that smuggling gangs of up to seven hundred roamed the English
~ountryside.~~
By 1784 there were nine cavalry regiments and fifty-six revenue cutters in
England and Scotland dedicated to suppressing smuggling, at a cost of well over a quarter
million pounds.33 They fided. Parliament responded with several investigations headed by
Lord Sheffield and ever harsher laws. By 1819 the cost of the preventative service

amounted to £546,402. The cost in lives escalated as well; throughout the 1820s gun
battles erupted on England's southern coast. Both smugglers and preventative officers
died; the authorities hanged several prominent smugglers, and transported hundreds more
to distant colonies.34
Smuggling was not successfblly curbed in England until the 1840s when an
enornlous army of coast guards, combined with lower tariffs, made smuggling difficult
and unprofitable. In some ways the destruction of the smuggling trade was a triumph for
those espousing Adam Smith's liberal economics, such as Sir Robert Peel, prime minister
in the early 1840s. Peel found that by lowering tariffs and throwing open British ports to
the world's shipping, many of the financial incentives to smuggle goods disappeared.35
Yet at the same time the state had to create a massive enforcement machinery to ensure
that trade was carried out legally, so that it could be taxed and regulated. Illicit trade
became increasingly furtive, involving concealment and bribery in the ports rather than
large gangs on the beaches.36 In addition the type of smuggled commodities changed:
smuggling increasingly became a matter of moving small, high-priced items rather than
shiploads of bulky wool or barrels of claret. By 1857 British smuggling was a mere
shadow of what it had been due to both increased state control and the effects of fiee
trade.37
What drove British smuggling? British neo-Marxists such as Cal Winslow
perceive smuggling in the same light as poaching and wrecking, a 'right' conmon people
possessed according to custom and traditi~n.~'
Ending sn~uggling,therefore, required a
change in societal views as well, and the industrial revolution, as Hobsbawm observed,
was "not merely an acceleration of economic growth, but an acceleration of growth

because of, and through, economic and social tran~formation."~~
The industrial
revolution harkened in a new age that demanded rationalization, professionalization, and
respect for the law. Not surprisingly Methodists, a sect particularly attuned to this new
age with its emphasis on improvement, self-control, sobriety and abolition of slavery,
were early opponents of smuggling as well.40
The industrial revolution thus played an important part in ending the social
economy of smuggling. The smuggler did not fit well into the scheme of modem
commerce, which tended to confine international trade to fewer ports with larger and
more modem facilities. But these causes were probably secondary to the rise of free
trade; Britain entered into a period of unfettered trade that made most smuggling
unne~essary.~'
The transition from mercantilism to economic liberalism put many
smugglers out of work and made them conform to new economic realities. Those who
remained in the trade practiced it through bribery, subtlety, and concealing cargoes within
vessels. This practice, true to the age, was dubbed "scientific smuggling.'42

Smuggling and the American Revolution
The American Revolution had a profound effect on North American history. Not
only did it create the United States, but it also ultimately contributed to the development
of Canada as a part of North America that consciously rejected revolution and American
ideology. For many American historians, smuggling played a role in developing both an
American identity and an American ideology. Generally these studies cast American
patriots as smugglers, even revolutionary leaders such as John

anc cock.^^

Serious colonial problems with royal customs began in 1762, when Parliament
passed an act calling for renewed vigilance on the part of customs oficers stationed in
North America. Since American colonies had long ignored crown trade regulations,
colonists saw the sudden vigilance of royal customhouse officers as a dangerous
precedent.44 In contrast, the British government saw smuggling as "a Practice carried on
in contravention of many express and repeated Laws, tending not only to the Dimunition
and Impoverishment of the Publick Revenue, at a Time when this Nation is labouring
under a heavy Debt incurred by the last war for the Protection of America; but also to
expose every fair Trader to. . .even Danger of Ruin by his not being able to carry his
Commodities to market on an equal footing with those who fraudulently evade the
Payment of the just dues and ~ustoms.'"~To counter the threat of smuggling, the British
government appointed a host of new customs officers, used the Royal Navy to enforce the
Navigation Acts, and even tampered with the colonial vice-admiralty courts that had
previously been very lenient with colonial smugglers. This latter action, especially the
removal of vice-admiralty jurisdiction to Halifax, Nova Scotia, alarmed many colonial
smugglers, who rightly perceived that renewed imperial vigilance would cut into their
profits. Some colonists saw these actions as dangerous innovations that threatened their
liberty; others were less concerned.
The northern commercial colonies were the most outspoken in their opposition to
new custonlhouse regulations, especially Massachusetts Bay. The means used by
Massachusetts varied from legal action to violence. Lawyers such as the young John
Adams and James Otis successfully frustrated crown officials in court. The irritation of
crown officials with Otis became so intense that a customhouse officer beat him over the

head with a cane, permanently debilitating him.46 When legal methods ultimately failed
against the determined royal government, the colonials adopted extra-legal methods.
Mobs throughout New England met the use of lightly armed revenue cutters with force.
Naval vessels met with yet more resistance, including the destruction of HMS Gaspee in
Rhode ~sland.~'
Mobs in Massachusetts were equally adamant in obstructing royal
customs officials. The most famous incident involved John Hancock's sloop Liberty in
1768, which directly resulted in the garrisoning of Boston with regiments of regulars.
Bostonians harassed the troops constantly, resulting in the Boston massacre of 1770.
~~
Notably, the crowd had been provoking the guard posted at the c u s t o m h ~ u s e .One
rumor circulating in Boston even asserted that customs officials fired muskets out of the
second story windows of the customhouse into the crowd.49
Maine, the third admiralty district of colonial Massachusetts, went through a very
similar process of resistance to crown authority. The only customs officials in Maine
were those in the port of Falmouth (later Portland). From there they sometimes ranged up
the coast to suppress smuggling and enforce the Navigation Acts. Events paralleled those
in Boston. Local courts supported ~ v o l o u lawsuits
s
against customs officials, but
refused legal proceedings initiated by crown collectors. In 1766, the people of Falmouth
protested the Stamp Act by mobbing the customhouse, demanding the parcel of stamp
paper, and burning it in the street. Later that year a mob in Falmouth rescued a cargo of
smuggled West India goods seized by customs officials. The unpopularity of the crown
officials in Falmouth continued to grow as their powers became more arbitrary. In one
instance a crowd armed with pistols forced a customhouse officer to name an i n f o r ~ n e r . ~ ~

The most despised of Falmouth's crown officials was Comptroller of Customs
John Malcom. This man had already become notorious in Rhode Island and North
Carolina for his obnoxious political views and enforcement of unpopular commercial
laws. Malcom proved to be just as unpopular in his native Maine as he was in other
colonies. In 1773 local merchants and magistrates incited a crowd of sailors to rough-up
Malcom after he seized a vessel in Wiscasset, Maine. The mob broke Malcom's sword (a
token of crown authority), and tarred, feathered, and paraded him around the settlen~ent.~'
Malcom fled to Boston, where he suffered fiu-ther abuse at the hands of another
The lesson was not lost on his fellow customs officers. In the spring of 1775, most of
Falrnouth's customs officials fled to the safety of HMS Canceau, including men like
Thomas Wyer, who spent much of the war at a British outpost on Penobscot Bay in
eastern Maine, and later became a merchant and local official at St. Andrews, New
Brunswick, on Passamaquoddy ~

a
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~

~

Boston saw the most smuggling-related violence, however. The Boston crowds
identified Crown customhouse officers with royal government because they were the
most obvious manifestation of British authority until the British army garrisoned the
town. Some scholars have attempted to link revolutionary fervor with smuggling, but this
does not seem to be a compelling argument. Yet it may be possible to link customhouse
patronage with loyalism. Virtually all of Boston's customhouse officers joined the
Loyalist cause in 1775 and 1776. When the British were forced to evacuate Boston in
March 1776, a young Loyalist customs officer named Edward Winslow removed the
royal coat of arms that hung over the entrance to Boston's customhouse. Winslow did
not want the royal arms defaced by the American forces, and hoped to return them to their

rightful place someday. That dream proved unrealistic, but Winslow held onto the coat of
arms and eventually hung them in the council chamber of New Brunswick, a Loyalist
province created by the British for refugees like himself after the war. Winslow always
hoped for a customhouse position himself, but like his dream of a Boston under royal
rule, it too never came to be.54
Could Loyalists be smugglers as well? The issue has not been addressed by
American scholars who assumed that only patriots smuggled. But Falmouth and Boston
Loyalists retained their old business contacts and continued to trade with their American
counterparts during the war from places like Penobscot and ~ a s s a m a ~ u o d d After
~ . ' ~ the
war, too, Loyalists in New Brunswick and Nova Scotia continued to conduct illicit trade
with Americans, even providing some American merchants with false shipping papers
that allowed them access to forbidden British

market^.'^

Unpopular customs officers in

the Maritimes were often harassed in a manner similar to Falmouth's and Boston's before
the war. Sometimes these attacks seemed to have ideological overtones, as when some
"ill minded and disloyal person or persons" stole the royal coat of arnx hanging over the
door of the customhouse at Saint John, New Brunswick, in July 1814.''
These attacks appear less ideological than immediate responses to unpopular
taxation and the often heavy-handed methods of British crown customs officers. In
addition, many Loyalists shared the same commercial values as the republican
Americans, and smuggling was simply a profitable means of conducting business.
Lorenzo Sabine, who had been an American customs officer at Passamaquoddy and
author of a two-volun~ebiographical dictionary of Loyalists, noted the Loyalist propensity
for smuggling and its seeming contradictions with their political principles:

The Loyalists who, at the peace, removed to the present British
colonies, and their children after them, smuggled almost every
article of foreign origin from the frontier ports of the United States,
for more than half a century, and until England relaxed her odious
commercial policy. The merchant in whose counting-house I
myself was bred, sold the "old Tories" and their descendants large
quantities of tea, wine, spices, silks, crapes, and other articles, as
part of his regular business. I have not room to relate the plans
devised by sellers and buyers to elude the officers of the Crown, or
the perils incurred by the latter, at times, while crossing the Bay of
Fundy on their passage homeward. But I cannot forbear to remark,
that, as the finding of a single box of contraband tea caused the
confiscation of vessel and cargo, the smugglers kept vigilant watch
with glasses, and committed the fatal herb to the sea, the instant a
revenue cutter or ship of war hove in sight in a quarter to render
capture probable. When a spectator of the scene, as I often was,
how could I but say to myself,-- "The destruction of tea in Boston,
December, 1773, in principle, how like!'"8
Loyalists were not blind followers of a royalist ideology. Canadian scholar Esther Clark
Wright found "that the Loyalists were rather ordinary people subjected to an
extraordinary e~~erience."'~
In many cases they faced the same rough frontier experience
as their republican counterparts, especially in New Brunswick, where there was little
British settlement before 1783.~' One Loyalist response to New Brunswick's primitive
conditions and uncertain economic conditions after the American Revolution was
smuggling, a practical commercial stratagem adopted by many of their predecessors in the
Bay of Fundy region.

Smuggling in the Bay of Fundy
The Bay of Fundy, as a part of the greater Atlantic economy, conformed to certain
patterns. Smuggling was no exception. Throughout the seventeenth century, trade existed
between the various groups surrounding the Bay of Fundy, including Native

While governments may have deemed much of this trade smuggling, that term seems
much too specific for a region so hotly contested, with many overlapping claims of
sovereignty. Nor were commercial regulations well developed; trade restrictions, such as
limiting the range of trade goods Indians received for furs, especially rum, seem to have
been honored more in the breech than in practice.62 Furthemlore, there were no real
customs agents in the area; seizure of contraband was a military function, and probably
cases never went to a civilian court. Archaeologists studying the remains of seventeenthcentury trading posts concluded that commerce with one's potential or actual enemies
was "a way of life on a frontier where opportunity took precedence over political
allegiance."63 Pragmatic aptly term describes the activities of the region's inhabitants,
who suffered a high degree of tunnoil and uncertainty in their lives.64
During the eighteenth century, as the British exerted control over the area,
smuggling developed as a means of ameliorating the harsh circumstances of life on a
frontier. The Acadian people of what is now Nova Scotia technically fell under British
control after the Treaty of Utrecht in 1713, yet they traded with whom they pleased.65
French influence in the Bay of Fundy endured until British forces captured Fort
Beauskjour in 1755, and New England merchants continued to trade with their French
colonial neighbors despite the law. Some of these smuggling vessels were heavily amled.
The Boston smuggling sloop Nancy and Sally carried five swivel guns and a variety of
muskets and musketoons on board.66 When a British naval vessel attempted to board the
Nancy and Sally, the smugglers resisted with force, and killed two Royal Navy sailors. A
court convicted three of the smugglers of manslaughter, branded them on their left hands

with the letter "M," and imprisoned them for three months. Upon their release, the Royal
Navy promptly impressed them.67
The New England settlers who came to the region in the mid-eighteenth century,
known as Planters in Nova Scotia, also smuggled in much the same way that their
Massachusetts Bay relatives did. But the scale was unremarkable, involving basic trade
goods such as rum, wool cards, or a few gallons of molasses. The settlements
surrounding the Bay of Fundy were too small to support a significant trade licit or
otherwise.68 Furthermore, between 1713 and 1775 the region was unified under British
rule. British regional domination meant that the two local colonial entities,
Massachusetts Bay and Nova Scotia, operated under similar regulations and markets.
Nonetheless, British warships such as HMS Jamaica occasionally patrolled the Bay of
Fundy in the 1760s to suppress smuggling.69
The American Revolution changed this situation because it created new
opportunities for those willing to risk crossing the border. When the United States broke
with Britain, new smuggling opportunities arose as governments attempted to regulate
and tax trade. American timber merchants were especially eager to sell masts to the
Royal Navy in Halifax, and gladly received contraband British goods that fetched high
prices in ~ o s t o n . ~The
' Loyalists at the British post at Penobscot actively participated in
this contraband trade, as did various people at Passamaquoddy. The local American
commander described Passamaquoddy as a hotbed of smuggling, and frequently reported
his frustration at not being able to stop illicit trade.71 Soon after the end of the war in
1783, and largely due to the arrival of Loyalists, Britain created the new colony of New
Brunswick on the northern shore of the Bay of Fundy. One of the first problems its

administrators faced was controlling smuggling, especially at Passamaquoddy, which was
divided at the Treaty of Paris in 1783 by the newly created border between the United
States and the remaining British North American colonies. The problem was exacerbated
by the Loyalists from Penobscot, who at the end of the war removed to St. Andrews on
the northeastern shore of Passamaquoddy Bay. Merchants from St. Andrews quietly
continued their illegal trade with American merchants after the war.72 Other regions in
the Maritimes suffered from an influx of contraband American goods as well, to the point
where one Nova Scotia merchant complained in 1787, "that you can scarce enter a House,
but you see an American package."73
Smuggling became a more important phenomenon in the region with the approach
of the War of 1812, when its scope and scale became truly remarkable. Smugglers
illicitly brought thousands of cattle to Nova Scotia, funneled millions of barrels of flour
through the Maritimes, and secreted thousands of tons of gypsum across the border from
New Brunswick into Maine. From 1806 to 1826 a roaring smuggling trade evolved,
largely as a result of a struggle between American demands for free trade and British
mercantilist policies that slowly eroded in the early nineteenth century. This constantly
fluctuating comnlercial war had consequences for the entire Atlantic community,
reaching from the Caribbean sugar colonies to the Newfoundland fishing industry. On an
official level, this struggle evolved as a series of trade negotiations and treaties between
Britain and the United States. But at the local level it often created greater incentives to
smuggle because protective tariffs created greater incentives to engage in illicit crossborder trade. During this time smuggling in the Bay of Fundy closely followed the

English model of escalating violence and resistance, first on the American side through
the War of 1812, and then in the Maritimes after the war.
Smuggling clearly represented a struggle over trade regulations, but what can it
tell us about attitudes toward national boundaries? The immediate answer is that the
borders imposed by the Treaty of Paris in 1783 were contested by the people who lived
on either side of them. Benedict Anderson's contention that nations were an "imagined
community" seems particularly apt here, because that imagination had limits.74 The
residents of Passamaquoddy refused to believe that their neighbors across the border were
somehow different from themselves. The American citizens of Passamaquoddy must
have had great difficulty in imagining that somehow the plantation owners of the South
were somehow closer to themselves than the fishermen of Campobello or Grand Manan
on the British North American side of the border. The first component of understanding
borderlands, however refers not to a place, or a process, but to an attitude that rejected the
arbitrary authority of the state. The most obvious manifestation of this disregard for
governmental interference in the economy was smuggling. The more government forces
attempted to halt unregulated trade, the more apparent it became to locals that the state
was an unwelcon~eand alien force.

A measure of the importance government attached to the smuggling trade was the
scale of the effort to halt it. The level of enforcement in the region, especially at Eastport,
Maine, increased dramatically on the American side of the border. In 1807, the federal
presence in Eastport consisted of an unarmed customs collector and perhaps half a dozen
part-time assistants. By 1812, the federal government bolstered that presence with a new
and more effective collector, a permanent U.S. deputy marshal, a small fortification

garrisoned by a half company of artillerists, and a revenue cutter. During the war
additional troops, up to five hundred, patrolled the area to suppress smuggling. In fact the
only shots discharged in anger by the cannon of Fort Sullivan at Eastport were at
smugglers: the British captured the post in 1814 without a shot being fired on either
side.75 However the American forces at Passamaquoddy completely failed, in no small
part because the local judicial system often favored the smugglers, as did minor customs
officials and militia.76

On the New Brunswick side of Passamaquoddy, too, officialdom mustered its
strength to combat smuggling. The region's Superintendent of Trade and Fisheries
operated a cutter that occasionally captured smugglers.77But the custon~sofficers in both
New Brunswick and Nova Scotia were pitihlly weak, and often

The Royal

Navy sometimes interfered with smuggling, but the best tool it had to stop smuggling impressment- was no longer in use after 1815. Nor was the authority of the Royal Navy
necessarily respected; smugglers on more than one occasion rescued vessels seized by
naval units.79 The British imperial government as a whole did not seem to be interested
in promoting colonial commerce over that of the United States, and the colonial
governments were not capable of halting illegal commerce even when they acted in
concert.

An example of this is the effort by Nova Scotia and New Brunswick officials to
control the carrying trade in gypsum after the War of 1812. Gypsum, mined at the head
of the Bay of Fundy, was highly desired by American farmers as a fertilizer in the MidAtlantic and Upper south.''

Until the 1820s Nova Scotia was the foremost producer of

gypsum in North America. Producers generally shipped it to Passamaquoddy, where

American merchants bought it in lots of twenty to sixty tons. The plan failed in part
because of American diplomatic pressure, but also because smugglers at Passamaquoddy
persisted in selling gypsum to the Ameri~ans.~'
Despite the intentions of the provincial
governments, the small fanners and coastal mariners who carried gypsum to the
American lines clung to their illicit trade and rejected the centralization of commercial
authority.82 The manner in which the gypsum smugglers rejected government regulations
was not subtle: it involved kidnapping government officers, shooting at customs officials,
and arnling vessels with cannon and muskets. In 1820 a "plaster war" broke out between
New Brunswick officials and plaster smugglers. At its height, plaster smugglers lashed
together rafts of up to ten schooners and brigs for self-defense and sailed down
Passamaquoddy Bay in open defiance of the provincial official appointed to regulate the
plaster trade. That official was Stephen Humbert, a Methodist deacon and sometime
smuggler. He proved powerless to resist such determined opposition, and could only
watch as the plaster vessels made their escape.83
Like the British model, smuggling in the Bay of Fundy eventually lessened
through a combination of state intervention and economic liberalization. Illicit trade at
Passamaquoddy diminished because it became less profitable and more risky, but it is less
clear that any social transformation occurred in either northern New England or the
Maritime provinces that made smuggling unacceptable. Small-scale smuggling persisted,
but the new economic liberalism with its emphasis on fiee trade meant that the days of
large-scale illicit trade ended in this region by the middle of the nineteenth century.
Reciprocity, a trade policy whereby British colonies in North America could trade with
the United States on virtually the same footing as American shippers, proved especially

effective in removing the incentives to smuggle. The continued development of the
American customs system, and its counterparts in New Brunswick and Nova Scotia,
further discouraged contraband trade at Passamaquoddy.
Despite regulations, ideology and a variety of other forces, much of the populace
at Passamaquoddy refused to accept the idea that the border created in 1783 meant that
people on the other side of it were "foreigners." The state created mechanisms that
attempted to separate American citizens from British subjects, but despite the law
Maritimers and New Englanders mixed and seemed to feel it was their right to trade,
especially at Passamaquoddy. Because the state imposed the border in the very area
where governmental authority was weakest, locals could and often did choose to ignore
that borderqS4Border populations could ignore the authority of distant governments with
some impunity; they could also offer criminals safe haven. Passamaquoddy's isolation,
low population density, cross-border marriages and connections fostered by locals, and
common frontier experiences resulted in a common rejection of commercial regulations
as bothersome and unnecessary restrictions: smuggling was thus tolerated, and even
received approval in border communities. Border residents even extended this
acceptance of illicit trade to "adventurers," smugglers from as far afield as New York
City, Liverpool, England, or even Sweden and the Caribbean, who in turn reinforced
resistance to governmental control.

The Smugglers
Passamaquoddy's smugglers were not usually cutthroats or pirates; generally they
were ordinary merchants, farmers, and sailors seeking to augment their incomes or

support their families.85 As Adam Smith noted in his Wealth of Nations, it was not the
actions of smugglers that made them lawbreakers, but rather the oppressive laws they
evaded that made their acts ~riminal.'~Legal records often named merchants as
smugglers. Some engaged in the practice habitually, while others indulged only
occasionally. International accounts agree that smugglers were highly individualistic. In
China, the term for smuggler, literally translated, means "operating for one's private
benefit.""

In Europe, smugglers were part of a bandit tradition that pitted the poor

against the powerful, but again, this was an individual rebellion, not part of a mass
revolt."

In England, too, smugglers pursued a doctrine of individualism when they

claimed freedom from unpopular laws.89 While smugglers were seen as highly
individualistic, popular belief often championed them as defenders of traditional
community rights.90 For this reason, public opinion often refused to associate smuggling
with crime; after all, smugglers provided valuable services to the community.9' In the
Maritime Provinces, like China, England, and the United States, smuggling had
widespread support.92
There were many reasons to smuggle: sometimes it was a carefully calculated
practice, other times it happened when an unusual opportunity arose, and sometimes it
happened by mistake, either feigned or actual. Several factors promoted smuggling.
Political control of mercantilist economies actively attempted to deny certain goods to
other states, and smugglers often stepped in to provide contraband goods despite
commercial laws. In effect, the political economies artificially inflated prices by
regulating or taxing foreign goods; this meant that smugglers could and did often offer
goods at prices below those set by law-abiding merchants. Furthermore, banking and

financial systems were too crude to accommodate all merchants in the Atlantic world,
especially given the perpetual shortage of specie; often merchants and mariners had to
receive foreign goods in exchange for their own rather than cash. Mercantile culture, too,
encouraged participants to "buy cheap and sell dear," a maxim that encouraged all
manner of illicit activity, such as diluting barrels of rum.93 Few assumptions may be
made about the general honesty of those engaged in conunerce; sharp bargaining became
increasingly common with the erosion of pre-market values.94 Smuggling was simply a
part of this mix for many merchants throughout the Atlantic world, especially in regions
like Passamaquoddy, where the indeterminate border offered unusually good
opportunities to engage in illicit trade.
Passamaquoddy's reputation as a smuggler's haven drew merchants such as John
Clap of New York to the region. He attempted to smuggle a cargo of provisions into
New Brunswick "in eight different boats, vessels, & rafts," but American officials seized
his goods and successfully prosecuted him.95 Another example is Nathan Appleton, who
during the War of 1812 smuggled British manufactured goods into the United States via
St. Andrews, New Brunswick. He in turn channeled his profits into a manufacturing
venture sponsored by Francis Cabot Lowell of the famous "Boston Associates" who
constructed the first large textile mills in the United

The lure of profit drew

adventurers to Passamaquoddy.
It is less easy to divine the reasons why common fishermen, farmers, and
timbernlen smuggled. Many undoubtedly engaged in it for profit like the adventurers;
others wanted to support their families, or found themselves trapped in unusual
circumstances. Fishermen regularly engaged in smuggling on a small scale, trading

American provisions and products like shoes to their Maritime counterparts in return for
fish. This saved the American fishermen a great deal of labor, provided New Brunswick
and Nova Scotia families with food and other goods at reduced prices, and had the added
bonus that the practice was virtually impossible to detect.97American fanners frequently
drove their cattle to the border to sell in British North America, even when their own
government forbade it. American farmers regarded this practice as their right, even during
time of war with Britain, when their cattle provided provisions for the British military.
When government officials attempted to interfere, farmers fought back.98American
timbermen, too, engaged in smuggling when their New Brunswick employers chose to
pay them in goods rather than specie. When they attempted to re-cross the border into the
United States, American customs authorities sometimes seized their hard-earned British
goods as ~ o n t r a b a n d . ~ ~

In New Brunswick and Nova Scotia smugglers also came from all walks of life.
Poor mariners and wealthy merchants alike engaged in illegal commerce. Moreover,
British adventurers from afar canle to the region to smuggle. One such adventurer was
John Young, a Scottish merchant who ventured to Castine, Maine, to partake of the
profitable trade with the enemy under the aegis of British troops it's occupation from
1814-1815. Apparently he was not a man for half measures. Not only did he buy
smuggled goods from willing Americans, but he in turn avoided the five percent duty
imposed by British customs officials there. Young packed contraband tobacco, soap,
candles, and other American goods in barrels of codfish. His justification was of ancient
vintage: "We are you know creatures of imitative habits & as all around me are
smuggling I am beginning to smuggle too."'00 Like their American counterparts, some

Maritimes smugglers used their ill-gotten gains to h n d more noble ventures. Christopher
Scott, founder of the Bank of New Brunswick, made his fortune as a smuggler "on the
lines," as many referred to the border.lO' Samuel Cunard, as a young captain of his
father's coasting schooner, engaged in the Passamaquoddy smuggling trade, thereby
launching the career of the man who founded the most famous shipping line in history.'02
Ordinary Maritimers smuggled, too. Like their American counterparts, they
participated in a pre-commercial economy that emphasized community bonds. They
sought to wrest a living by farming, lumbering, or fishing, and feared taxes that had to be
paid in cash.lo3 Seeking out lower prices, high-quality goods, and easy profits at the
expense of the govemment was a rational survival strategy that often gained the
acceptance or at least acquiescence of entire communities. Smuggling at Passamaquoddy
quickly became something of a local tradition: one New Brunswick local who lived close
to the border recalled smuggling as one of the region's most important trades, "which
some are in the habit of styling Contraband-but

whlch we call free trade. Our

geographical position exposes us to great temptations in this respect.--,, 104
With the exception of John Wesley and the Methodists, and a handful of honest
govemment officials, it is difficult to find a group that found smuggling immoral.
Common people traded illegally to survive, and local traditions often condoned the
practice.10s Capitalists smuggled for profit, but even the smuggling adventurers often had
a very strong strain of Christian morality; often the most religious merchants were the
most successfd busine~smen.'~~
Four out of the five Tappan brothers are a dramatic example of this phenomenon.
During the War of 1812 they continued their silk importation business by smuggling

through Canada. Arthur Tappan, later a renowned Abolitionist famous for his role in the
Amistad trial, conducted business out of Montreal for part of the war; he later introduced

contraband cargoes through Castine, Maine."'

His older brother John, who taught Arthur

the mercantile trade, smuggled goods through Halifax and the Bay of Fundy. lo8 Younger
brother Lewis also seems to have introduced goods illegally into the United States fiom
British North America. In 1813, he and his partner George Searle petitioned Congress for
relief fiom the penalties incurred whde importing goods into the United States through
Passamaquoddy. Lewis went on to create the nation's first credit information agency, and
was equally zealous as Arthur in promoting Abolitionism and other moral ref~rms."~
The fourth brother, Charles, was involved in collusive capture schemes during the War of
1812, and admitted as much as an elderly man."' The Tappans became very successful
businessmen, but early in their careers they smuggled.ll1 Yet at the same time they were
strictly moral Christians who even forbade their clerks to attend performances at theaters.
Clearly the public did not perceive smuggling as a morality issue. Even Adam Smith
thought smugglers were essentially honest people forced into a life of crime by the state's
commercial laws.' l 2 People who criticized smuggling tended to be those who favored
government, and thus it was the state and its supporters who tended to brand smuggling
as an immoral, unpatriotic, or grossly criminal act while most of the public ignored,
acquiesced, or participated in illicit trade.

Conclusion
Smuggling in the Bay of Fundy was a complex phenomenon. It insinuated itself
into many aspects of the region's history. But did smuggling bind the region together,

creating a "special relationship" between New England and the Maritimes? While there
is ample evidence that there were cultural sympathies between New England and the
Maritimes, it is also apparent that smuggling was business, conducted in line with Adam
Smith's dictum that a merchant "is not necessarily the citizen of any particular
country."113 More compelling is the idea that smuggling was a regional and traditional
response to the centralization of commercial wealth and power."4 Certainly there is an
element of that in the case of Passamaquoddy. But the presence of so many adventurers
from distant ports indicates that smuggling was not merely a local phenomenon, but part
of a larger process that encompassed the entire Atlantic basin: the transition to a market
economy. Some of the great smuggling merchants invested their profits in the new
commercial economy then developing. More clear is the idea that smuggling represented
a challenge to government on both sides of the border. It led to disorder, loss of revenue,
and higher taxes. Smugglers and government were locked in combat, and sometimes the
smugglers won, as in the case of the Plaster War. Nor was this struggle confined to the
Bay of Fundy: smuggling was part of a worldwide struggle that struck at state authority
and required massive law enforcement efforts and social transformation to defeat. 115 ~n
the Bay of Fundy, where jurisdictions were unclear or underdeveloped and governmental
authority weak near the international border, smuggling thrived into the nineteenth
century.

In part smuggling thrived at Passamaquoddy and other coastal smuggling havens
because it was more convenient to conduct illicit trade there than to obey the burdensome
commercial laws imposed by the state. Another reason smuggling thrived at
Passamaquoddy was because the border between two great commercial powers ran

through it. Smuggling was closely related to the border, an invisible line between the
United States and British North America that profoundly shaped the daily lives of
Passamaquoddy residents.
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CHAPTER 2:
PASSAMAQUODDY AS BORDERLAND

Introduction
Lewis Frederick Delesdemier had delayed his report to Secretary of the Treasury
Alexander Hamilton as long as possible. Delesdernier, the United States Customs
Collector for the District of Passamaquoddy, belatedly started his report to Hamilton in
October, 1789. Hamilton demanded that the customs collectors write a detailed report
outlining the boundaries and economic activities of each customs district. Delesdernier
set out to complete this task, but Passamaquoddy was a remote and recently settled
coastal region on the border between Maine and New Brunswick, with a scattered
population and no roads. It proved difficult to write, in no small part because
Delesdernier's district was uniquely troubled by the conflicting claims of Britain and the
United States to sovereignty over the region's several islands. In point of fact,
Delesdemier kept the United States customhouse on Frederick Isle, a tiny island
repeatedly claimed by New Brunswick.
Another of Delesdernier's difficulties was determining exactly what
Passamaquoddy was; the word meant different things to different peoples. The word
itself is Native American, and translates roughly as "place where the Pollock are," or

"place where the Pollock leap entirely out of the water," a reference to the area's
bountifid fishing grounds.' Euro-Americans generally referred to the indigenous peoples
who hunted and fished local waters as the Passamaquoddy tribe. The United States
Congress picked up the term in 1789 when naming customs districts, thus making
Passamaquoddy a distinct administrative term. But the most common use of the word
Passamaquoddy was imprecise, denoting the lands surrounding the bay and its numerous
islands. The eastern shore of the bay was generally conceded to be British-held territory
after 1783, and the western side American; but both governments claimed jurisdiction
over the islands in the bay.2 The term Passamaquoddy had many meanings; it was a
fishing ground, a body of water, a nation, an administrative unit, and a border region.
Often locals shortened the tern1 to 'Quoddy.
Passamaquoddy's location on the border between the United States and the
British colony of New Brunswick complicated Delesdernier's duties in several ways.
The 1783 Treaty of Paris that established boundaries between the remaining British
possessions in North America and the newly created United States did so in only vague
terms, and the new nation and colonial power disagreed on the exact location of the
border line (see Map 2. I ) . ~Conflicting claims on both sides meant that local officials
could not agree where the border was, resulting in legal tangles when law officers
attempted to impose their authority. Delesdernier's experience of this confusion was
direct; in December, 1788, armed New Brunswick officials landed on the shore beneath
his own home and claimed jurisdiction over the island he lived on. Delesdernier
defended his house with an ax, thereby protecting hearth and home as well as the
sovereignty of the United ~ t a t e s . ~
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Figure 2.1 : Conflicting Boundary Claims at Passamaquoddy, c. 1818
Source: ~ a r r o lA; Good and Wise Measure, 45.

Delesdemier sought a solution to the problem of jurisdiction, and in his report to
Hamilton requested that he look into the matter. In the mid 1790s the American and
British governments created a commission to establish a stable border.' But the presence
of a border or line that allegedly separated American citizen from British subject did not
mean that people respected the various laws designed to keep the jurisdictions distinct.
Delesdemier was deeply troubled by the behavior of the people who lived near the
border. As a customs officer, he was essentially a tax collector, levying tariffs on
imported goods, regulating shipping, and prosecuting those he caught attempting to evade
federal commercial laws. Because Delesdemier could not discem the limits of his
authority until a definite border was established, his efforts to impose federal laws were
of little avail, especially in attempting to halt illegal commerce. The most troublesome
spot for Delesdemier was Moose Island. He described the inhabitants of this island as
"acting in a kind of neutrality (if the expression may be admitted)." Delesdemier's
apology for the term neutrality is in itself revealing. The collector seemed to feel that this
behavior was unusual - even embarrassing- to report to the federal government in distant
New York
Delesdemier was not the only government official who was troubled by the
seeming lawlessness of the Passamaquoddy region. George Leonard, Superintendent of
Trade and Fisheries in New Brunswick and Nova Scotia, laid an especially harsh
judgment on the people of Passamaquoddy. Leonard stated that on top of the smuggling
activity at Passamaquoddy, "These Islands are the asylum of deserters from the British
Navy and Army, criminals and absconding debtors from Nova Scotia and New
Brunswick."' Notably, Leonard was a Crown officer whose position largely entailed

pursuing smugglers; he was also among the most zealous of New Brunswick's Loyalist
elite, and thus was predisposed to criticize the inhabitants of a region that had been
especially vexatious to him.8 He was not alone; an American observer suggested in 1802
that the islands of Passamaquoddy were so troublesome and crime-ridden that they were
best given to the ~ r i t i s h .As
~ early as 1791, a Scottish traveler stated Moose Island was
"inhabited by Yanky smugglers, that carry on a contraband traffic with the colonies on
each side."" Even President Thomas Jefferson referred to the region's inhabitants as the
External observers, especially agents of state authority,
"rascals of ~assama~uodd~.""
agreed that crime was endemic at 'Quoddy, and that smuggling was the most common of
these crimes.
Border-related crime, and above all smuggling, united Passamaquoddy's
population despite the ideological differences that separated Maine's republican settlers
from New Brunswick's Loyalist refugees. Even during the War of 1812, when Britain
and the United States were at war, British subjects and American citizens mingled on the
islands of Passamaquoddy Bay to conduct a lively illicit trade. The international
boundary that ran through Passan~aquoddywas much more than a dividing line; it was an
interface between two political entities where people mixed and traded, resulting in a
curious overlapping zone where state authority held little power. The border was the
central fact of life for Passamaquoddy's residents, who manipulated it to their own ends
in a way the state often deemed illegal. Understanding the dynamic between crime and
the border requires a grasp of the region's geography, knowledge of the peoples who

settled Passamaquoddy, especially those arriving after the American War of
Independence, and an understanding of how the region's population coped with the
international boundary.

Geography of a Smuggler's Haven
Passanlaquoddy lent itself to smuggling. The border was not only vague, but the
region itself was remote from governmental authority; even the weather conspired against
the law. Until 1806, there was no road or even path connecting the American settlers to
the rest of Maine' s settlements. Beaches often served as footpaths, but the preferred
mode of transportation was by boat.12 On the New Brunswick side, too, no road
connected the Loyalist settlements to the rest of the colony until about 1808.13 Europeans
and Americans traveled to and from Passamaquoddy by sea for decades after its
settlement. The geography of Passamaquoddy favored smugglers in several ways. First,
the cultural geography imposed by Europeans took decades to sort out; the border
remained hard to place, and both the United States and Britain had conflicting claims of
sovereignty, especially over the region's many islands. The United States laid claim to
several islands based on the fact that there was no navigable water between them and the
United States mainland; in effect it claimed all the islands west and south of the main
shipping channel.14 The British, however, claimed all of the islands in Passamaquoddy
Bay. Smugglers utilized these conflicting claims to their own ends. The marine
geography of Passamaquoddy, especially as it related to navigation, was almost as
important for smugglers as it was to law officials.

Figure 2.2: Benjamin R. Jones's "A Map and Chart of the Bays, Harbours, Post
Roads and Settlements in Passamaquoddy & Machias with the Large Island of Grand
Manan," 18 19.

To understand that geography one must see the region through the eyes of a
mariner. Sailors approaching Passamaquoddy had several concerns. The average tidal
range at Quoddy is from eighteen to twenty feet; during the monthly spring tides the tidal
difference increased to twenty-seven feet." The tides did not merely rise and fall; the
greater the tides, the greater the currents associated with them. Twice every day a
staggering seventy billion cubic feet of water entered and exited Passamaquoddy Bay,
creating rapid currents, eddies, and even whirlpools. Furthermore, these waters were
cold. In warmer months, the combination of warm air and cold ocean waters resulted in
thick fogs that reduced visibility to a few feet; those fogs could last weeks. The
combination of currents and fog was particularly dangerous to sailing vessels. The perils
were many: currents might sweep even large ships onto ledges, or cliffs; currents could
spill passengers from smaller boats into chill waters; fogs hid reefs and other vessels; and
the combination of the two compounded these problems. To overcome these dengers the
New Brunswick provincial government authorized aids to navigation and licensed pilots,
while the American federal government constructed a lighthouse on West Quoddy Head
in 1808. These efforts helped, but ships continued to wreck. Even the aid of a pilot
might not help. For example, a New Brunswick court stripped a pilot of his license for
his improper conduct that led to the loss of the mast shlp Britannia near Campobello in
1798.16
Grand Manan Island dominated the approaches to Passamaquoddy and proved a
formidable obstacle to mariners. The island is cliff-bound on its western and northern
sides, with numerous shoals, rocks, and rips on the eastern side. Grand Harbor, the best
port on the island, offered shelter only for smaller vessels such as those used by the

island's fishermen." Contrary winds, or lack of wind, left sailing vessels at the mercy of
the tides, inexorably drawing the vessels onto the ledges and rocks that surrounded the
island.18 Many ships failed to weather Grand Manan and wrecked on its rocky shores.19
Ideally mariners left Grand Manan to the east as they approached Passamaquoddy.
If a shipmaster wanted to enter Passanlaquoddy, he had several choices. A
prudent mariner picked up a pilot with local knowledge to guide him through the
treacherous channels. A more daring captain might trust the printed sailing directions for
the area, such as Edmund Blunt's The American Coast Pilot, which was available in
~ had access to nautical charts. The cautious
annual editions fiom the 1 7 9 0 s . ~Few
mariner, on enquiry, discovered there were three channels into Passarnaquoddy: Western
Passage, Head Harbor Passage (often referred to as the Ship Channel), and Letite
Passage. The Western Passage was a shallow channel between West Quoddy Head on
the American mainland and Campobello Island in New Brunswick that narrowed to
perhaps two hundred feet. Currents, a crooked channel, and shoals dictated that only
smaller craft use this entry. Sometimes smuggling craft used this entry to elude pursuing
customs craft. At the eastern end of Campobello lay the main channel, which while full
of tiderips and boils, was a wide and tremendously deep passage that even the largest
sailing vessels could enter. The harbor that lay between Moose Island and Campobello
however was extremely deep and sheltered. Blunt's American Coast Pilot described it as
"sufficient for 100 sail of the line to lie in."21 The narrow Letite Passage on the eastern
end of Deer Island was generally too dangerous for sail driven or oar propelled vessels to
navigate; even modem cruising guides note that its currents run at six to eight knots, with
eddies, boils, and numerous rocks and ledges.22 On one occasion a New Brunswick

preventative officer used this channel to escape a wrathful assembly of plaster
smugglers.23 Most ships used Head Harbour Passage; locals might on occasion use the
other channels, but they were risky choices.
Canlpobello offered sailors a sheltered anchorage surrounded by islands, some
American-held and some British. Most of the islands fell within the British jurisdiction,
but the American government claimed some as well, especially Moose, Dudley, and
Frederick islands. Campobello, claimed by the British, was the largest island in the bay.
Its seven and a half mile length formed a barrier between Passamaquoddy Bay and the
Bay of Fundy. Campobello had several anchorages, the most important of which was
Broad Cove. Campobello's handful of settlers rented their land fiom the island's resident
proprietor, a Welsh eccentric named David

wen.^^

In 1803, about 245 people of all

ages lived on Campobello. Campobello's populace were mostly fishemen, who operated
a few dozen open fishing boats and a handful of small trading

schooner^.^'

Canlpobello

was ideally situated for smuggling; its proximity to both the American mainland and
American-held Moose Island, and its gentle cobble beaches and anchorages provided
smugglers with a base to quickly introduce contraband into the United States and vice
versa.
Deer Island, on the British side of the border, was the second largest island in the
bay. In 1803, about one hundred and seventeen people, mostly fishermen and their
families, populated its shores. Despite the fierce currents between Deer Island and the
American-held islands, it was a smuggler's haven as well. On still nights people on
American-held Moose Island could hear smugglers loading and unloading boats on Deer
Island.

Smallest of the three major islands was Moose Island, settled mostly by
Americans, but claimed by New Brunswick until 1818. The British claim to the island
was sufficiently strong for the British to occupy and garrison Moose Island in 1814,
during the War of 1812. The British retained possession of the island until 1818, when
international arbitration restored it to American control.26 Moose Island was the most
populous of the islands, with a large settlement incorporated by the Conunonwealth of
Massachusetts as Eastport in 1798. This community grew steadily, 244 in 1790, to 562 in
1800, over 1500 in 1810, and almost 2,000 in 1820, making it the largest in the region.27
Although a fishing community, it increasingly became a commercial center and notorious
smugglers' den.28

A mariner sailing through the Bay would also have noted the numerous smaller
islands that dotted Passanlaquoddy Bay. The most important of these was Indian Island,
which despite its tiny size had warehouses, piers, stores, and periodically a customhouse
~~
authorities claimed jurisdiction over
operated by New Brunswick a ~ t h o r i t i e s .American
Dudley and Frederick Isles, both of which were located between Moose Island and the
Western Passage. New Brunswick officials claimed sovereignty over these islands until
after the War of 1812, too, leaving them in a sort of legal limbo. For several years
Delesdernier established these islands as American territory by keeping his custon~s
office there. Numerous other smaller islands dotted the bay as well, many of them
inhabited by fishermen and merchants who sought to be on the water, Most notorious of
these was Green Island, better known as "Pope's Folly." This island, claimed by both

Figure 2.3: Detail of Benjamin Jones's 1819 map.

American and British authorities, was scarcely more than a rock. Despite its tiny size an
American smuggling merchant named Pope built a wharf and store on the island around
1807.~'

Continuing up Passamaquoddy Bay, mariners faced another challenge. One byproduct of the tidal currents is "Old Sow," the world's largest regularly occumng
whirlpool. The unusual name is attributed to the strange noises that emit from the
whirlpool, an odd combination of grunts and roaring. Old Sow sits astride the present
border, between Moose Island in the United States and Deer Island in Canada, in the
main shipping channel to Passamaquoddy Bay proper. A current of three knots is typical
in the area, but near Old Sow the current can exceed seven knots. Associated eddies and
. ~ an
' age when motors were unknown,
countercurrents further complicate n a ~ i ~ a t i o n In
Old Sow's currents provided a serious navigational challenge that required prudence,
patience, and local knowledge to overcome. People periodically perished in Old Sow; a
New Brunswick paper noted in 1817 the deaths of five men whose boat "was caught in a
whirlpool near Dog Island while leaving Moose ~sland."~*
Passamaquoddy Bay proper lay north of Old Sow. While there were still fierce
currents there, there was often less fog.33 In 1784, Loyalists founded a substantial port
community known as St. Andrews on the northern end of the bay. St. Andrews was the
principal Loyalist community in Passamaquoddy, and besides serving as a commercial
center it was also the shire town of Charlotte

The county's jurisdiction

included the islands of the bay, Grand Manan, and the entire western shore of
Passamaquoddy Bay and the St. Croix River. Like Eastport, St. Andrews was a notorious
smuggling port.35

On the American shore opposite St. Andrews a small American settlement called
Robbinston developed. John Brewer, the local postmaster, militia officer and innkeeper
who also engaged in shipbuilding and the timber trade led this community in the early
nineteenth century. Typical of local refusal to let the boundary interfere with their
livelihoods, Brewer married the daughter of Nehemiah Marks, a prominent Loyalist who
helped found St. Stephen, New Brunswick. This action, combined with his close
dealings with New Brunswick merchants and his occasional smuggling ventures, ensured
the enmity of some Americans who viewed him as a traitor, both to the United States and
~~
Brewer rose to local prominence,
the Commonwealth of ~ a s s a c h u s e t t s .Nonetheless,
became a brigadier general in the Massachusetts militia, and on occasion took it upon
himself to defend American soil fkom encroaching British army officers, whom he
verbally chastised.37
The St. Croix River - often known as the Schoodic - is nearly a mile wide at its
mouth; it flows into the northwest corner of the bay between St. Andrews and
Robbinston. The border now runs down the middle of the channel, but for years after the
American Revolution both American and New Brunswick officials debated which river
was the 'true' St. Croix. The Americans claimed it lay east of the Schoodic, while British
colonial officials claimed it lay to the west. The dispute was finally resolved in the mid1790s by Loyalist Robert Pagan of St. Andrews, who uncovered the remains of an old
French fortification dating to the early seventeenth century on an island mid-stream in the
St. Croix. The ruins proved that the St. Croix was the border as intended by the 1783
Treaty of

68

The St. Croix's head of navigation lay about ten miles upstream from its mouth;
settlements formed there on both banks. On the American side lay Calais, and on the
eastern bank lay St. Stephen, New Brunswick, barely a hundred yards away. Shipping
could not go beyond this point, but smaller craft navigated the St. Croix, and rafts of
timber floated down from the forests upstream to the sawmills at the falls that lay
~ ~ too, the border proved awkward. For example,
between the two c ~ m m u n i t i e s .Here,
the New Brunswick assembly refbsed to grant a license to operate a ferry from St.
Stephen to Calais because it lacked the powers to pern~itan international voyage.40
Fog was a constant concern to mariners in this region. Combined with currents, it
conlpletely disoriented sailors. Fog hindered all mariners, but state agents seemed to find
it more frustrating than the smugglers. For example, the captain of an American gunboat
complained of the fog in a letter to the secretary of the navy:

In consequence of the extraordinary fogs, which have
completely enclosed us since our arrival in these boats, it is,
at times, utterly impossible to designate the exact boundary
line of the United States. I have been extremely particular
in my orders to the officers of the guard, relative to
encroachments on the dominions of Gt. Britain, but yet it
frequently happens that when one imagines himself within
a few yards of shore, he may, in consequence of the tides
and eddies, which run with remarkable velocity and from
every point of the compass, be some miles out. About three
weeks since, a boat was sent from No. 42, with orders to
return in fifteen minutes, and altho' the officer of the boat
exerted utmost of his abilities to obey his instructions, he
was nearly sixteen hours absent, before he was able to find
his ~ e s s e l . ~ '

The elements truly seemed to favor the smugglers at Passamaquoddy. At the very least,
Passamaquoddy's environment made patrolling the border difficult. But the region's
inhabitants, who had their own ideas about the border, made state control of the
Passamaquoddy border a farce.

The People of Passamaquoddy
The same pilot who guided mariners into Passamaquoddy probably had to inform
shipmasters where the border lay and which lands fell under British or American
jurisdiction. Having arrived at Passamaquoddy, there were precious few clues for the
mariner to discern which settlements were inhabited by American citizens or those by
British subjects. The vernacular architecture was identical and the people themselves,
with the exception of the Indians, were very alike.42 The only clear indicators were the
flags that flew above fortifications in Eastport and St. Andrews.
Although it was not always obvious to visitors, several groups - divided by race
and ideology - occupied the Passamaquoddy landscape. The first was the
Passamaquoddy Nation, the original inhabitants of the region. The second were British
colonists who arrived before 1775. The Loyalists, the largest group of settlers, arrived
very suddenly in large groups in 1783 and 1784. On the American side of the border a
steady trickle of fishern~en,timbermen, merchants, fanners, and a few artisans slowly
developed a community of Moose Island and along the west shore of the St. Croix. Each
of these groups had a different relationship with the border that encouraged cooperation
rather than conflict with others.

The most isolated of these societies was the Passamaquoddy Nation, separated by
race, religion and language from neighboring Euro-American newcomer's. Numbering in
the several hundreds, the Passamaquoddy maintained their traditional lifestyle as best
they could in the face of white invasion and pressures for assimilation. This traditional
lifestyle included hunting in the region's forests and fishing the ocean waters. The
Passamaquoddy were in many ways a marine people; observers noted their abilities to
navigate the area's rough waters, especially when hunting porpoise.43 The border
constructed in the Peace of 1783 bisected the Passamaquoddy homeland. The
Passamaquoddy suffered directly from the 1783 Treaty of Paris in that Loyalist settlers
displaced the native community, causing conflict - but not bloodshed - between the
Indians and British colonists. These troubles peaked in 1784, when the Passamaquoddy
captured and held a Loyalist surveyor encroaching on their lands. The surveyor soon
~ ~ Treaty of 1796
escaped, and the tensions eased when John Allan i n t e r ~ e d e d .Jay's
recognized the right of Native Americans to cross the border unhindered, including the
Passamaquoddy. But that border also offered no protection to the Passamaquoddies;
whites on both sides plundered valuable timber from Indian lands.45 Correctly perceiving
their perilous situation on a border between aggressive Loyalist and American settlers,
the Passamaquoddy pursued a cautious diplomacy with both New Brunswick and
Massachusetts officials, utilizing their border position to play one side off the other. The
result was that whites perceived the Passamaquoddy as essentially neutral, and therefore
worth courting on occasion. For example, both sides sought Indian depositions in the
.~~
1790s when a commission met to determine the location of the St. Croix ~ i v e r By
staying aloof and neutral, the Passamaquoddy seem to have steered clear of smuggling.

However, there is some evidence that they may have sold canoes to smugglers, or even
acted as guides to smugglers who used Indian trails and canoe routes to bring smuggled
goods away from Passamaquoddy during the War of 1812.47
The Passanlaquoddy were a constant presence in the region, but remained
outsiders largely shunned by white settlers. Euro-American observers often noted Indian
activities as indicative of the region's exotic nature.48 During the Revolution, the
Passamaquoddy for the most part supported the revolutionary cause, and were arguably
the crucial factor in making eastern Maine American territory.49 The American veterans
who fought alongside the Passamaquoddy, especially John Allan and Louis Delesdernier,
acted as their advocates after the war. But this friendship seems to have been with a few
white leaders such as Allan, or David Owen of Campobello, local patriarchs who seemed
to acquire prestige from their contact with the Indians. Other borderland residents had
more difficulty. Moose Island merchant Nathaniel Goddard recorded several scuffles
with Indians who came to his store, but it remains unknown how common this experience
was.50 These sort of misunderstandings between white merchants and the Indians were
largely a function of the increasing marginalization of the Passamaquoddy. Because the
Indians were increasingly viewed as outsiders even in their ancestral homeland, they
were excluded from the "in group economic morality" and treated less charitably in
business dealings.51 Their exclusion was based on several factors, the most obvious
being race and culture.
Very few Passamaquoddy could speak English, a fact that shielded them from
Protestant missionaries and other interlopers. 52 Even fewer settlers could speak
Passamaquoddy, and the language used to communicate was probably French.

The poor communication and lack of understanding of the Passamaquoddy resulted in a
degree of fear on both sides of the border. When the War of 18 12 broke out, local leaders
on both sides of the border hastened to meet with and pacify the Passamaquoddy Nation
with gifts, although the Passamaquoddy could muster only about sixty men capable of
waging war.53 The Passamaquoddy, too, reacted to news of the war with fear. Many
families fled to the woods, and the Passamaquoddy convened a number of meetings with
other native groups to discuss the war and how they should react to it. 54
Most Passamaquoddies adhered to the Catholic faith brought to them by French
missionaries in the early seventeenth century. This, too, set them apart from early white
settlers, most of whom were Protestant. Religion was very important to the
Passamaquoddy, and they insisted on and received from Congregationalist Massachusetts
both a Catholic chapel on Pleasant Point and the services of a priest, all paid for by the
Massachusetts General

The priest for much of the period was Father RomagnC,

a refugee from the French Revolution. One of his many strengths was his ability to speak
French, English, and the Passamaquoddy tongue as

Romagnk reported the

presence of a few Catholics among the settlers, too, notably the crypto-Catholic Dunn
family of St. Andrews. The Dunns were an influential family of office holders in
Charlotte County. Their secret adherence to Catholicism is especially interesting because
British office holders were required to deny the authority of the pope."
If the Passamaquoddy people were distinct and separate from the people who
arrived later in the region, they were also the reason the first English-speaking settlers
came to the region. Fur traders were the earliest settlers; they came to trade
manufactured goods for Indian furs. Fishem~enfollowed the traders, lured by the

bountiful fisheries. The most significant settlement emerged on Campobello. The
wealthy Owen family from Wales received this island as a land grant, and by the early
1770s attempted to create a farming community named "New Warrington." Many of
these early settlers were English, Irish, Welsh, and Scottish; others were Yankees from
i n ~Revolution some sided with the British, others with the
New ~ n ~ l a n d . ~ % u rthe
Americans, and some remained neutral or left. Moreover, some of these early settlers
were willing to play off one side against the other by engaging in smuggling. As early as
1778, Passamaquoddy became known as an unstable border region, the refuge of
smugglers, deserters, and bandits. Both British and American forces kidnapped and
otherwise harassed locals. 59 John Allan, the local American commander, deemed the
region "a nest of

illa an^."^^

A few early settlers remained at Passamaquoddy after the

War of Independence, but their sparse numbers were quickly subsumed by the arrival of
the Loyalist refugees and American settlers, many of whom were veterans of the
American War of Independence.
New Brunswick's Loyalists were refugees from the American War of
Independence, a diverse group including Germans, Scots, Irish, blacks, southerners,
Quakers, New Englanders, New Yorkers, and others. Many were fornler members of the
British military; others were civilians who sought refuge in British-held garrisons at New
York or Castine, Maine, until the end of the war.61 The Loyalists arrived en masse at
Passamaquoddy in late 1783, and several thousand settled on the eastern shore of
Passamaquoddy the following year. Many were members of the "Penobscot
Association," both civilian and veteran Loyalists who had collected in eastern Maine
during the latter phase of the war.62 St. Andrews was the main settlement, planned on a

rigid grid system by military engineers as a commercial center and regional port.63
Within a few years it became the shire town of newly-created Charlotte County within
the British colony of New Brunswick, which the imperial government had agreed to split
off from Nova Scotia to create a new Loyalist province.64
The post-Revolutionary settlers on the American side arrived more slowly. A few
veterans, such as Allan and Delesdernier, settled at Passamaquoddy immediately after the
war. In the 1780s fishermen from Cape Ann and other Massachusetts fishing
communities began to settle on Moose Island, squatting on the land without any legal
title. Along the shores of the bay and up the west bank of the St. Croix small
communities began to develop by 1790, mostly focused on the timber trade. Both
timbermen and fishermen farmed on the side because the region's soil was thin and
seldom productive enough to support large pioneer families through agriculture alone.
Development was slow until 1808, when Jefferson's Embargo created a set of conditions
highly conducive to a profitable illicit trade with the British colonies across the border.65
Canadian scholars have long battled a myth promoted by groups such as the
United Empire Loyalists that emphasized the social superiority of Loyalists as the source
of that nation's much vaunted "peace, order and good government."66 A local history of
St. Andrews, New Brunswick, entitled The Diverting History of a Loyalist Town,
reinforced this idea by portraying the community's leaders as elegant gentlemen who
bowed to each other across muddy streets, and only reluctantly put away their silks and
broadcloths for the frontiersman's buckskin.67 Since the 1950s, Canadian scholars such
as Esther Clark Wright have struggled to abolish the myth of Loyalists as wealthy
patricians, venal office holders, arrogant military officers, or vile traitors such as

Benedict Arnold.68 Wright instead emphasized the rough frontier nature of Loyalists
settlements in New Brunswick, and not only found Loyalists ordinary people, but that
they were often far from industrious and sober.69 Canadian legal historian David Bell
built on Clark's work by exploring the tumultuous political history of early New
Brunswick, and concluded that many Loyalists had democratic expectations greatly at
odds with their leaders' aristocratic fantasies. The source of these democratic leanings
was the American colonial political culture they experienced before the

evolution.^^

The Loyalist experience at Passamaquoddy was thus a typical North American
confrontation between settlers and what they deemed a wilderness. The basic impulse
was for survival by creating, maintaining and reproducing a largely subsistence economy
through resource extraction and agriculture. Merchants may have sought profit, but hard
~'
settlers engaged in a pre-market economy in
money was extremely ~ c a r c e .Instead,
which they constantly exchanged labor and commodities with one another, a system that
encouraged a rough sort of egalitarianism. The two great fears among such pre-market
peoples were debt and taxes, both of which required scarce hard cash.72
The harshness of the conditions at Passamaquoddy and the identical nature of the
extraction economy tended to suppress the differences between the peoples on both sides
of the border. Passamaquoddy and white, loyalist and republican, all found
accommodation more advantageous than confrontation. Trade was the obvious
manifestation of this accommodation, the most remarkable example of this being
Benedict Arnold's occasional business trips to Passamaquoddy in the early 1790s.
Arnold's presence drew a variety of reactions from the American population. One soldier
who had fought under Arnold in the Continental Army burst into tears of anguish when

he saw his old commander near Campobello. Others reacted more negatively, especially
those who had suffered in his raid on New London, Connecticut, after he joined the
British side.73 Fanlily ties stretched across the border, too, among all groups in the
. ~ ~ to trace, but nonetheless
region, including the Fundy shore of Nova ~ c o t i a Harder
important, were the cross-border friendships among the mercantile leadership that
evolved out of and expedited commercial relationships, transactions that built crossborder trust. However, the creation of Masonic lodges and churches with transnational
menlberships in the nineteenth century indicates that there was a genuine feeling of
community that spanned the border.75
Strangers to the region reported no difference in the appearance of
Passamaquoddy's white population; they dressed alike, spoke alike, ate alike, and worked
alike. The fisherman on Campobello sat down to a noontime dinner of milk and potatoes
much like that of his American counterpart on Moose Island, and lived in a very modest
log home until a better structure could be

The similarity created considerable

official confusion about who belonged on what side of the border. Laborers moved
freely back and forth across the border, including woodsmen, fishermen, sailors, and
shipbuilders. Americans served in New Brunswick's militia; British subjects held
commissions in the Massachusetts militia in Eastport. This confusion seems to have been
especially marked among the so-called "late Loyalists" who arrived in New Brunswick
from the United States after 1784. An American citizen named Joseph Porter served as a
Charlotte County representative to New Brunswick's legislative assembly; late Loyalist
William Vance moved from that same county into Washington County and served as a
representative in the Maine state legislature after 1820.'~

Passamaquoddy developed as one region after 1783, divided by a border that
enriched and complicated the lives of its residents even as they seemingly ignored it
entirely. This experience was not unusual in North American societies in the early
nineteenth century. American settlers in the West, late Loyalists in Upper Canada,
Tejanos in Texas, and Native Americans everywhere all developed modes of localized
accommodation in the name of making life easier or safer. Nor was this experience
restricted to areas of North America settled by Euro-Americans; a similar situation
developed in the Pyrenees between Spain and ~ r a n c e . ~ ~

Borderlands Theory
For generations, United States historians, operating in the shadow of Frederick
Jackson Turner's "Frontier Thesis," emphasized the importance of a violent democratic
frontier that insistently pushed westward, inevitably enriching the English-speaking
. ~ ~Turner's thesis has some distinct
peoples who conquered North A m e r i ~ a But
problems, especially when taken out of the United States. In Canada, for example,
French-speaking peoples were the first Euro-Americans to settle the West, and did so
with relatively little violence, mixing easily with the Indian~.~'Loyalists, a diverse group
that according to Canadian historical myth rejected the violent egalitarian democracy
promoted by the American Revolution, founded two of Canada's provinces, yet despite
their pioneering experiences did not become notably dem~cratic.~'
Furthermore,
Canadian historical traditions have long emphasized the peacehlness of the Canadian
experience when compared to the A m e r i ~ a n .Many
~ ~ Canadian scholars have rejected
Turner's thesis because it represents a sort of American scholarly imperialism that

clashes with Canada's own historiographical

tradition^.^^ Even in the United States, the

Frontier Thesis has encountered problems; the American Southwest, for example, had a
Spanish-speaking population of Euro-Americans hundreds of years before Englishspeaking invaders arrived, bringing into doubt Turner's idea of a great sweep of
advancing civilization from east to west. Even Turner himself had to make exceptions
for certain groups of Americans, such as fishern~en,who did not go west, but often north
towards Canada; many of the American inhabitants of Passarnaquoddy were just such
settlers.84
Despite these problems, Turner's shadow is a long one, and continues to heavily
influence American historical thought. Bernard Bailyn in particular has picked up on
Turner's idea of the North American frontier as a violent place, "a ragged outer margin of
a central world, a regressive, backward-looking diminishment of metropolitan
accomplishment," where "overt violations of civil order" could be expected.85 Given the
massive violence and violations of civil order at colonial metropoles such as Paris and
London in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, Bailyn's assumptions about an
extraordinarily violent periphery of Euro-American settlement in the New World seem
flawed.86 One need only consider the massive violence associated with English
smuggling, which occurred at the core of Bailyn's "metropolitan accomplishment" to
realize that it was at least as violent as the "ragged outer margin of a central world, a
regressive, backward-looking diminishment of metropolitan ac~om~lishment."~~

A more useful model of inquiry is the "Borderlands model,'' originally developed
by Herbert Eugene Bolton, an historian of New Spain and a contemporary of Tunler.
Bolton emphasized the accommodations made between invaders and indigenous

peoples.88 Furthermore, Bolton argued that borderlands always needed to be considered
with reference to metropolitan agendas.g9 This borderlands model remains strongly
linked with the American Southwest, but increasingly historians of northern North
America have usefidly applied it to the interaction between regions in what is now
Canada and the United states."
Canadian scholars have uncovered considerable evidence of regional ties across
the United States-Canada border that continued to link the American northeast with the
Canadian Maritimes, even after the 1783 Treaty of Paris. For example, Reginald C.

Stuart recognized that New Englanders viewed the Maritime Provinces as an extension of
their own commercial enterprises through the War of 1812.~'George Rawlyk and Neil
MacKinnon have explored the enduring connections between Maritimes Loyalists and
republican New England after the American

evolution.^^

Graeme Wynne has stated

that "the boundary established by the continental division of 1783 was a remarkably
porous divide," and that ethnic ties bound Nova Scotia and New Brunswick to the
American northeast in a "greater New England of experience."93 Despite these scholarly
works, there is a lingering nationalist resistance among some scholars about Borderlands
thought as applied to the Northeast, notably illustrated in the work of historian Phillip
~ u c k n e r However,
.~~
Bolton's emphasis on borderlands interaction with the metropolis
meshes neatly with Canadian historiography, which has generally emphasized the
importance of imperial centers.95
Defining the composition of a borderland remains a challenge however. Jeremy
Adelman and Stephen Aron have created a borderlands model as "the contested
boundaries between colonial domains," and places where accommodation played an

unusually strong part in the decisions people made.96 Yet Adelman and Aron's views
seem too confined to a spatial analysis of a borderland as a region that developed from a
violent frontier to an accommodating borderland to a rigidly divided "bordered land."97
A more applicable interpretation of borderlands theory is to see it as a set of values and
attitudes based on very pragmatic principles of self-help. In considering Passamaquoddy,
the most useful definition of a borderlands may be Lauren McKinsey and Victor
Konrad's: a "borderlands is a region jointly shared by two nations that houses people
with common social characteristics in spite of the boundary between them." For
McKinsey and Konrad, borderlands theory explains how different political comnlunities
blend into each other, especially in econon~icterms, where they meet at a boundary. The
product of this blending is "an area in which interaction has a tempering effect on the
central tendencies of each society."98
Smuggling, the activity for which Passamaquoddy was most famous, acted as one
of the most important interactions that tempered the "central tendencies" of both British
colonists and American citizens. Smugglers resisted state-imposed commercial
restrictions and taxation, usually in a peaceful manner, but occasionally utilizing violent
crowd protest to achieve their ends. But the smugglers who operated at Passamaquoddy
were not solely locals; many were from far away, suggesting that the borderlands
dynamic was not just a border phenomenon, but a commonly held set of beliefs that were
concentrated in border areas.
Exploring the cross-border interactions and their "tempering effects" is a complex
process, in no small part because borderlands residents often concealed their actions and
thoughts. In a borderland, even representatives of the state engaged in misleading their

superiors. To outsiders, such officials appeared almost hypocritical in their enforcement
of regulations that they themselves broke or bent. But to locals, the understanding
manner in which customs officers and others turned a blind eye to illicit trade was a
positive good. To better understand the subtleties of borderlands attitudes, the
circumstances of individuals who lived there deserve closer attention.

Lewis Frederick Delesdernier: Model of a Borderlands Resident
Lewis Frederick Delesdernier, the American customs collector at Passamaquoddy,
is an example of the seemingly contradictory forces at work within a borderlands society.
An analysis of his life as a borderland resident reveals the contradictory stresses created
by official demands and local needs.
Born in Nova Scotia to Swiss parents, so-called "foreign Protestants," young
Delesdernier responded to the American Revolution by joining pro-American forces in an
attempt to seize the colony from British control.99 The effort failed, and Delesdenlier
was among the number of Nova Scotia refugees who spent the remainder of the war in
Machias, Maine. At Machias, Delesdernier served as an aide to Colonel John Allan - a
fellow refugee fiom Nova Scotia - and sometimes as commander of a company of Indians
who served under Allan. Delesdernier either learned the local Indian language or
communicated to them in French, the language used in his parent's home. Throughout
hls life he served as an interpreter between locals and the Passamaquoddy. At Machias
Delesdernier met a fellow Swiss, a young Genevan nobleman named Albert Gallatin who
had come to the region specifically to see Indians. The two became friends, and this
chance meeting served Delesdernier well for many years."'

After the American Revolution, Delesdernier moved with his fornler commander
to the shores of Passamaquoddy Bay. Each occupied an island adjacent to Campobello in
order to assert the sovereignty of Massachusetts as far east as possible.'0' In so doing,
they guaranteed a degree of friction with neighboring Loyalists because New Brunswick
claimed sovereignty over all the islands in Passamaquoddy Bay.
After 1786 the state of Massachusetts appointed Delesdernier as the local "naval
officer," a position that required him to tax and regulate shipping. Delesdernier garnered
other positions as well; he served as the first postmaster for the area, acted as a justice of
the peace, and served briefly as a deputy sheriff. After the Constitution took force in the
United States in 1789, the federal government made Delesdernier's state-appointed
position as naval officer into a federal one with the title "customs collector," an office he
held until 1809. His resolve as an American customs officer was soon tested. A
Campobello, New Brunswick, woman named Ann Storrow fled her overbearing landlord,
to whom she and her absent husband were in debt, and sought refuge at the home of
Delesdernier on nearby Frederick Isle. The landlord was none other than David Owen,
the tenlperrnental proprietor of Campobello, who also claimed Delesdemier was
squatting on his property. Owen sought to recover debts from Storrow, establish his
claim to the island, and reinforce New Brunswick's claim to all the islands of
Passarnaquoddy all in one blow. In his capacity as justice, Owen summoned the
Charlotte County sheriff to assist him in arresting Storrow. Sheriff John Dunn and a
posse duly arrived with Owen on Frederick Island, and demanded Delesdemier surrender
her. Delesdemier refused, apparently brandishing an ax. Owen then ordered Dunn to
break down Delesdemier's front door. The sheriff, doubting whether the island was

within his jurisdiction, refused. The posse balked too, because its members also
questioned the legality of these measures. lo2 Frustrated by Dunn and the posse, Owen
agreed to leave, but only after seizing Storrow's cow and carrying it back to Campobello,
muttering that it was Storrow's "damnable tongue that had provoked him to commit this
outrage." Storrow was a hard woman to silence: she swore out a complaint against Owen
in the Charlotte County courts, "more to vex Owen, than from the idea of getting any
redress," and even publicized the matter in the United States. Delesdernier, too, swore
out a complaint against 0wen.'03
The Storrow incident revealed several facets of borderlands life. First, the
uncertain boundary line between the United States and New Brunswick made a very
ordinary incident an international matter. Second, the incident involved little actual
violence, but a great deal of bluff and bluster. Third, although the men involved in this
incident differed greatly in their politics, in a very short time they would be acting in
concert. In 1805, Delesdernier traveled to Saint John, New Brunswick, to testify on the
behalf of Dunn on charges of complicity in smuggling. Even more startling, David Owen
,

presided over Delesdernier's second marriage in 1815.1°4 Conflict between republicans
and Loyalists was not inevitable; they could live side by side and even become friends
despite ideological differences.
As local American shipping increased, however, Delesdernier's position as
collector became both more demanding, increasingly engaging him in border conflicts.105

In 1802 the American Congress pernlitted foreign vessels to land goods at
Passamaquoddy, thus opening international trade, even from nearby New Brunswick. In
1805 Delesdernier moved hls office to the rapidly growing town of Eastport on Moose

Island, establishing his offices close to the increasingly busy wharves of that community.
The plaster trade grew during these years, with Nova Scotia and New Brunswick vessels
bringing their cargoes to Passamaquoddy to sell to American merchants and traders. The
trade was profitable to both sides, and as a community leader Delesdernier did his best to
promote the trade by bending, and even breaking, the federal laws he was supposed to
enforce.
Delesdernier's mode of accommodation permitted British ships to anchor
alongside American vessels and transship their cargoes of plaster directly into American
holds. This saved the labor of depositing the cargo on either the American shore or
wharves, and then reloading the plaster onto an American vessel. But it also violated the
principle that foreign cargoes come under customhouse scrutiny, whether they be in~ ~ plaster entered the United States duty free, so Delesdernier
bound or o u t - b o ~ n d . 'But
did not defraud the United States government in so doing. However, Delesdernier clearly
broke American commercial regulations when he permitted American coasting vessels
perform "international" voyages, even if that voyage consisted of a few hundred yards
across the harbor into British waters, and there exchange cargoes of American produce,
especially flour, for foreign cargoes.lo7

A few British colonial officials railed against the practice, which defrauded New
Brunswick and Nova Scotia customs duties far more than American. George Leonard, a
doctrinaire Loyalist and rigid enforcer of colonial trade regulations, often con~plained
against the plaster trade, and eventually took drastic measures against it.'08 The British
admiral in command of the Halifax station reported that Delesdernier "appears to be an
agent for smuggling teas and East India goods into our colonies."'@'

But Delesdernier

was not acting alone; in fact he was acting in concert with John Dunn, the Loyalist sheriff
who had refused to break down his door in 1790. As the presiding customs officers in the
region, Dunn and Delesdernier worked out a compromise whereby they deemed a portion
of the harbor between Campobello, New Brunswick, and Moose Island, Maine, as
"neutral waters." Notably, this was a purely local arrangement by the two officials, one
that caused considerable diplomatic difficulty in what is known as the Falmouth
incident .I1'
Further diplomatic problems between the United States and Great Britain, such as
Jefferson's Embargo from December, 1807 to March, 1809, revealed the problems of
attempting to accommodate traders at the borderline. The embargo called for a complete
cessation of commerce with British North America, a virtually impossible task.
Nonetheless, Delesdernier took on the onerous duties of sealing the border, an act that
angered the various smugglers gathered at Passamaquoddy. Indeed, they threatened to
burn the collector's home."' The collector faced smugglers from as far away as New
York, so-called "adventurers" unrestrained by local ties and anxious to make a profit no
matter what the risks. Federal authorities sent revenue cutters, soldiers, and naval vessels
to support Delesdernier, who does appear to have made an honest effort to obey his
superiors. Ultimately, however it was not the strangers who undermined the collector;
his neighbors and acquaintances betrayed him by breaking open a government warehouse
and smuggling goods across the border in the customhouse boat."* Federal authorities
blamed Delesdernier, removed him from his position as collector in 1811, and brought a
civil action against him. Locals reacted to Delesdernier's removal by promptly electing
him as Eastport's representative to the Massachusetts legislature.'13

During the War of 1812, Delesdernier again took a lead in promoting cross-border
harmony when he assumed leadership of Eastport's committee of safety. This
organization, hastily brought together the day following the news that the United States
had declared war on Britain, actively communicated with New Brunswick officials and
residents to ensure the conflict did not devolve into the sort of petty raiding and
kidnapping the region experienced during the War of Independence.'I4 The committee
went so far as to communicate their peaceful intentions to New Brunswick's lieutenant
governor. Delesdernier also resumed his old duties as a translator between the
Passarnaquoddy and the American military. He helped to assure Indian neutrality for the
duration of the conflict.115Delesdernier may have possessed at least ambivalent feelings
toward the American federal government by this time; occasionally he still worked as a
subordinate officer at the customhouse, but by late in the war the federal government
arrested Delesdernier for debt related to his removal from office. During his absence in
Machias jail, his wife died and the British military occupied Eastport, two blows that
must have grieved the old veteran mightily. At least he had the knowledge that his son,
captured by the British and sent to Halifax, was relatively safe thanks to the intercession
of Delesdernier's cousin by marriage, John Uniacke, the attorney-general for Nova
scotia.'16
In later life Delesdernier faded from the public eye, with one exception. He
remarried in 1815. Living in British-occupied territory, the couple appeared before
David Owen and had the justice marry them, despite the fact that his new wife does not
seem to have gained a divorce from her forn~erhusband.'" When eastern Washington
County returned to American control after the war, Massachusetts authorities deemed the

union illegal because they did not recognize the authority of a New Brunswick justice to
marry two Americans; undeterred, the couple married again. Sometime in the 1830s,
Delesdernier died after a long period of disease and mental illness, financially broken and
apparently alone. 'I8
Delesdernier's life and the border were woven together in a sometimes surprising
fashion. Like his neighbors on both sides of the boundary, Delesdernier struggled to
match official expectations, actual and imagined, with the realities of frontier life at
Passamaquoddy. In the eyes of the federal government, Delesdernier failed; but locally
he remained popular even after his removal from office, and his memory remains strong
in local histories published since his death.

Conclusion
Defining Passamaquoddy as a borderland improves our understanding of how and
why the region's residents, divided by a political boundary after 1783, continued to
interact despite their ideological differences. The common history of all the groups who
lived at Passamaquoddy was one of sporadic violence and dislocation during the
American Revolution, a pattern revealed in the life of Lewis Delesdernier. After the
peace of 1783, these groups, united by a common geography, sought to create a more
stable, peaceful community despite the boundary line that theoretically divided Loyalists
from republicans. The goal of harmony was pragmatic, a set of attitudes that encouraged
cross-border cooperation for the mutual benefit of the communities surrounding
Passarnaquoddy Bay. In pursuing this goal, the borderlands peoples defied, twisted or
broke with the policies of their respective political institutions. Borderlands officials

created their own rules, and borderlands peoples pursued their livelihoods even when it
broke with the commercial regulations of distant central governments, often by
smuggling or acquiescing to illicit trade. The borderlands experience was thus a dynamic
between officialdom and pragmatism, and a set of attitudes held by various peoples who
lived in proximity to the boundary between the United States and British North America.
In times of crisis, such as Jefferson's Embargo or the War of 1812, outsiders often

'

flocked to Passamaquoddy for their own reasons, an unofficial recognition that
borderlands attitudes were not limited to the border area, but were commonly-held beliefs
throughout North Anlerican society. The origin of borderlands attitudes was located in
the interaction between officialdom, locals, and strangers.
1
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CHAPTER 3:
AMERICAN ENFORCEMENT METHODS

Introduction
Lewis Delesdernier's friend John Allan warned the Treasury Department in 1800
about widespread smuggling at Passamaquoddy. Allan embarked on a campaign to
convince Congress to open the Passamaquoddy customs district to foreign trade by
deeming it a "port of entry and delivery for foreign vessels." This foreign trade would
include New Brunswick, just a few hundred yards across the border from the American
town of Eastport. Allan argued that
The proximity to the British govenment-the connection
and intimacy which naturally exists between the inhabitants
on each side of the line by reciprocal communicationsThe affinity and sameness with every kind of business that
arises from the nature of our local situation, will ever
induce the people to screen and cover vessels that may
come on our Shore however unjustifiable, while a general
and total prohibition continues.-Was it a Port of Entry
&c., and vessels admitted, it would alter the situation
materially. For there would not be that friendly care &
sympathy, nor would they dare to screen and shelter vessels
or illicit trade, as is now the custom.Allan continued by stating the advantages opening trade to New Brunswick vessels
would bring to the region and to the federal government. Opening trade to foreign
vessels would permit American produce to flow into British North America, and colonial

produce, especially plaster, to enter the United States. Opening Passamaquoddy to
international trade was consistent with the American revolutionary ideal of free trade that
encouraged dropping exclusionary commercial policies.' In contrast, the British Empire
still attempted to pursue a mercantilist economic policy that excluded foreigners,
including Americans, from the much-vaunted commercial privileges given to its own
subjects.* Allan also argued that by permitting the trade it could be regulated and taxed,
whereas previously it had been conducted illicitly with the sympathy of many Americans
at Passarnaquoddy. Allan concluded that if Passamaquoddy were opened to foreign
trade:
The Revenue Laws will be better supported.-The duties &
other emoluments will be considerably increased.-Illicit
Trade & Conduct reduced.-The fair, honest & uninformed
Trader (who in fact are the only people that suffered, some
very considerably) will be encouraged & protectednavigation & trade increase & flourish, & give great
content & satisfaction through the settlement^.^
Allan's successful efforts to open the Passamaquoddy customs district to foreign
trade outlined some of the problems of border enforcement. Cutting off all trade between
the United States and the remaining British colonies only encouraged violation of the
law; for Allan the best way to regulate trade at the border and defend American
sovereignty was to legalize it. Furthermore, Allan's efforts to cooperate with
government, and govenunent's duty to respond to the needs of its citizens, was indicative
of the changes wrought by the American Revolution whereby commercialization and
democratization worked i n t e r a ~ t i v e l ~
The
. ~ control of the Passamaquoddy border by
American customs officials was one reflection of that interaction between commerce and
government, both in its successes and its failures.

Customs officers were the primary enforcers of the Passamaquoddy border.
Customs officers enacted the elaborate commercial regulations that theoretically
restricted or occasionally completely denied trade between the United States and British
North America. Even in the best of times, customs officials faced the overwhelming task
of controlling cross-border trade. In times of crisis, militia, naval, and regular military
units joined them. But in a borderland these agents of centralizing tendencies often found
themselves divided in their loyalties, under pressure to moderate or even pervert the very
regulations they were sent to enforce, or even overwhelmed by a variety of largely
peaceful tactics designed to undermine their authority. The longer officials spent in
Passamaquoddy, the more likely they were to buckle under these pressures and either
ignore, permit or actively promote illicit trade; some even went so far as to engage in
smuggling themselves.

Borderland Residents and State Authority
Deciphering borderlands attitudes towards state authority is difficult, but it reveals
that borderlands residents shared with the rest of North American society an ambiguous
relationship with agents of state authority. At Passamaquoddy conflicting claims of
sovereignty put forth by both the United States and Great Britain reinforced this
ambiguity. In order to assert sovereignty, both nations often exerted extraordinary efforts
to enforce their laws and regulations, especially commercial regulations that provided
valuable tax income. Law enforcement on the often troubleson~eborder dramatically
shaped the lives of borderlands peoples during repeated efforts to quell illicit trade at
Passamaquoddy.

The problem of catching and prosecuting smugglers proved a thorny one for
government officials on both sides of the border. They took it seriously; smugglers
reduced government revenue and encouraged defiance of the law. Governmental efforts
were not consistent, however, and officials varied in their conduct from strict
enforcement to blatant corruption. The perennial question for the various governmental
authorities was: how much enforcement would suffice? The general American impulse
until 1816 was to regulate and tax trade as little and as conveniently as possible.5 But in
times of crisis, such as Jefferson's embargo of 1807-1809 or the War of 1812, civil
authorities had to call in the military to enforce unpopular commercial laws that restricted
international trade. The overall pattern was one of governmental inconsistency, running
from draconian military intervention to the grossest apathy and corruption. That
inconsistency was further exacerbated by frequent instances of inter-agency jealousy and
lack of cooperation. This was most notable during the War of 1812, when the district's
assistant collector inquired of Maine's United States marshal, "whether the Military have
the wight [sic] to make Seizures the same as custon~house

officer^."^

Border residents faced a different question: how much cooperation with
officialdom was sufficient? Here their pragmatism came to the fore. Some of
Passamaquoddy's residents risked alienation by acting as law enforcers or informants,
occasionally endangering their lives. The majority however only obeyed laws that
conformed to their own views on justice, while ignoring those deemed unjust and
victimless, especially commercial restrictions. In so doing, they created a set of

community values well adapted to their unique situation in a frontier region contested by
the United States and Great Britain. The border community often persecuted individuals
who deviated from these norms, even if those norms stood in opposition to federal laws.'
Thus at Passamaquoddy the relationship between law enforcement and the local
population was seldom what it appeared to be on the surface. Local officials often
continued to adhere to local values that contradicted national goals, even federal customs
collectors. Eastport, a community described as "lawless," in fact frequently petitioned
the Massachusetts General Court for more courts and jails.8 Infornlants worked both
sides of the law, such as Jabez Mowry, a notorious smuggler who routinely "informed"
on his own contraband as a means of legitimizing its presence in the United ~ t a t e s . ~
Lawyers such as Jonathan D. Weston also profited by defending smugglers in court and
by expediting their business through consular services.1° Criminals arrested by local
authorities sometimes turned out to be those who interfered too much with smuggling. An
example is when Eastport officials arrested Patrick Campbell for attempted murder: in
fact he was a United States soldier performing his duty when he attempted to stop, and
finally shot, a smuggler." Nor was this true only on one side of the border. These
conditions existed both in New Brunswick and in Maine.

In some ways the state exerted more effort at the border than elsewhere, simply
because of the perceived need to control entry and exit as a function of sovereignty. But
at the same time the border was distant from the central authorities in London or New
York, and later Washington. This made government intercession into border matters
erratic. Centralizing tendencies were weak in general, and typically consisted of unarmed
customs officers who were often in sympathy with smugglers and others who violated

border regulations. On occasion the arrival of soldiers or warships to enforce the border
demonstrated the authority and power of the state, but their presence was usually
temporary. Passamaquoddy residents reacted in a variety of ways to these forces, but
they constantly applied pressure on governmental forces to operate with prudence and
moderation. Furthermore, state agents became more vulnerable to the values and nornls
of Passamaquoddy society the longer they stayed, especially if they established local
friendships or relationships. The weakness and vulnerability of state institutions and
officials generally left border residents to their own devices, allowing them to develop
attitudes towards the international boundary that often violated the laws of their
respective states.

American Customs Regulations
When the American government established itself in 1789, it faced the task of
funding its own operation. Toward that end, Congress quickly established the Treasury
Department and a system of customs houses to charge imported goods a special tax
known as a duty.'* While more efficient than the British system and tightly controlled by
the Treasury Department, the new American customs system was quite similar to the
British one, a reassuring fact for the new nation's merchant community.
The cooperation of the merchants with the customs system was a crucial
~
duties comprised
component of the American constitution's s ~ c c e s s . 'Customs
approximately ninety percent of the American government's income during most of the
period considered.I4 The system relied heavily on an honest and well-organized customs
collector operating under the administrative scrutiny of the Treasury secretary and the

fiscal scrutiny of Congress, which took an enormous interest in customhouse affairs.
Federal law provided stiff penalties for any collector who falsified a ship's manifest,
over-charged duties, or colluded with merchants to defraud the nation's revenue. The
Treasury Department dismissed those who neglected their accounts, one of the charges
that ultimately led to Delesdernier's downfall as a customs collector in 1808."

In his role as a customs collector, Delesdernier acted primarily as a tax gatherer
and enforcer of commercial shipping regulations. Complex commercial codes strictly
regulated the conduct of shipping. Masters of all vessels coming from foreign ports were
obliged to surrender their paperwork within twenty-four hours of arriving in port to the
collector before unloading, and pay duties on goods imported, or post a bond that those
taxes would be paid by the consignee. Customhouse officials returned these papers or
issued new ones when the vessel prepared to depart. Coasting vessels, which is to say
those vessels licensed by the government to operate only within national limits, had less
stringent requirements.I6 The problem was that in Passamaquoddy Bay a coasting vessel
might find itself in foreign waters because of insufficient wind, strong currents, tidal
change, or the design of cunning mariners intent on smuggling. Federal officials had to
sort out the honest from the deceitful, by balancing their own judgment, regulations
imposed by Congress, and Treasury Department circulars.
Customs collectors were bureaucrats who processed a variety of paperwork to
collect revenue and regulate shipping. Essentially the federal government spun a web of
paperwork to document minutely a vessel's activities. Every vessel carried documents
issued from the custon~house,which were in turn used by customs authorities or consuls
in other ports to verify the ship's identity and cargo; the larger the vessel and more

valuable the cargo, the greater the amount of paperwork, regulations, fees, and duties.
The most important documents carried by a vessel were its enrollment (if engaged in the
coasting trade), its registration (if engaged in foreign trade), or its license (if a small
vessel under twenty tons). American vessels received several benefits over foreign
vessels, such as lower duties and coasting privileges that allowed them to go from one
port to another largely unimpeded.I7 Vessels that failed to comply with the commercial
laws faced severe fines. A merchant who violated the commercial laws faced not only
fines, but the loss of his vessel and cargo at government auction, as well as forfeiture of
sizable bonds. l 8

In a period of extreme profitability for the American merchants as neutral carriers
during the Napoleonic Wars, conformity to the laws, however bothersome, made good
business sense. While European powers fought each other during the French Revolution
and subsequent Napoleonic conflicts, American shipping thrived supplying all sides,
especially with provisions such as wheat flour.I9 The federal government supported this
maritime boom by pursuing a diplomacy that opened new markets to American
merchants, and even created a navy specifically to defend shipping.20 The merchants'
conformity to the commercial laws in turn generated steadily growing revenue for the
fledgling American government (see Table 3.1). The Jefferson administration adopted
these Federalist policies when it came into power in 180 1. Albert Gallatin, the young
Swiss immigrant who met Delesdernier during the American Revolution, was the
Treasury secretary during both Jefferson administrations and most of the two Madison
administrations. Gallatin closely adhered to established Hamiltonian policies, with the
exception that he colluded with Congress to abolish most federal internal taxes.21That

policy left the federal government almost entirely reliant on customs duties; by 1807
almost ninety-seven percent of government revenue came from commercial shipping (see
Table 3.1).
The federal government did not rely solely on the good will of the merchants.
Revenue cutters and customhouse boats patrolled the waters to detect smugglers.
Congress allowed the collectors to use armed force in pursuing suspected smugglers and
granted them legal authority to board any ship within four leagues of the coast. On shore,
collectors could ask local magistrates for search warrants to enter buildings suspected of
hiding c ~ n t r a b a n d .For
~ ~ example, by 1809 Delesdernier had recourse to use a deputy
U.S. marshal, the local revenue cutter, or federal troops if any were present. Congress
also empowered the collectors to call out the militia under certain circwn~tances.~~

In addition, a host of laws controlled ship movement. Congress carefully
designated the harbors that shipping could use; -every customs district possessed a
customhouse located in a "port of entry and delivery." In the Passamaquoddy customs
district, there was only one such port, but essentially it comprised the entire bay and
reached up the St. Croix River. Federal law required masters of vessels to submit their
paperwork to the customhouse for inspection and calculation of tariffs, tonnage duties,
and other fees within twenty-four hours of anchoring. Often a customs inspector boarded
a vessel soon after it anchored to look over the ship's paperwork; sometimes the inspector
remained on board the vessel if he suspected it of smuggling. Delesdernier kept vessels'
paperwork in an iron trunk bolted to the floor of the customhouse while they remained in
port, ensuring that the master returned to fetch it before departure. This ensured that

Table 3.1 : Customs Receipts and Federal Revenue, 1791-18 15
Year
1791
1792
1793
1794
1795
1796
1797
1798
1799
1800
1801
1802
1803
1804
1805
1806
1807
1808
1809
1810
1811
1812
1813
1814
1815

Customs Receipts
$4,399,000
3,443,000
4,255,000
4,801,000
5,588,000
6,568,000
7,550,000
7,106,000
6,6 10,000
9,O8 1,000
1O,75 1,000
12,400,000
1O,4OO,OOO
11,000,000
12,900,000
14,600,000
15,800,000
l6,3OO,OOO
7,200,000
8,500,000
13,300,000
8,900,000
l3,2OO,OOO
6,000,000
7,300,000

Total Federal Revenue
$4,409,000
3,669,000
4,652,000
$43 1,000
6,114,000
8,377,000
8,688,000
7,900,000
7,546,000
10,848,000
12,935,000
14,900,000
11,000,000
11,800,000
l3,5OO,OOO
l5,5OO,OOO
l6,3OO,OOO
17,000,000
7,700,000
9,300,000
l4,4OO,OOO
9,800,000
l4,3OO,OOO
11,100,000
15,600,000
'

Customs % of Total
99.77%
93.84%
91.46%
88.39%
91.39%
78.40%
86.90%
89.94%
87.59%
83.71%
83.11%
83.22%
94.54%
93.22%
95.55%
94.19%
96.93%
95.88%
93.50%
91.39%
92.36%
90.8 1%
92.30%
54.05%
46.79%

Source: Percentage calculated fi-om figures provided in Curtis P. Nettels, The Emergence
o f a National Economy (New York: Harper & Row, 1969; reprint, Amlonk, NY: M.E.
Sharpe, Inc., 1989), 385.

vessels complied with all requirements before sailing.24 Vessels thus faced the scrutiny
of the customhouse both on entering and leaving a customs district. For most of the
period under consideration the American customhouse was at Eastport on Moose Island,
but it shifted according to need. In the early years, Delesdernier kept his custom office
on Frederick Isle, but sometimes the custom house was on the mainland in Lubec.
Congress strictly controlled shipping. Federal statutes banned foreign vessels
from smaller collection districts. Delesdernier, his fiiend John Allan, and other local
residents success~llypetitioned Congress to pennit both American and foreign vessels to
enter Passamaquoddy from foreign ports in 1803, although vessels that arrived from
beyond the Cape of Good Hope were not allowed.2s Federal statutes also banned foreign
vessels under thirty tons from entering American ports, a regulation difficult to enforce at
Passanlaquoddy due to its proximity to the border. Delesdernier and other customs
officials at Passamaquoddy seem to have largely ignored this last regulation. Small
boats, especially fishing vessels from Campobello and other islands on the New
Brunswick side of the border, regularly appeared at Eastport's wharves, even during the
War of 1812.'~ These small vessels were almost indistinguishable from their American

c o ~ n t e r p a r t s .American
~~
customs authorities sympathized with these small producers,
and the effort to distinguish them from American vessels would have required an
enormous effort. Furthermore, prosecution would have cost more than the money
recouped from their seizure; there was simply no incentive to harass people involved in
what was local business, even if it did cross the border.

Federal law required all vessels to have their name and homeport clearly painted
on their stem to identify them. But smuggling vessels often concealed or falsified their
~~
flags do not seem to have been required; some masters
name and h 0 m e ~ 0 t - t .National
flew them, others did not. Federal law forbade merchants to move or unload goods after
sunset.29 Vessels that changed their appearance, rig or name required new registers or
enrolln~ents.~~
Collectors held enormous bonds on the legal behavior of a vessel,
sometimes up to three times the value of the ship and its cargo. Departing ships did not
receive their registers and other customs paperwork until all bonds, paperwork, and other
requirements were complete. Most merchants saw the wisdom of conforming to
American conlmercial laws. Compared with the British colonies, American regulations
were relatively simple and inexpensive, a fact noted with envy by some of New
Brunswick's

inhabitant^.^'

Delesdemier seems to have used his office to facilitate trade

as much as possible; before 1808 he made few seizures and made special
accommodations to ensure that trade on the border proceeded as smoothly as possible.
While larger ports possessed a trio of customhouse officers who held presidential
commissions (a collector, naval officer, and surveyor), at Passamaquoddy and other small
ports the collector performed all three functions. The collector's primary duty was to tax
imported goods at rates set by Congress. Secondary duties included recording all such
transactions and hiring individuals to assist in collecting government revenue. Naval
officers countersigned customhouse documents after carefully checking the collector's
figures, and assumed charge in the absence of the regular collector. Surveyors were in
charge of registering vessels and all scales and other measuring devices, such as
hydrometers to measure the alcohol content of spirits, and hence the amount of duty.

Compensation for collectors was initially fairly generous without being ostentatious.
Secretary of the Treasury Alexander Hamilton believed in generously compensating the
collectors to ensure that talented men were drawn to the position, and to prevent the
temptation to embezzle.32 Later Jeffersonian administrations were more frugal in their
approach; in 1802 Congress set the limit of a collector's emoluments - including both
salary and fees - at five thousand dollars, even for ports as large as New York

Passamaquoddy's Customs Collectors
The Passamaquoddy customs district had three collectors between 1783 and 1820,
all of whom illustrate the tension between local needs and desires and the demands of the
federal government. During his tenure as collector, Delesdernier exhibited a decidedly
pragmatic approach to office holding, an attitude shared by his successor, Lemuel
Trescott, who took charge of the Passamaquoddy customhouse in 1810. Trescott adopted
many of Delesdernier's policies by largely ignoring cumbersome rules and seeing hlmself
as a facilitator of trade. Both community boosters sought to develop the regional
economy and both were popular local leaders. Stephen Thacher [varies as Thatcher]
replaced Trescott on the latter's retirement in 1818. Thacher was a very different sort of
collector: a political appointee with no local connections who rapidly became unpopular
for his rigid enforcement of the letter of the law.
Louis Delesdernier became collector of Passanlaquoddy in 1789, and continued in
that post to 1810. During that period he oversaw substantial improvements in his district.
First, successfully petitioning Congress to open the Passarnaquoddy customs district to
international arrivals in 1803, thereby legitimizing the already substantial plaster trade

with the Maritime Provinces that passed through the bay.34 By opening his district to
American vessels returning from foreign ports and to foreign vessels, Delesdernier made
Passamaquoddy much more competitive. Local shipping tonnage made an immediate
increase in 1803 after remaining relatively flat for years (see Appendix A). His second
major achievement was the construction of West Quoddy Lighthouse in 1808 on the
approach to the Western Passage. This aid to navigation was a considerable
improvement in helping mariners negotiate the treacherous and foggy waters of the

Delesdernier's local boosterism also seems to have involved a high degree of
tolerance for illicit trade across the border, especially in the plaster trade. American
goods, notably provisions such as flour, Virginia tobacco, American anchors and sails as
well as East India goods such as tea, West India goods such as rum and sugar, flowed
across the border at Passamaquoddy in exchange for plaster, millstones, fish, timber, and
.~~
even agreed with
other products from New Brunswick and Nova ~ c o t i a Delesdernier
his opposite number in New Brunswick to facilitate this trade by creating an unofficial
"neutral zone" wherein American and British vessels could lay alongside one another and
exchange cargoes. British colonial officials viewed Delesdemier as an accessory and
facilitator of smuggling, a fact that bolstered his local popularity.37
Delesdemier's success as a collector was due in part to his closeness with Albert
Gallatin, one of the most influential - and longest serving - Treasury secretaries in
American history. Gallatin stayed with the fellow Swiss Delesdemier family during the
American War of Independence, and they remained friends for decades. Delesdemier
and Gallatin often exchanged personal news in their official correspondence, especially

about Delesdernier's father, who had gone mad.38 The collector utilized this connection
to pursue local improvements, and undoubtedly counted on Gallatin to shield him fiom
criticism, which the secretary did by expressing his opinion to President Jefferson that the
collector was honest and sufficiently diligent for the post, but not especially talented.
Despite Gallatin's fiendship with Delesdernier, the secretary removed him fiom his post
in 1810 for failing to enforce Jefferson's embargo.39 It is difficult to trace Delesdernier's
subsequent movements, but the government did not entirely abandon him. His successor
employed the former collector in various ways around the custon~house.~~
The federal government replaced Delesdemier with Lemuel Trescott, who had
previously served as the collector of nearby Machias. Trescott was a Continental Anny
veteran made famous by his successful attack on a Loyalist outpost on Long Island in
1780. He probably owed his appointment to fellow veteran Henry Dearborn, the
secretary of war under Thomas Jefferson. After the war he became a merchant in the
Passamaquoddy area, and was active in the Order of the Cincinnati, the ~reemasons.~'
Similarly to Delesdernier, Trescott was a local booster; he was involved in early attempts
to establish a bank at Eastport and took an active interest in civic affairs,42 Like
Delesdernier, he seems to have attempted to facilitate local trade as much as possible,
especially before and during the War of 1812. One example of this was Trescott's refusal
to close the port during a ninety-day embargo that preceded the declaration of war
because he had not received official word, which was delayed by a washed-out bridge.
His port hummed with activity as shipping hurriedly cleared out, until at last he ran out of
official papers for them, thus preventing further departures until an official circular that
closed the port finally reached him.43 Trescott retired in 1818, a wealthy man fiom the

emoluments of his eight-year tenure in office. Probate records estimated his estate at
over $30,000, including mahogany furniture and large amounts of cash, much of which
was willed to local charities.44 Trescott, too, enjoyed local popularity; shortly after his
death the people of Eastport commemorated his memory by erecting a lyceum and
schoolhouse, suitably named 'Trescott ~ a 1 1 . ' ~ ~
Stephen Thacher was a very different sort from Delesdernier or Trescott. Thacher
was neither a Revolutionary War veteran nor a local. Instead, he was a Yale-educated
lawyer from southern Maine, appointed to the collectorship of Passarnaquoddy as a
political favor.46 His legal training is significant; one historian has termed lawyers the
"shock troops of capitalism," and claimed that they were the "main purveyors of
capitalist ideology.'A7 This ideology dictated that regional pre-market economies must
subordinate themselves to the national one.48 True to his training and adherence to
capitalism's larger goals, Thacher was inflexible and legalistic, quickly becoming
unpopular with a borderlands populace used to his predecessors' lax enforcement.
Probably the least popular of Thacher's actions was his enforcement of the federal law
that banned foreign vessels under thirty tons from entering American ports.49 Letters to
the local newspaper castigated Thacher as an avaricious political appointee, a poor
replacement for the affable Trescott. One local merchant and noted smuggler complained
of Thacher, that the collector was "the most vexatious man I ever saw, or heard of."50
One newspaper picked up on Thacher's former position as a Massachusetts judge,
nicknamed him "Judge Snatcher," a reference to the rapacity with which he seized even
boats carrying c o r d ~ o o d . ~ '

It would be easy to conclude that Passamaquoddy's first two collectors were
rogues, defrauders of government, and perhaps even traitors. Evidently this is not the
case; the federal government did dismiss and prosecute Delesdernier, and eventually
jailed him for malperformance as collector, yet it did not refuse him a Revolutionary War
pension.52 Trescott, who certainly facilitated some smuggling during the War of 1812,
also impeded much illicit trade, a fact that directly lead to his capture by British forces in
1814 when they occupied Moose Island. While attempting to escape with the
customhouse papers, a well-known smuggler seized Trescott by the collar and held him
until British soldiers arrested the old veteran. It would also be difficult to brand Trescott
with any unpatriotic motives, given his service in the Continental Army and high esteem
the federal government had for him; he was even offered the command of a U.S. Army
regiment in 18 12, a commission he declined.53 These conflicting actions and motives of
the collectors, some based on personal welfare, others on community interests, clashed
with the demands of the distant federal government and national economy. This dynamic
between regional and national economies created strains on borderlands residents, often
resulting in a wary or even hostile attitude toward government officers. These same
conflicts were reflected in the subordinate customhouse officers and even in the revenue
cutters that occasionally patrolled Passamaquoddy Bay.

Lesser Customhouse Officers and Revenue Cutters
The collectors did not carry out their duties alone. Various subordinate customs
officers and the crews of the several revenue cutters that patrolled Maine waters
supported them. The most consistently present were the inspectors, generally part-time

employees who did the outdoors work of the customhouse, such as boarding vessels,
checking paperwork, and pursuing smugglers in small open boats. Below them worked

an assortn~entof boatmen and guards. Less frequently, the Treasury Department's patrol
vessels, known as "revenue cutters," appeared at Passamaquoddy. Locals served both as
subordinate customs officers and on revenue cutters. Like the collectors, a knowledge of
their activities reveals the attempts of these officials to reconcile local needs with official
demands.
Chief among the lesser customhouse officers was the deputy collector, who took
charge of the customhouse in the absence of the collector. Unlike the other inspectors,
the federal government paid the deputy collector a small annual salary.
Passamaquoddy's first deputy collector was William Coney, who also served as the
region's deputy U.S. marshal after 1808.'~ The official record reveals Coney as a man
deeply concerned with money, petitioning government for his share of seizures or
questioning the right of the U.S. military to make seizures from which he would not
benefit." Coney made a number of seizures, but he, too, seems to have taken an interest
in facilitating trade, especially during the War of 1812. Notably, the two men who posted
bonds for his service as deputy marshal, Samuel Tuttle and Jabez Mowry, were both
notorious smugglers.56 A Boston newspaper claimed in 1814 that: " He has been in the
British interest some time, and was in the habit of giving every facility to smugglers."57
Coney's career ended with the British occupation of Eastport in 1814. Rather than
remove to American territory, he remained under British jurisdiction, and even took a
loyalty oath to the British crown.'* Coney apparently preferred the comforts of retaining
his property to the abstractions of national loyalty.

The lesser customhouse officers remain relatively anonymous, but some of their
names appear in legal records. A few were direct relatives of the collectors, such as
Delesdernier's son William. Others, such as John Swett, served intermittently for many
years; a number worked for the custonlhouse less often. The pay could be lucrative,
usually two dollars a day, paid in hard-to-find cash.59 Much of this work was done by
patrolling in open boats, or guarding warehouses, or serving as tidewaiters who remained
on board vessels prior to their sailing to ensure additional cargoes were not illicitly
loaded at the last minute. Generally it was not dangerous employment, and customhouse
officers were unarmed. But during Jefferson's embargo, Collector Delesdernier had to

a m his employees.60 Gunplay was fairly common during Jefferson's embargo, and on
occasion smugglers did assault or even kidnap these

officer^.^'

Sometimes these officers

betrayed the trust put in them by the collector; on at least one occasion the alleged assault
on a customs guard was a fraud.62 Others succumbed to bribes and threats.63 Gauging
the honesty and effectiveness of these officers is extremely difficult because of a scarcity
of records. Those who betrayed the trust placed in them and were caught are most
evident, but this leaves questions about the more conscientious customhouse officers as
well as the ones who may not have been caught aiding or abetting smugglers.
The United States Treasury Department operated two revenue cutters in the Gulf
Early
~ in 1812, the
of Maine from the early l79Os, with more added before 181 2 . ~
federal government conlrnissioned a cutter exclusively for Passamaquoddy, which was
promptly captured by the British Navy, and another after the war.65 The mere presence
of a cutter forced those engaged in illicit trade to work much harder and carefidly than
they normally would have. Cutters maximized their utility by sending out smaller craft to

patrol. For instance, in August, 1811, the American revenue cutter New Hampshire's
boat approached more than a dozen vessels anchored off West Quoddy Head. When the
anchored vessels realized the craft approaching them was a revenue cutter's boat, they
immediately got under way. Despite this precipitous flight, the cutter's boat boarded and
seized three coasting schooners with a total of 2 10 tons of gypsum illicitly introduced
from New ~ r u n s w i c k Nonetheless,
.~~
the presence of revenue cutters was temporary, and
only hindered rather than stopped smuggling.
Like the collectors and other customhouse officers, the captains of the revenue
cutters displayed a spectrum of tolerance for smuggling. While Benjamin Trevett of
Lubec earned the nickname "capt. Ketchum" and epithet "pirate," other cutter officers
seem to have been quite popular. This was especially true of Hopley Yeaton, captain of
the cutter New Hampshire from 1803 to 1811. Yeaton is a significant historical figure in
that he was the first commissioned officer in the United States Revenue Cutter service,
and has thus been deemed the "father of the United States Coast ~ u a r d . " ~Yeaton
'
seems
to have become acquainted with Passamaquoddy while captain of the New Hampshire,
and moved to what is now Lubec, Maine, around 1800. Yeaton, who was a fisherman
himself, seems to have acted with restraint and forbearance when dealing with local
mariners. The man who replaced Yeaton as captain of the New Hampshire offered a
vivid contrast. William P. Adams was a former naval officer, and it showed in his
imperious attitude. Even his superiors thought him too haughty for the position; one
claimed "he is not possessed of the discretion requisite for the command of a Revenue
Adams's unpopularity and arrogance soon caught up with him: the federal
government removed him from command in 1812, despite his appeals to the press.69

Positions on cutters were political plums widely sought after by many mariners.
They provided steady employment, and paid cash, with the potential for prize money or
portions of the proceeds of vessels seized and condemned in court. While a position on a
cutter was sure to make a mariner unpopular with some people, there never seems to have
been a shortage of men willing to serve on these vessels. One recommendation for Zenas
Morton to be the commander of the cutter at Passamaquoddy even noted his smuggling
past. The author stated: "it would be improper of me to recommend a man to support the
laws that I knew he himself had violated, but this will not exactly apply to Capt. Morton;
[but] it is true that I think he was concerned in the illegal importation of some wine into
this distri~t."~'Collector Trescott did well not to forward the application to the Treasury
Department, for within weeks Morton stood accused of participating in plaster
smuggling7'

Catching and Punishing Smugglers

Delesdernier, Trescott, and Thacher rarely captured smugglers or seized
contraband themselves. Instead they relied on a system of informers, officers under their
direct control, and patrols by revenue cutters'- the forerunners of the United States Coast
Guard. The collector, once informed of a seizure, then collected evidence and sent it to
Maine's federal district judge. Complex or appealed cases could go to the Massachusetts
Federal Circuit Court, and on occasion the United States Supreme Court heard smuggling
cases from Passarnaquoddy as well. Under American federal law there was no such
crime as "smuggling." Generally government officials seized contraband "for a breach
of the Revenue-Law of the United States." The U.S. district attorney usually brought

charges against the vessel or goods involved, rather than the smugglers, except when
there had been violent resistance to federal officers. If the district court successhlly
prosecuted the contraband, the local U.S. marshal then auctioned off the goods involved,
with a portion going to the government and a portion going to the officers or informants
involved.
Infornlation was a key element in combating smuggling. Collectors had to keep a
sharp lookout for vessels or cargoes that might be involved in smuggling. Informants
were one such source, and could reap large rewards. However, such actions entailed
enormous risks and complications. In a comnlunity known for smuggling, infornlants
were very unpopular, especially as they stood to gain by somebody else's loss.72
Furthermore, motives to inform varied, ranging from personal gain, to revenge, to
twisting the legal system so that it would actually promote smuggling. Even the
collectors sometimes disliked infornlants; Trescott referred to one as a "~coundrill."~~
Customs inspectors caught most of the smugglers who were brought to trial.
Often patrolling in an open rowboat, these officers boarded vessels, inspected their
paperwork, and sometimes searched it for evidence of illicit trade. If the officer
suspected or found a vessel that contained contraband, he seized it and its cargo for trial
before a federal judge. Once seized, customs officials handed the vessel over to the local
deputy U S . marshal for care until the district court determined what to do with it.
Sometimes officials had the seized vessels beached and stripped of their sails and rudder
to prevent escape, or as it was termed, "rescue" the vessel. Passamaquoddy's collectors
sometimes sent seized vessels or cargoes as far westward as Portland to ensure their

safety from rescue.74 Sometimes customs officers seized only a vessel's cargo, or part of
cargo, and placed it in a secure warehouse to await trial. If the owner or the master of the
vessel had sufficient resources and was deemed trustworthy, the court might permit him
to post bond for the vessel and cargo before trial and thus retrieve them while the slow
legal process ground on.75
Many smugglers took advantage of this bonding'system as a means of
legitimizing their goods, especially during the War of 1812. The system relied on courtappointed local merchants to assess the value of the seized goods. These supposedly
honest merchants, however, often valued the goods far below their market price sometimes at only ten percent of their true market value.76 The claimant of the
contraband had to post bond for the assessed value, or up to three times the value of the
goods in certain cases, upon which his goods were released to him after paying bonds of
only a fraction of the contraband's value. The system actually encouraged smugglers to
inform against themselves because they could recover the informant's share of the
proceeds.77 Furthemlore, if the smuggler successfully defended his case, he recovered
the bonds; if that failed, he could always petition the Treasury secretary or Congress, as
many merchants did.78 The system outraged the American military commander at
Eastport, who complained bitterly about a practice that undermined his efforts to stop
wartime s n ~ u ~ ~ l i Collector
n ~ . ' ~ Trescott's motivations in permitting bonding seem to
have been two-fold. First, it got both the contraband and its claimants out of his district,
saving him considerable time, effort, and worry about rescues or storing the illicit goods.
Second, he received gifts of cash from relieved merchants; on one occasion a New York
merchant gave him $100 for assisting in the bonding process.80
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The collectors frequently attended the federal courts themselves to aid the federal
district attorney in prosecuting the case, necessitating long trips to the westward. Often
they had to collect extensive written depositions from witnesses to support their case;
federal law excused witnesses from having to travel more than one hundred miles, and
often pernlitted transients such as mariners to make sworn statements rather than
appearing in person. This was in keeping with revolutionary ideals that justice be
accessible and relatively cheap. Sometimes witnesses did have to travel to the federal
courts to testify, but they were reimbursed for their expenses by the district's U.S.
marshal. Unfortunately for the witnesses, U.S. Marshal Thomas G. Thomton sometimes
took years to pay their bills.81
Written depositions leave the impression that Eastport in particular was a
community of eyes and ears. Some depositions are completely based on the rumbling
noises of barrels loaded in the dark; others attempt to establish the exact location of a
vessel's anchorage.82 Not all depositions were especially usehl, however; many
witnesses exhibited a sort of willhl ignorance, claiming they did not know the names of
people, or forgetting other key pieces of information. It is also probable that smugglers
chose to work in relative anonymity, not revealing their names to one another. These
depositions were made before local justices, many of whom were smugglers themselves,
or sympathetic to smugglers. A degree of caution must therefore be used when
considering this evidence. However, they also provide a wealth of details about ordinary
life at Passamaquoddy.

The collector worked with the United States district attorney to prosecute the
case. The basic facts, including the date, parties involved, list of contraband, and specific
laws broken, were taken down on a printed form known as a "libel." Legal proceedings
were generally against a vessel or against the contraband goods. Vessels in maritime law
had a corporate identity similar to a person; it is one of the reasons the law required them
to have names, and why smugglers often changed or obscured the name of their vessel
and its port of call.83 Sometimes the accused smugglers stepped forward to legally
defend their actions and claim the goods. If that occurred they were entitled to a trial by
jury, one of the few American departures from British admiralty law, which seldom used
juries. If no claimant stepped forward, no jury was required and the federal judge
decreed or "condemned" the goods. The judge then ordered the U.S. marshal to auction
the goods off publicly after advertising the sale in local newspapers. Generally half the
proceeds of the auction went to the U.S. Treasury and the captors, usually the collector
and informant or officer involved, received the other half - or one "moiety" - after the
court deducted the cost of the trial.
The trials were held far from Passamaquoddy. The nearest sitting of the federal
court was in Wiscasset, hundreds of miles to the west of Eastport. The U.S. federal court
system was a humble institution during its first few decades of existence. It rotated
between York, Portland, Wiscasset and occasionally Castine. Usually it sat in
courthouses or meetinghouses borrowed from Massachusetts, but sometimes it convened
in the federal judge's own home. When state courts needed those courtrooms, the federal

court found itself sitting in "Mechanic's Hall" in Portland or "a room over the bank" in
Wiscasset, The district's sole federal judge and other court officers had to travel to these
10cations.~~
The American system for prosecuting smugglers was far from perfect; it created
tensions within small communities and it was open to abuse. For example, locals
harbored deep grievances against both inspectors and informants who enriched
themselves at the expense of their neighbors, and violence, threatened or real, could
ensue after a seizure. If the owner of the seized vessel was a poor man, a seizure could
impoverish him and his family.85 Sometimes there was bickering about the just allotment
of the proceeds of successfully prosecuted seizures. Clever smugglers sometimes
informed against themselves, knowing they could recoup their losses through various
ploys, including gaining the informant's share for themselves. Furthemlore, the
collector's tolerance of smuggling was often exceeded by the lesser customhouse
officers. Delesdernier's downfall during Jefferson's embargo was the result of his
subordinates breaking into a customs warehouse and using the customhouse boat to
smuggle goods across the lines.86
The American system of suppressing smuggling had some features that made it
very different from the British colonial system. These differences were based on the
American pre-Revolutionary experience of smugglers. Trial by jury within a reasonable
distance of one's home was clearly a reaction against pre-Revolutionary efforts to have
.~~
locals as customs officers was
all smugglers tried in Halifax, Nova ~ c o t i a Appointing
another; American colonials had deeply resented British appointees. Importantly,
Maritimers also detested British officials sent to regulate them after 1 7 8 3 . ~So
~ too, the

American system was relatively non-violent as well. Customs officers were not armed,
except during extraordinary times such as Jefferson's embargo. Even the revenue cutters
seemed to have operated with little implied or actual violence. This was in keeping with
the spirit of a Treasury Department circular issued by Alexander Hamilton to the first
revenue cutter captains in 1791, which enjoined them to act with "a cool and temperate
perseverance in their duty, by address & moderation rather than by vehemence or
~iolence."'~

Conclusion
The reaction of borderlands residents to the centralizing authority of the United
States government was remarkably con~plex,in no small part because some served as
federal officers themselves. Passamaquoddy's customs collectors often found themselves
trapped between local interests and government regulations, a situation they often
attempted to ameliorate by making local exceptions to federal regulations or perceiving
their duty as one of facilitating trade rather than halting it. The border populace loathed
inflexible or imperious customs officers, and quickly generated editorials, petitions, and
complaints against them.
Passamaquoddy's citizens, in common with other American frontier peoples, had
an abiding fear of taxes. 90 During peaceful times, Passamaquoddy's residents paid their
customhouse duties and fees fairly happily; maybe more happily than most American
mariners because they probably knew how expensive and corrupt New Brunswick and
Nova Scotia customs systems were. However, during times of turmoil and financial

hardship, locals resented taxation and regulation that threatened their livelihoods, and
naturally resisted them. When federal courts called on them to account for their behavior,
they responded with a variety of excuses, or fled to British North Ameri~a.~'
Despite their misgivings about paying taxes, many locals sought employment at
the customhouse or on board revenue cutters to augment their incomes. But
Passamaquoddy's populace were almost entirely reliant on maritime trade, and when the
federal government acted in an arbitrary or heavy-handed manner, as it did between late
1807 through the War of 1812 they deeply resented it and resisted conmercial
regulations. The American residents near the border were active participants in
American democracy, and petitioned with some success for internal improvements such
as the West Quoddy lighthouse. This did not prevent them from manipulating American
commercial regulations for their own benefit, or occasionally defying the government
outright, but in the early republic this sort of pragmatic, regional response was common
throughout the United States. The so-called "Whiskey Rebellion" of 1794 in western
Pennsylvania was one such tax revolt, as was the "Nullification Crisis" of 1832-1833.
Passarnaquoddy's three American customs collectors, even those who apparently
winked at illicit trade, faced a difficult task in controlling the border region. While
Delesdernier and Trescott seemed to have been in sympathy with smugglers, even they
made seizures from time to time. Thacher's approach was less sympathetic, in part
because he was a political appointee with no local connections. The popularity of the
first two collectors and the unpopularity of the last was due to their enforcement of laws
designed to control smuggling. This popularity was directly linked to the methods used

by customs officers and the legal consequences for smugglers once caught, as well as the
rewards to customs officers for catching smugglers. A similar dynamic operated on the
New Brunswick side of the boundary.
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CHAPTER 4:
COLONIAL ENFORCEMENT

The Falmouth Incident
New Brunswick's colonial customs officials faced some of the same problems
enforcing commercial regulations as did their American counterparts. But there were two
important differences between the American and British customs systems and the
problems they faced. First, the British colonial customs system continued to suffer from
salutary neglect after the Revolution, and possessed none of the administrative vigor
displayed by Americans such as Secretary of the Treasury Alexander Hamilton. Second,
the colonial customs system was divided between two kinds of officers, those who
regarded their offices as profitable sinecures and those who wanted to reform the system
to operate efficiently. The result was that corruption was rife, scandals were frequent,
and customs officers spent much of their time defending their reputations. The event that
illustrates the problems of New Brunswick's customs officers most clearly is the
Falmouth incident of 1805.

'

On the surface the Falmouth incident appears unremarkable. On October 24,
1805, the captain of the Union cutter acting under the authority of the Superintendent of
Trade and Fisheries seized the American sloop Falmouth for violating British
commercial laws that forbade American vessels to trade while within New Brunswick

waters. The Falmouth was engaged in the illicit plaster trade, whereby Maritimes plaster
producers exchanged gypsum for American goods, especially flour, at the border by
simply transferring cargoes from one ship to another. George Leonard, in his capacity as
Superintendent of Trade and Fisheries, had been battling this form of smuggling for some
years. As recently as 1803 he had success~llyprosecuted two American vessels engaged
in the plaster trade.2 Expecting this seizure to proceed in a routine manner, the Union
escorted the Falmouth to Saint John for adjudication by New Brunswick's vice-admiralty
court.
Leonard sought to encourage British shipping and colonial control of the plaster
trade, but his greater concern was smuggling. In a letter to his patron Thomas Carleton,
the absentee Governor of New Bnmswick, Leonard wrote the following:
These evils [of the plaster trade], tho' great, are however
comparatively small when the clandestine trade, that is
encouraged by these illicit practices, is taken into
consideration; for the above articles are principally, if not
altogether, paid for, by Teas and coarse cottons imported
from the East Indies by the Americans, adulterated
brandies, and other spirits, coarse shoes and Boots, and
other articles, principally the manufactures of the United
States, received in return for the Plaister and Grindstones.
These contraband articles, thus received, are afterwards
easily distributed by boats and small craft t h o ' every part
of this Province, and also tho' that valuable and populous
part of the Province of Nova Scotia lying upon the Bay of
~ u n d ~ . ~
Leonard went on to detail how American merchants at Passamaquoddy also received
timber, lumber, furs, and fish in return for their goods. He concluded: "Accordingly it is
to be seen that the subjects of the United States near the boundary line and especially
upon Moose Island, where they have a Custom house established are becoming very
wealthy and have large stores erected for carrying on this species of Commerce, altho'

their soil and its products and harbors are inferior.'* Leonard believed correctly that
because of these American traders, British merchants found it impossible to compete
unless they themselves became smugglers. The same reason accounted for what he
termed "the appearance of lack of property in general among the inhabitants on the
British side."5 Eliminating smuggling at Passamaquoddy became something of a
personal quest for Leonard, one that would earn him many enemies within the province.
The Falmouth case became a difficult one for Leonard. First, the American
captain proved especially willing and able to defend his case in court. Second, New
Brunswick's customs establishment opposed Leonard's rigid enforcement of the
Navigation Acts. Third, because the possession of the islands in Passamaquoddy Bay was
still undetem~ined,the matter drew the attention of both the United States and British
governments. The Falmouth incident thus underscores many of the problems colonial
customs officials faced in stopping smuggling at Passamaquoddy.

In January, 1806, the Falmouth case quickly went on trial before William
Botsford, New Brunswick's vice-admiralty court judge.6 The captain of the Falmouth
and his lawyers put up a skillful defense. They contended that the sloop was in American
waters at the time of seizure, and that the American customs collector had given him
permission to proceed to what was termed a "neutral area" where it was customary for
American vessels to take on cargoes of plaster directly from British vessels.' This
defense was problematic because both Britain and the United States claimed jurisdiction
over the waters in which the Falmouth anchored. Diplomats had yet to decide what
nation should possess Moose, Dudley, Allan, and Pope's Folly islands. American
citizens lived on and claimed all the islands as part of Massachusetts, but New Brunswick

officials claimed them as well. Furthermore, the "neutral zone" the Falmouth lay in was
an unofficial construction made in 1799 between the American customs collector, Lewis
Delesdernier, and his New Brunswick counterpart from St. Andrews, Deputy Customs
Collector John ~ u n n . '
The prosecution countered with its own arguments. Foremost among these was
the point that the Falmouth was anchored in British waters because all of the islands in
Passamaquoddy Bay were part of New Brunswick according to the 1783 Treaty of Paris.
The prosecution also attacked the idea that local customs officers could create a neutral
zone on their own authority. The defense contested the allegations of British sovereignty
over all the islands in Passamaquoddy Bay, and brought forth New Brunswick's customs
collector and comptroller as witnesses to attest to the validity of the "neutral zone." They
even brought the American customs collector to Saint John to testify.
The Falmouth case was a struggle between the province's customhouse
authorities and the superintendent of trade and fisheries, with the Falmouth and the viceadmiralty court judge in the middle. Leonard brought some damning evidence against
the customhouse authorities, including the fact that the agent for the Falmouth's cargo of
gypsum was the custonls surveyor and searcher, Colin Campbell; the owner of the cargo
. ~ William Botsford found against the Falmouth, and
was Campbell's son, Colin ~ r Judge
ordered the vessel and cargo condemned, but refused to fine the owners or captain
because they were engaged in a trade that had been tolerated for so long. Botsford also
found that all of the islands in the bay should be considered as within New Brunswick's
jurisdiction, and that the customs authorities had indeed exceeded their authority in
creating a neutral zone. However, the judge also condemned Leonard for his conduct in

bringing unfounded charges against the owners of the vessel. The mixed results of the
trial hardened the rivalry between Leonard and New Brunswick's customhouse
establishment. l o

Mercantilism and the British Empire

The struggle to control commercial shipping and eliminate smuggling was not
restricted to New Brunswick; it occurred throughout the British Empire, including
England, and London itself. The issue was the entire conception of trade: was trade to
serve the interests of the state, or did the state exist to support trade? The former concept,
known as mercantilism, was the dominant paradigm in the eighteenth century, but by the
beginning of the nineteenth century it was just beginning to be challenged by free trade.
However, ordinary people had always challenged mercantilism at the popular level by
resisting the many restrictions and taxation it imposed. Resistance or support of
mercantilism entered political debate, newspaper editorials, street theater, and smuggling.

In many ways, the reaction to mercantilism is related to the ideology of the British
Empire. This ideology was a loose set of ideas that propounded the empire as
"Protestant, commercial, maritime, and free."" However, support of mercantilist policies
did not necessarily equate with unequivocal support for the empire or vice versa; the
issue was always clouded by pragmatic commercial concerns, or those who worried that
the state was encroaching on their traditional liberties. Furthermore, those who loudly
supported mercantilism often subverted those very policies by engaging in smuggling.

Mercantilism is a modern label for an eighteenth-century concept. Adam Smith,
the man most responsible for the demise of mercantilism, invented the tern1 "mercantile
system" in the late eighteenth century. More recently, Smith's phrase has been shortened
to "mercantilism," a term that implies far more rational thought and consistency than
actually existed.I2 At the time, when people referred to British trade policies they
generally discussed the "Navigation Acts," a series of laws passed by Parliament, starting
in 1651, which endured until about 1850. These laws embraced three principles. First,
only British ships could trade with British colonies; the ship had to be built within the
empire, and the law required that its captain and three-quarters of the crew were British
subjects. Second, the laws restricted the kind of commodities British colonies sent to the
mother country; for instance, a New Brunswick merchant could not ship tea bought in the
United States to Britain. Third, goods from outside the British Empire were supposed to
pass through Britain first, where they would be taxed before distribution to colonial
markets.l 3
These laws enriched the British Empire at the expense of its ~ o m ~ e t i t o r s . ' ~
Mercantilism deprived foreign governments of valuable shipping and markets, while
enhancing British customs revenue and shipping. Britain's rise to preeminence among
the European powers was often attributed to the Navigation Acts, and many believed that
this system promoted national and commercial security.15 Offenses against the
Navigation Acts were therefore deemed as a direct assault on the British Empire's safety
and prosperity. Nova Scotia's vice-admiralty court judge, while prosecuting a smuggler,
claimed that every deviation from the Navigation Acts was a "nail driven into the Coffin
of the British empire."16 Some colonial officials, such as George Leonard, would have

agreed. But given the scale of smuggling in British North America, it is apparent that
many were willing to sacrifice the needs of the empire for their own pragmatic concerns,
even in a Loyalist colony like New Brunswick. Many Maritimers believed it was "a
crime to support the fair [legal] trader by repressing smuggling."" Moreover, some of
those who acted contrary to the Navigation Acts were the very individuals who should
have been enforcing it, such as New Brunswick's custon~ouseofficers.'*
The Navigation Acts were a mixed blessing for New Brunswick. Shipbuilders
liked them because the laws deemed colonial-built vessels as British, and allowed them
access to the vast imperial markets.19 Timber merchants also appreciated the benefits of
imperial privileges.20 Others complained about commercial restrictions, or evaded the
laws through a wide variety of schemes. There is a growing body of evidence that the
Navigation Acts seldom performed in the manner intended; Canadian historian Gerald S.
Graham categorized contraband as a crucial staple of North Atlantic trade.21 American
historian Francis Jennings has gone so far as to say that smuggling was "necessary and
intrinsic" to colonial trade.22 One of the problems with British mercantilism was that the
British North American economy was too underdeveloped to perform its assigned role
within the imperial economy, and thus attempts to enforce the Navigation Acts "only
produced smuggling and evasion."23
Another problem with the Navigation Acts was that the United States remained
both an important market and producer for colonial and British merchants.24 The
Maritime Provinces needed American commodities such as wheat, and the British wanted
access to America's growing demand for manufactured items. Con~merciallyaggressive
American merchants, farmers, and fishennen sought access to colonial markets, and

frontier colonies like New Brunswick had difficulty in excluding American goods from
their markets, so Saint John's customs officials used their discretion in bending, or even
'
were made by the colony's officials to
breaking the Navigation ~ c t s . ~Attempts
discourage smuggling, and one of Lt. Governor Thomas Carleton's first actions was to
forbid illicit and illegal trade with the United States, or the aiding or assisting therein.26
Therefore, when authorities arrested Gillam Butler of Campobello for smuggling
American whale oil that he claimed was British, provincial authorities acted in a manner
intended to discourage further illicit trade with the United States. The courts found
Butler guilty, and attempted to make an example of him when it fined him £500 and
sentenced him to three months in prison.27
Yet Carleton and his successors could not consistently pursue rigid enforcement
of the Navigation Acts. In order to obtain supplies necessary for colonial enterprise such
as shipbuilding, Carleton had to press imperial officials in London to change the laws,
and occasionally they did.28 But overall, imperial officials pursued policies for the
benefit of the imperial core rather than the colonial periphery. Sometimes these policies
benefited the colonies, but often they did not. As Adam Smith, himself a customs officer,
noted, the system was often corrupt and unproductive.29 In New Brunswick and Nova
Scotia, the mercantilist system benefited some merchants, but hurt others and drove up
prices for ordinary consumers. With a few exceptions, such as George Leonard, colonial
and imperial officials often turned a blind eye, or even actively participated in,
smuggling. Far from discouraging smuggling, crown customs officers often shielded
smuggling activity.

New Brunswick's Customs Officials

Like the United States, New Brunswick had difficulty stopping smuggling at
Passamaquoddy. Controlling cross-border trade was hard enough, but when the border
was as indefinite as that which ran between the United States and New Brunswick,
enforcing anti-smuggling laws became an administrative nightmare.30 Furthermore, the
United States produced in abundance low-cost, high-quality foodstuffs, especially flour,
the very products New Brunswick could not provide for itself and that the British markets
could not provide.31 New Brunswick's attempts to control trade with the United States
were often undercut by British imperial policy; sometimes the Colonial Office in London
encouraged trade with the United States, while on other occasions it forbade it. The
complex relationship of the Loyalist population, with its strong commercial and
emotional ties with the United States, further complicated the issue; from its inception,
New Brunswick struggled to control illicit trade with the United States and usually
failed.32 These problems are best understood through New Brunswick's customhouse, a
remarkably corrupt and lax establishment even by contemporary standards.
New Brunswick's customhouse establishment is fairly typical of the colonial
customs service. New Brunswick's customs authorities operated out of Saint John, the
colony's largest port and site of its only full-fledged customhouse. A small number of
lesser officials worked in the province's other ports, which were known as "outports."
Saint Andrews was always one of New Brunswick's more important outports. From the
founding of the colony at least one customs official, deemed a sub-collector, operated at

Passamaquoddy, generally at Saint Andrews. But as the plaster trade became more
important, another customs officer served shipping interests fhther down the bay at
~am~obello.~~
Most New Brunswick's customs officials, like their counterparts in the rest of
British North America, proved extremely tolerant of illicit trade. In this they closely
resembled the behavior of Crown customs officers in the thirteen American Colonies
before the Revolution. Often locally appointed colonial custon~sofficers were lax, and
Crown customs collectors appointed from Britain were unpopular due to their venality,
corruption or inflexibility.34
British imperial officials showed little interest in colonial reform following the
American Revolution, and largely continued a policy of 'salutary neglect' after
establishing New ~ r u n s w i c k .The
~ ~ king appointed a lieutenant governor who in turn
chose a council that acted as advisors. The council represented the interests of the
colonial elite, and was composed of wealthy and powerful individuals who often held
other offices as well, such as supreme-courtjudges.36 An elected Legislative Assembly
represented the interests of ordinary New Brunswickers. Largely composed of
merchants, the Assembly introduced new legislation for the approval of the lieutenant
governor, who in turn sent it to England for Crown approval. The Assembly, as Leonard
noted, was often in sympathy with smugglers owing to its own predominantly
commercial composition.37 Despite this sympathy, members paid lip service to the very
Navigation Acts they flaunted by arranging a portrait of arch-mercantilist Lord Sheffield
to hang in the Assembly chambers, a perfect representation of the differences between
Loyalist action and ideology.38
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The political system was neither egalitarian nor especially democratic, nor was it
intended to be.39 The political ideals of New Brunswick's Loyalists were based on a
concept of deference whereby the middling and lower social orders supported a wealthy
educated elite who in turn were supposed to reciprocate by doing their best to bring
stability and prosperity to the colony.40 Central to this idea of deference was the rule of
law: New Brunswick's supreme court judges sat in the governor's council, where they
vigorously defended status and privilege.4' Furthermore, Loyalists were obsessed with
legal technicalities, and were quick to sue.42 Despite ideals of good order, rule of law,
and elite government, New Brunswick almost immediately developed a lively political
climate in which the middling and lower classes challenged the assumptions of the
colonial elite.43 New Brunswick's political dynamic quickly began to resemble to that of
the pre-Revolutionary colonies, an uneasy and fractious relationship in which the
governors and council, assembly, and Crown office holders competed for power.44
The most lucrative offices in the colony were in the Crown customhouse in Saint
John. The highest-ranked customs officer in the colony, ternled the collector, sometimes
made more in a year than even the lieutenant governor, both from a salary and fees
extracted from shipping.45 Those customs officers, directly appointed by the Customs
Commissioners, held their appointments at the pleasure of the Crown, which was
essentially an appointment for life. Lesser officials held their office on the pleasure of
the customs collector. The entire customs hierarchy existed outside of the colonial
government's direct authority (see Figure 4.1). It formed almost "a state-within-a-stateconnected with, but basically independent of, the various other royal

official^.'^^

The

primary duties of these officers were to regulate shipping by enforcing the Navigation
Acts, and to tax incoming goods with imperial duties that went to the Crown and
supported colonial government. These offices were both prestigious for the office holder
and genuinely important to the colony as a whole, and this excited the interest of other
government bodies and the jealousy of other office holders, especially George Leonard.
The customs collector was the most important officer in the customhouse. The
Board of Customs Commissioners in London directly appointed this official and charged
him with overall regulation of customs matters in New Brunswick. This included a
considerable patronage network, whereby the collector appointed minor officers to
control the province's outports. The collector was responsible only to the customs
commissioners and to the Colonial Office; even the lieutenant governor had little
authority over customs issues. While the annual salary was only £50, the collector was
also entitled to gather fees for every service rendered to shipping, such as an entry or
clearance certificate. While these fees were usually just a few shillings per transaction,
they were numerous enough to provide a substantial income for the collector. Between
1807 and 1808 the collector's income averaged £ 800; by 1816, the collector garnered a
stunning £2,900 - £900 more than the lieutenant-governor's salary - thereby initiating an
extensive investigation by the Assembly into the fee structure at the Saint John
custon~house.~~
The Assembly committee found extensive abuse in the fee system, and
the Treasury censured him and fined him £250; nonetheless, he remained in office.48 The
corruption within Saint John's customhouse highlights the inconsistencies between
Loyalist myth and reality in New Brunswick.

Loyalist Ideology, Officeholding, and Corruption

Determining the ideology of the Loyalists is no easy task, but a crucial one in
recovering the "mentality" of New Brunswick officials.49 George RudC defined ideology
as a blend of two elements, one of popular beliefs and the other adopted ideas fiom
outside, what he termed "inherent" versus "derived" influences that overlapped one
another. Inherent ideology tended to be backward-looking, demanding the restoration of
traditional rights. Derived ideology tended to be forward looking, seeking reform rather
than re~toration.~'Rudt's model of ideology underscores the essential difference
between American republican ideology and the Loyalist ideology of the remaining
British colonies in mainland North America.
American scholars in recent decades have created a large body of knowledge on
the ideology of the American Revolution. Generally this has concentrated on the
"Patriot" cause, the revolutionaries who emerged victorious in the American War of
Independence. Republicanism was in some ways a dynamic driven by the tension
between an inherent ideology, such as preserving the "rights of Englishmen," and derived
ideological concepts, such as virtue.51 For officeholders the key elements of this derived
ideology was virtue, whereby they defined their interests and duties in terms of the
common good; they subsumed personal interests for public ones. Sociologist Max Weber
identified the creation of a bureaucracy based on merit and technical qualifications as an
important factor in the rise of the modem state; but Loyalist officeholders possessed an
ideology that revolved around pre-modem ideals of privilege and social status.52

Much less has been written on the ideology of the Loyalists, which was largely
based on ancient but loose British ideals of Protestantism, commerce, maritime power,
and

The strongest element of Loyalist ideology was essentially backward-

looking, seelung to restore the pre-1775 world to create an hierarchical society based on
deference and loyalty. Loyalists attempted to put these ideals into practice when the
British imperial government created New Brunswick as a separate colony at their request.
Prominent among the Loyalists who sought the creation of New Brunswick was the
former Massachusetts attorney general, Jonathan Sewall, an officeholder who had
strongly resisted the rise of Boston radicals in the 1770s. Yet even Sewall, one of the
most outspoken Tory pamphleteers, had acted to defend Boston smuggler and equally
~
ideology
outspoken Whig John Hancock fiom the imperial Customs ~ o a r d . 'Loyalist
accommodated both the ideals of an orderly society and more pragmatic economic
concerns, but sometimes these values conflicted, as with smuggling. This created an
ambivalence, perhaps even hypocrisy, among Loyalist officials. These conflicting
desires were born of their pre-Revolutionary experiences and traveled with them when
creating and administering New Brunswick.
The behavior of customs officials in Sewall's pre-Revolutionary Massachusetts
largely explains the behavior of New Brunswick's customs officers. In Weber's tern~s,
these colonial officials viewed their posts as patrimonial, an office they owned based on
their loyalty to the king, and being so far fiom the king's authority, they quite naturally
pursued personal agendas." In colonial Massachusetts this meant that many customs
officials "bent with the wind" and ignored or even expedited illegal intercourse. In
cooperating with smugglers, customs officers avoided a great deal of trouble, profited

from official and unofficial remuneration, and gained the esteem and fhendship of
colonial merchants without loss of self respect, social esteem, or even much risk of
censure from the Customs Commissioners. Their official dereliction of duty could be
tolerated because of their public profession of loyalty to the king and the widely held
conviction that the growth of the British empire's trade was better served by disregarding
the unreasonable restrictions embodied in the less-popular clauses of the Navigation Acts,
such as those prohibiting trade with French islands in the West in die^.'^

New Brunswick's Creole Customs Collectors
New Brunswick's custom officers seem to have retained this pragmatic view of
officeholding. Most of them identified more with the colony's merchants than they did
with the interests of the crown. In his study of the British customs service in colonial
America, Thomas Barrow termed these officials "Creoles." Barrow posited that these
officials' interests had degenerated from those of the Crown to a more local concern due
to their great distance from London, a factor Weber noted was common in patrimonial
bureaucracies. This was especially true when their pay was based on fees collected
directly for their services.'' In contrast to the creoles were the "schematists," customs
officers who attempted to enforce the laws more rigidly and reported frequently to
~ n ~ l a n d . "The
' ~ Falmouth incident, which unfolded in New Brunswick's courts, can
largely be seen as a struggle between Creoles and schematists in the customs service.
New Brunswick's first customs collector was William Wanton, a Loyalist from
Rhode Island and son of its last colonial governor. Wanton received his commission as
collector in 1784 as a means to recover the financial losses his family suffered from the

Revolution. He held the office until his death in 1816, at age eighty-two. Wanton's
Loyalism was of a moderate kind; he claimed before the Revolution his bbprincipleswere
that Great Britain had no right to tax America but the family were never for opposing G.
Britain by arms," a conclusion that indicates his creole sympathies.59 The source of
Wanton's attitudes toward officeholding were probably inherited from his father, who as
Rhode Island's governor proved remarkably tolerant of smugglers and had done his best
to impede official investigations of the burning of the revenue cutter Gaspke in 1772.60
Wanton was a popular man in Saint John social circles and maintained an
epicurean lifestyle on the emoluments of his office. Knowing that the province relied on
trade, Wanton spent little effort suppressing smuggling. Instead he quietly collected his
fees from shipmasters and merchants who were eager to pay them so long as he ignored
their illicit trade. Wanton regarded his position as collector as a sinecure, in keeping with
Weber's dictum that patrimonial bureaucrats considered their office as a personal right
'
malfeasance
rewarding them for their personal loyalty to the m ~ n a r c h . ~Wanton's
proved extremely profitable; in his final year in office alone he garnered over £5,500 in
fees.62 As with creole customs officers in colonial Massachusetts, merchants honored
and rewarded Wanton for his laxity.
Not all of New Brunswick's Loyalists found Wanton's actions laudable. George
Leonard leveled repeated charges against the Saint John customhouse, frequently
accusing it of corruption. Wanton's defense against charges of laxity were calm and
reasoned. His accusers exaggerated their points, he argued, and he expressed a mild
shock at the various accusations made against him.63 After repeated complaints a
commission arrived from London in 1812 to investigate smuggling in New Brunswick

and neighboring colonies. The commission found that in 1810 smugglers brought into
New Brunswick nearly all the tea; three-quarters of the wine; nine-tenths of spirits such
as gin; seven-eighths of all soap and candles; most of the indigo, starch, mustard,
tobacco, and East India textiles; and all of the nankeens, sailcloth, cordage and anchors.
Much of this contraband arrived fiom the United States via ~ a s s a m a ~ u o d d ~In. "that
same year the colony's top five customs officials earned £2,780 to prevent smuggling, the
collector's share netted £871. Yet the Customs Commissioners did not remove Wanton
To pacify
fiom office, or even reprimand him; they tacitly countenanced his beha~ior.~'
Leonard, the Crown gave him greater powers to pursue smugglers, and provided him
with a new cutter to carry out the task.66
Henry Wright, who succeeded Wanton on his death, shared Wanton's views on
office holding as a personal privilege. However, Wright proved far more rapacious than
his predecessor.67 In his first year in office, he collected more than £1,000 in fees above
what Wanton had by arbitrarily raising them by a third. Furthermore, Wright installed his
son-in-law as the deputy collector at Indian Island at Passarnaquoddy and installed his
son - not yet age twenty-one and therefore ineligible for office - as the deputy collector at
~ i r a m i c h i .He
~ ~also dismissed the deputy collector at St. Andrews, an act later found to
be

Whereas Wanton extracted his fees and turned a blind eye to smuggling,

Wright raised the customhouse fees and pursued smugglers, making him increasingly
unpopular. Wright even went so far as to pursue a smuggling case against General John
Coffin, a popular Loyalist leader, member of the Lieutenant Governor's council, and
forn~erconmanding officer of the New Bmnswick Fencible Regiment during the War of
1812.~'

Wright may have been more aggressive than Wanton in pursuing smugglers, yet
he also fits into Barrow's model of a creole officeholder. Wright had no interest in
reforming the customs system, but merely wanted to harness it more effectively for his
own gain. Nonetheless, Wright was not a perfect creole in that he was an outsider, an
Englishman with no local connections. Wright seemed to have an Englishman's disdain
for colonials, an attitude that led him into conflict with General John Coffin, a powerhl
member of the governor's council, whose brother sat in the British House of ~ o m m o n s . ~ '
Wright's men seized a boat belonging to Coffin at Passamaquoddy Bay because they
found American contraband on board. The ensuing public power struggle embarrassed
many of the colonial elite, including Wright, Coffin, and the influential lawyer Ward
~ h i ~ m a Coffin
n . ~ ~even challenged Wright's comptroller to a

Finally the case

was brought before the Customs Commissioners in London, who supported Wright's
position but also launched an investigation into the collector's conduct.74 Smuggling
scandals such as the Falmouth incident and the Wright-Coffin affair thus rocked New
Brunswick society from time to time, much as they had Massachusetts before the

evolution.^^

George Leonard, Schematist
Superintendent of Trade and Fisheries George Leonard is exactly the sort of
official Barrow had in mind when he coined the term "schematist." Barrow defined a
schematist as an officeholder, "either English or colonial, who by dint of continually
submitting reports and suggestions on the operation of the system created a reputation for
knowledge and diligence, thus earning themselves a place in the [customs] service."76

From the 1780s to the eve of the War of 1812, Leonard launched a personal campaign to
eradicate smuggling in the Maritime Provinces. This should not be surprising in a man
that historian William S. MacNutt deemed the most zealous of the New Brunswick
Loyalists, a man who refused to temper his loyalty with "either caution or business
acumen," and who professed to believe that "the War of the American Revolution was
still being fought on New Brunswick

Leonard's hatred of Americans and bitter

memories of the War of Independence fueled his zealous enforcement of the Navigation
Acts, blinding him to the fact that during the Napoleonic Wars imperial authorities were
more interested in maintaining amicable commercial relations with the United States than
in rigidly enforcing commercial laws.78
Leonard's feud with the Saint John customhouse seems to date back to the years
immediately after Britain established New Brunswick as a separate province. Leonard
had occupied a temporary position as Comptroller of Customs with a mandate from
Governor Carleton to suppress the illicit trade with the United

In June, 1786, he

displayed his customary rashness by seizing two American vessels at Passamaquoddy
without warning, and driving a third on shore in its effort to escape him.80 This incident
provoked a minor diplomatic crisis in which Massachusetts requested the aid of the
Continental Congress. However, Massachusetts did not pursue the matter because it soon
became embroiled in a tax revolt in the western part of the state called Shays' Rebellion,
and the American Continental Congress was rapidly losing power. New Brunswick
officials also wanted to keep peaceful relations, and the incident was quickly forgotten as
more pressing needs arose."

Leonard seems to have been disappointed that the Customs Commissioners did
not choose him to become a pennanent customs official. Consequently his patron,
Governor Carleton, found him a more demanding and less remunerative position, that of
superintendent of trade and fisheries. In this capacity Leonard once again had a mandate
to prosecute those engaged in illegal trade with the United States. He also used his
position as an opportunity to criticize New Brunswick's customs establishment for its
laxness. From 1798 to 1812 he was unrelenting in his efforts to convince the Custon~s
Commissioners, the Secretary of State for Colonies, the New Brunswick Assembly, and
other provincial officials that something must be done to halt smuggling with the United

Leonard's efforts as a schematist, especially with the constant flow of reports and
recommendations to the Customs Commissioners, and even trips to England in 1787 and
1797, seem to have paid off. In 1796 the Customs Commissioners extended his
commission to include all of New Brunswick, Nova Scotia, and what is now known as
Prince Edward Island; in 1800 they granted him an annual subsidy to operate a 33-ton
sloop carrying two small three-pounder cannons as a patrol vessel.83 In 1801 the
Commissioners made him a preventative officer with broad powers to seize vessels and
property engaged in contraband trade. In 1810 they gave him a more substantial grant to
operate a larger revenue cutter capable of patrolling the Bay of Fundy year-round. The
vessel was virtually a miniature naval vessel, armed with eight 12-pounder carronades
and a crew of 25.84

Whether as Comptroller of Customs or Superintendent of Trade and Fisheries,
Leonard's strict enforcement of the Navigation Acts made him enemies. Nova Scotia's
governor complained that Leonard's actions "have entangled us in constant Disputes and
Broils with the United States," and that he interfered with Nova Scotia's customs

officer^.^'

As early as 1798, an anonymous letter to Lord Portland mocked Leonard as

"an illiterate, silly, contemptible fellow," who was "even ignorant and weak enough to
suppose that he has the right to control the customs house."86 Leonard was glad to return
the favor, writing to his friend Edward Winslow that Collector Wanton and Comptroller
Parker were afraid that he would expose to the public how much they made from the
illicit plaster trade at ~ a m ~ o b e l l o .Leonard
~'
then embarked on a campaign to harass and
embarrass New Brunswick's customs officers even as he attempted to eradicate
smuggling at Passamaquoddy. This campaign would directly impact smuggling and
borderland relations until war broke out in 1812.

Aftermath of the Falmouth Incident
Leonard con~plainedbitterly about the Falmouth incident and the opposition of
the customs authorities to his cutter to all who would listen. Displeased by the judge's
verdict on the Falmouth, Leonard published an advertisement in the New Brunswick
Royal Gazette that despite his respect for Botsford, he would continue to pursue

smugglers at ~ a s s a m a ~ u o d However,
d ~ . ~ ~ by early 1806 diplomatic pressure was
building for Leonard to ease off on his anti-smuggling campaign. At the request of
Anthony Merry, Britain's minister to the United States, the president of the provincial
council ordered Leonard to abstain from seizing any more U.S. vessels at

~ a s s a n l a ~ u o d Leonard
d ~ . ~ ~ complied, but continued his campaign from afar, informing
Merry that the "evils" in Passamaquoddy Bay "have greatly increased" since the
"to abstain from any seizures of American vessels" that
Lieutenant Governor ordered h ~ m
were in situations similar to that of the sloop ~ a l r n o u t h By
. ~ ~September Leonard
reported that the illicit trade on the lines has become worse than ever, American
smugglers were becoming bolder, and the more their demands were acceded to, the more
demanding they became. In October he began to call for an investigation into the
activities of the deputy collector at Passamaquoddy. In 1807 the feuding went before the
House of Assembly, with both the customhouse officers and Leonard claiming the
proceeds of fourteen barrels of contraband rum seized by the superintendent. 91
The Saint John customhouse reacted to accusations of corruption with the
blandest of denials. Collector Wanton and Comptroller Robert Parker responded,
"Where countries border on each other, it is utterly impossible to put an effectual stop to
illicit intercourse between the Inhabitants on each side." They thought that Leonard
exaggerated the scale of smuggling at Passamaquoddy, and were astonished at Leonard's
accusations, but of course items manufactured in India did find their way into New
Brunswick from the United
Increasingly frustrated by his inability to patrol Passamaquoddy, Leonard finally
was able to prevail upon the commander of the small Royal Navy schooner Porgey to go
to Passamaquoddy and ruthlessly eliminate its thriving smuggling trade. Lt. James
Flintoph took to the task eagerly; he printed an advertisement in the Royal Gazette with
his intentions:

PUBLIC INFORMATION

To prevent as much as possible any interruption
being given to the carrying trade between these provinces
and the United States of America; notice is hereby given to
all concerned, that any vessel employed in carrying plaster
of paris and grindstones, from the quarries of Nova Scotia
and New Brunswick to the places of consumption
southward and westward of Portland, shall pass free and
unmolested; and I pledge my word of honor that I will not
interrupt them in their lawful pursuits, unless it shall appear
that they have on board deserters from His Majesty's navy
or army; the same special regard will be paid to all persons
conling within the description of fishermen. And to
discourage and punish all those concerned in illicit traffic, I
am detem~inedto treat with the utmost severity such as are
found delivering their cargoes into American vessels in the
Bay of Passamaquoddy or its neighborhood, or who may
clandestinely introduce any articles either provinces
contrary to law.
J. Flintoph, Lieutenant ~ o r n r n a n d e r ~ ~
True to his word, Flintoph sailed for Passamaquoddy and immediately began to
seize American vessels engaged in the plaster trade. According to the American
collector, Flintoph "arrived on the evening of the 5th instant, fired his guns
promiscuously, and in every direction, even among houses. The shot is in my possession
that rolled between innocent children, to the great alarm of the peaceable inhabitants of
both Governments in this vicinity."94 Flintoph's methods, typical of Royal Navy
enforcement, were crude and violent. He fired cannon, impressed sailors into naval
service, and his men beat or threatened to shoot mariners who resisted.95 A few weeks
later the Porgey returned and seized two more American vessels with additional violence
and gunfire, despite the protest of the American collector and Charlotte County

Flintoph's tough methods at the behest of Leonard were his undoing. Complaints
about his behavior soon began to reach Admiral Berkeley in Halifax, who was
d ~ . ~ ~ also
undeceived by Flintoph's bland report of his actions at ~ a s s a m a ~ u o d Flintoph
suffered from a stroke of bad luck. Americans were in a rage over the unprovoked attack
of HMS Leopard on the United States Frigate Chesapeake off the Virginia coast on June
22, 1808, and Admiral Berkeley faced criticism from his superiors for his role in that
action. Flintoph's over zealousness at Passamaquoddy only added to Berkeley's
problems, so the admiral apparently asked for and received Flintoph's resignation. Other
Royal Navy officers who patrolled Passamaquoddy grimly noted Flintoph's fate and
hoped to avoid a similar situation.98

Crown Customs Officers at Passamaquoddy
The lesser customs officers at Passamaquoddy seem to have taken their cue from
the customhouse in Saint John in tolerating, encouraging, and perhaps even participating
in illicit trade at the border. The mentality of these lesser officials was undoubtedly
creole, governed by their desire for good relations with their borderland neighbors,
friends and families. Undoubtedly, too, they wished to avoid confrontations with
schematists like Leonard. Only one office defied this pattern: the surveyor and searchers
were often initially vigorous law enforcers, but with time they also became increasingly
lax.

New Brunswick's surveyor and searcher was supposed to be an "outdoor officer"
who spent most of his time on the waterfkont searching for smugglers. The province's
collector expected the surveyor and searcher to travel to the various outports and patrol
the wharves and piers of Saint John, observing shipping and looking out for smugglers.
With a "writ of assistance," British law empowered the surveyor and searcher to enter
warehouses and even private homes in search of contraband, using force if necessary.
Writs of assistance were spectacularly unpopular in the American colonies before the
Revolution, and became the center of several controversies in Boston; they proved to be
just as controversial in colonial New ~ r u n s w i c k . ~ ~
The least popular surveyor and searcher was Richard Batchelor, who served in
that capacity from 1790 to 1793.1°0 Batchelor used very violent means that earned him a
great deal of trouble throughout the province in incidents at Saint John, Campobello
Island in Passamaquoddy Bay, and Cumberland at the head of the Bay of Fundy. At
midnight, August 13, 1791 at Portland Parish (across the harbor fiom Saint John proper),
Batchelor beat William Comely's dog to death with the butt of his pistol before beating
down the door to Comely's residence. Comely resisted this intrusion with force; during
the ensuing fkacas, Batchelor ordered his assistant to blow Comely's brains out.
Batchelor claimed he acted the authority of a writ of assistance, but Comely promptly
sued Batchelor anyway.'01 A few weeks later, Batchelor broke into a house on
Campobello looking for contraband goods fiom the United States. The islands
headstrong proprietor and Charlotte County Justice David Owen ordered Batchelor
arrested. Batchelor resisted, escaped, and apparently assaulted Owen himself with a

knife.lo2 In July, 1792, Batchelor seized a vessel for smuggling at the head of the Bay of
Fundy. A crowd subsequently rescued the vessel, and troops had to be called in twice
before the vessel arrived safely at Saint ~ o h n . ' ~ ~
Not only did Batchelor's actions make him very unpopular, they also resulted in
lawsuits against him and no doubt in his resignation and return to England in 1793 for "ill
health."lo4 David Owen's comments on Batchelor's activities at Passamaquoddy are the
most telling. In a letter to his brother, Owen noted that a New Brunswick court had
recently indicted the searcher of customs, "a man lately sent out from London," for
breaking open stores on Campobello by virtue of a writ assistance. The courts also
indicted Batchelor for stealing one of Owen's boats and resisting two men who attempted
to recover it. Owen noted that "This fellow has occasioned almost a civil war," and
concluded that "There is much general clamor and discontent such as preceded the
Rebellion in 1774" due Batchelor's actions. Owen's letter indicated that New
Brunswickers were not tolerant of outsiders who used violent methods, and that colonial
courts would prosecute officers who used writs of assistance. Both facts were highly
reminiscent of resistance to customs officers in Boston during the 1770s.'05
Batchelor's replacement was Colin Campbell, a Passamaquoddy resident who had
served as the deputy customs collector at St. Andrews. Like Batchelor, Campbell proved
willing to use violence, at least early in his career, but soon took a more relaxed position
on illicit trade. Canlpbell initially was a vigilant officer. In late 1795, he seized the
American vessel Mary for bringing corn to a gristmill on the New Brunswick side of the
St. Croix River. The owners rescued it from the surveyor and searcher, and Campbell
had to call in militia to assist him. Local magistrates complained that Canlpbell was

destroying the goodwill they had built with their American neighbors.lo6 Governor
Carleton agreed and ordered the Mary returned to her American owners, who later sued
~am~bell.'~~

In 1796, Campbell continued his anti-smuggling campaign when he testified that
some of Charlotte County's most prominent men, including several magistrates, were
involved in smuggling tea, wine and brandy from the United States and that they hid
them in "houses, warehouses, and other outhouses" on various islands throughout
~ a s s a m a ~ u o d dLater
~ . ' ~that
~ year another violent incident took place at
Passamaquoddy. Campbell had seized an American vessel for smuggling and placed
armed guards on board the boat, which was anchored off Grand Manan Island. On the
night of October 2 1, the guards shot and killed an American smuggler during an effort to
rescue the vessel. The guards responsible faced only a cursory trial, but after this
incident Campbell's tactics changed.lo9
After 1796, Campbell had become more interested in the timber trade than in
acting as surveyor and searcher, and no more reported episodes of violence involved him.
Perhaps Collector Wanton, Governor Carleton, or some other individual encouraged him
to modify his ways; there is no real way to account for the change. However, Campbell
by this time was one of several Charlotte County notables reported for plundering the
King's forests.

lo

His apostasy was clear by 1805, when his involvement in the illicit

plaster trade became known, but the gears of British imperial bureaucracy ground very
slowly; the Customs Commissioners did not remove him from office until 1816. The

Lieutenant Governor recommended one of George Leonard's sons as a replacement, but
the Customs Commissioners instead chose Patrick Kelly, who Collector Wright restricted
to operating only within Saint ~ohn."'
What were the reasons for Campbell's conversion to creole behavior? Economic
incentives surely played a role, but do not seem to be the sole reason he abandoned his
duties as surveyor and searcher. However, the dilatory but profitable mode of Collector
Wanton certainly earned Campbell a profitable living; in 1810 he earned £464,
considerably more than his counterparts in ~ r i t a i n . " There
~
must have been social
pressures, too, as his fellow Charlotte County magistrates and merchants - many fellow
Scotsmen like himself - sought accommodations with their counterparts in Washington
County, Maine, including commercial connections. Painful lawsuits, and probable
censure fiom other Crown officials, and lack of support by the Customs Con~missioners
probably fiu-ther persuaded him to turn a blind eye to smuggling and adopt the creole
mode of office holding.
Passamaquoddy's other Crown customs officers seem to have always acted as
creoles, a mode of action that dovetailed nicely with other forms of borderlands
accommodation. From the founding of the province in 1784, St. Andrews had a deputy
customs collector. Initially Campbell himself, who John Dunn, co-creator of the "neutral
zone" exposed in the Falmouth case, replaced him at an early date. Dunn, who also
served as the Charlotte County sheriff and deputy naval officer, also had a spiritual
reason to adopt the borderlander's resistance to centralized state authority. Dunn and his
family were secret adherents of Catholicism, despite laws that forbade Roman Catholics
from holding office.'13 To circumvent these restrictions but remain true to his faith, he

had his children secretly baptized by the missionary priest to the Passamaquoddy Nation
in nearby Pleasant Point, ~ a i n e .l 4' He continued in office until after 1820, despite
Leonard's call for his removal in 1806 and an extremely negative report based on a
special inquiry made by the Customs Commissioners.

l5

As deputy collector he earned

£602 in fees in 1810, without collecting even one penny for the King's revenue in either
~
creole leniency with smugglers made him a popular man.
duties or s e i z ~ r e s . "Dunn's
An American smuggler during the War of 1812 had dinner with Dunn at St. Andrews,
and found him "a very open warm hearted ~rishman.""' This description seems
appropriate, given that Washington County, Maine's highest ranked militia officers also
dined with Dunn that night, notwithstanding the war.'18 Like Collector Wanton in Saint
John, or his American counterparts Delesdernier and Trescott, Dunn was remembered by
a local historian as a "man proverbially kind, liberal, and hospitable."l

l9

In response to the needs of shipping, especially the plaster trade, customs
authorities appointed another deputy collector to Passamaquoddy. Generally this deputy
collector kept his office on Campobello, but during the British occupation of Moose
Island the office relocated there. After the Americans regained possession of Eastport in
1818, the ofice moved once again to Indian 1sland.120 Thomas Henderson, too, came
down in local memory as an affable character. Appointed to oversee the largely illicit
gypsum trade passing through Passamaquoddy, Henderson largely kept out of the official
record, making him the perfect creole official: honored, rewarded, and mostly
invisible.12'

Conclusion

The Falmouth incident, the abuses by customs officials, and their creole attitudes
display some of the less flattering aspects of Loyalist and colonial society. New
Brunswick's colonial population, like its Nova Scotia counterpart, had a double standard
when it came to govemment. As Neal MacKinnon observed about the Loyalist
experience in Nova Scotia, "if the government was obliged to be honest and
conscientious towards them, it did not mean that they in tum had to be honest and
conscientious towards the government."'22 This pragmatic, even hypocritical colonial
attitude toward the state seemed to grow in power with distance from the imperial core in
London. Far from embracing modem ideas of a bureaucratic state, New Brunswick's
elite had a decidedly pre-modem view based on their entitlement to multiple offices, lifelong tenure, and a proprietorial interest in collecting fees for their own en~ichrnent.'~~
William Wanton's attitude towards the collectorship seems to have always been creole in
nature. Colin Campbell's early efforts to rigidly enforce the Navigation Laws quickly
collapsed when social peers applied pressure and when other avenues to wealth became
apparent. Moreover, colonial society had effective ways of dealing with non-creole
troublemakers like Richard Batchelor.
The ambivalence of colonial society to state authority, especially customs
officers, meant that many borderland residents already resisted the centralizing
tendencies of govemment even before they arrived in Passamaquoddy. Most Loyalists
who came to the region were North Americans, and thus shared more in common with
their republican neighbors than with peoples in the British Isles. Even non-North
American Loyalists, such as the lowland Scots, arrived with a prejudice against the

London

Furthermore, the wilderness situation in which they found

themselves meant that the idea of a Loyalist haven in New Brunswick, led by an
aristocratic elite, remained only a dream. The North Americans habitually resisted
imperial commercial restrictions, even in a province founded by self-proclaimed
Loyalists. In New Brunswick, the very officers commissioned to enforce these laws
often turned out to be violating them, and assisting their neighbors in doing so as well.
Thus the lure of illicit trade transcended their Loyalism. Sometimes these underlying
contradictions between officeholding and corruption became a public struggle between
creoles and schematists, as with the Falmouth case.125
Customs officers at Passamaquoddy, whether loyalist or republican, merely
reflected more widespread attitudes when they turned a blind eye to smuggling. The
British and American governments fkther confused the issue by occasionally
encouraging smuggling to undermine the trade policies of the other. In this manner,
government itself promoted borderlands attitudes by attempting to subvert the
commercial loyalties of foreign merchants. Merchants and officials thus colluded in the
creation of the Passamaquoddy borderlands.
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CHAPTER 5:
THE BORDERLAND EXPERIENCE

Dr. Faxon Goes to a Tavern
An important element of the borderlands mentality is how locals perceived

themselves and their relationship to the state. Determining how borderland residents felt
about themselves and their situation is difficult. Loyalties seemed to shift continually as
dictated by circumstances, a perpetual reassessment that occurred throughout British
North America and the newly-created United States. Living on or near the border
between the two simply amplified the necessity of suppressing ideology in favor of
pragmatic concerns. An illuminating example of this ambivalence toward state loyalties
occurred in 1807, just as Britain and the United States seemed to be on the verge of war.
Dr. Jonathon Faxon, an American expatriate living on Grand Manan, New Brunswick,
happened to be in an Eastport tavern. The conversation turned to the recent Chesapeake
affair; some of the Americans present began to criticize the British government. Faxon,
who had taken an oath of loyalty to the British monarchy, stepped forward and defended
the British government, nearly precipitating a brawl.'
What are we to make of Faxon's actions? Here was an American citizen, a
veteran of the Continental Army, who had departed the United States and taken an oath
of loyalty to the same British monarchy that he had once fought against. Where was the

revolutionary ardor and ideology that American scholars have made so much of?2 Why
was he permitted to live in a Loyalist province? The answers lie in the pragmatic
borderland attitudes at Passamaquoddy.
Examining Dr. Faxon's life reveals a gap between revolutionary ideals and the
realities of everyday life. Faxon was born in Rhode Island, served in the Continental
Anny while still a teenager, and attended Brown University. He arrived on Grand Manan
sometime after 1800, and became popular both with the island's Loyalist proprietor,
Moses Gerrish, and the other settlers because of his "industry," which included
smuggling flour during Jefferson's embargo.3 Faxon brought additional settlers, built
ships, wharves and mills, and engaged in co~nmerce.~
Some even claimed he "forwarded
the settlement of Grand Manan more than any three men that ever was on this ~sland."~
Yet rumors persisted that Faxon was unfriendly to the British government. As
late as 1807, Gerrish defended Faxon as "exemplary in his conduct, and [he] has
Faxon provided
expended a considerable sum of money in promoting a settlen~ent."~
evidence to New Brunswick authorities as to his character, including the statement on the
Eastport tavern argument about the merits of British governance. But tensions
concerning deeds and property rights were building on Grand Manan; the details are
unclear, but people complained of personal assaults, the destruction of their buildings,
and dishonest land deals by ~errish.' Faxon was implicated in these matters, and soon
Gerrish turned on him. By 1810, Gerrish claimed Faxon was "the most accomplished
villain that ever fell to my lot to be acquainted with," that a "small volume of his knavery

and viciousness" should be written, and that he should be banished from the province.
Gerrish concluded his letter with an indictment against the American settlers on the
island, particularly Faxon:
The People on this Island (with few exceptions)
who have been citizens of the United States did not leave
their principles behind them they have no attachment to this
Government only from matters of Private interest; they are
still republicans in heart, lip & life and in case of a rupture
between the States & Great Britain, I should be under
greater apprehensions from a party of these people,
combined with the Indians than all the forces the United
States would send against us.-Report says, that the
celebrated Dr. Faxon has aided and assisted a junto at
Moose Island in framing a petition to Congress for this
Island to be annexed to the United states.*
The conflicting views of Faxon's conduct point out a conflict between North
American revolutionary ideology and actual experiences. How are we to understand how
borderland residents interpreted their world, and especially their precarious position on
the boundary between two ideologically opposed states?

Borderlands as Frontier
On a regional basis there has been a great deal of study on the frontier experience
and its inter-relationship with the American Revolution. Maine has benefited from two
exemplary works: Laurel Thatcher Ulrich's A Midwife's Tale: The Life of Martha
Ballard, Based on Her Diary, 1785-1812 and Alan Taylor's Liberty Men and Great
Proprietors: The Revolutionary Settlement on the Maine Frontier, 1760-1820.~The idea

of New Brunswick as a frontier has not been explored to the same extent, a somewhat
ironic development given that many American scholars such as Bernard Bailyn use
Patrick Campbell's painting "An American landscape hewn and enclosed, with Native

Americans canoeing by" as the archetypical American landscape. Actually it depicts a
portion of the Saint John River in New Brunswick in the 1790s." However, Canadian
historiography is not silent on the frontier experience in New Brunswick. Esther Clark
Wright's The Loyalists of New Brunswick, first published in 1955, found that the Loyalist
experience was one of hardships very akin to American settlers."
Ulrich's and Taylor's works are some of the most influential examinations of the
frontier experience. Ulrich achieved this by closely examining the journal of a Maine
midwife; Taylor did so by studying frontier agrarian protest against wealthy land
speculators. Both works could be instructive for Canadian scholars in that Ulrich's
midwife was probably a Loyalist and Taylor's "Liberty Men" frequently fled the law by
seeking asylum in British North America. On the Canadian side, one of the most useful
works that examines everyday life for the Loyalists is Neil MacKinnon's This Unfriendly
Soil: The Loyalist Experience in Nova Scotia, 1 783-1 791.I2 While Taylor's agrarians
often fled to the British provinces to escape the avarice of land speculators, MacKinnon's
Loyalists often moved back to the United States when their commercial dreams failed in
the Maritime Provinces. Other Loyalist studies, such as Jane Errington's The Lion, the
Eagle, and Upper Canada, and Esther Clark Wright's Loyalists of New Brunswick, also
emphasize the fact that Loyalists faced a frontier experience identical to the American
one, yet developed a different set of political ideals.13
Taylor examined four themes that are applicable to the Passamaquoddy
borderlands: migration to the frontier, the creation of property out of wilderness lands;
evangelical religion; and organized resistance against land speculators and proprietors.
Taylor linked all of these themes to the American Revolution and the different

interpretations the wealthy proprietors had from poor land squatters, stating that the
frontier poor "believed in a different American Revolution, one meant to protect small
producers from the moneyed men who did not live by their own labor, but instead, preyed
on the many who did."14
The problem with Taylor's revolutionary settlement thesis is that there was a
nearly identical process in New Brunswick, a Loyalist province that presumably rejected
all the egalitarian ideals espoused by revolutionaries. New Brunswick Loyalists moved
to a frontier much like ~ a i n e ' s . " Loyalists also believed they had a God-given right to
improve wilderness lands; evangelical religion was also prominent in British North
America.16 Moreover, there was organized resistance to authority on a number of issues,
sometimes resulting in collective actions that ended in violence." Loyalists even drank
in the same prodigious amounts that Taylor's Libertymen did.'* Close examination
reveals a North American viewpoint that eschewed the British social model for one better
adapted to the frontier.I9 Even in loyalist New Brunswick, only a few individuals
possessed a real connection or adherence to Britain, and often even those few had
powerful emotional, familial, or commercial connections to the United

Migration to the Frontier
Taylor posited that post-revolutionary settlers came to the Maine frontier seeking
refuge. It was a life of poverty and hardships for most, but the hope of establishing
economic independence sustained them. Settlers sought independence from wage labor

In New
and debt by establishing a competency that supported their farnilie~.~'
Brunswick, a province created largely for rehgees from the American War of

Independence, the frontier offered refhge to the war-weary. On both sides of the border,
veterans of the conflict went to the frontier, expecting land. Like their American
counterparts, many Loyalists preferred to work on their own lands, eschewing wage labor
in favor of working on their own farms.22 The primary difference seems to have been
that the British government was far more forthcoming in giving lands and support to its
veterans than were the American state and national governments. Military settlers were
given tools, provisions, and free land. Many settlers left, however, after finding frontier
life too difficult.
Many Aniericans had few reservations about moving to loyalist New Brunswick.
Campobello's proprietor noted this tendency with some alarm, claiming they were "by no
means friendly to the Government of the Province," and "have actually defied the
proprietor" of Deer ~ s l a n d Many
. ~ ~ were so-called "late Loyalists" who moved from the
~ Loyalists displayed
United States to British North America in the late 1 7 8 0 s . ~Late
remarkably little allegiance to either the American or British political system. Men such
as Joseph Porter from New Hampshire easily crossed and re-crossed the border. Amving
at Passamaquoddy in 1786, he moved into New Brunswick after marrying the daughter of
Nehemiah Marks, the same prominent Loyalist who allowed another daughter to marry
an American militia general, John Brewer of Robbinston. Despite some concerns about
whether he was actually a British subject or not, he eventually became a magistrate and a
representative to the provincial assembly.25
Another example of late Loyalist pragmatism is William Vance, who moved to
Passamaquoddy from New Hampshire in 1784. By 1786 colonial authorities made him a
justice of the peace. Sometime before the War of 1812 he relocated to the American side

of the St. Croix River. When New Brunswick magistrates threatened to arrest him for an
illegal dam he had constructed, Vance discovered a new American patriotism within
himself. A Charlotte County observer noted "This Mr. Vance soon after the late
American declaration of war removed from the county, publicly declared his adherence
to the American cause, and his determination to maintain his American allegiance, and
had actually two cannons mounted on his American premises, whereby we are assured he
~~
preparations were to no
avowed his intention of using hostily if a t t a ~ k e d . "Vance's
avail; when he crossed the river on business provincial authorities arrested him. Later
Vance became an enthusiastic Jacksonian politician, and even served in the Maine
~e~islature.~'
Before, during, and after the War of 1812, many Americans moved to New
Brunswick, seeking jobs, land and opportunity. Their presence was often accepted with
little difficulty if they took a loyalty oath and behaved well. United States citizens
frequently petitioned for and received provincial lands.28 In 1807, the provincial
government even offered free land to those Americans willing to take an oath of
loyalty.29 Pushed by a sour American economy and pulled by New Brunswick's newly
prosperous economy, the Americans came in droves. Charlotte County proved especially
attractive to Americans due to its proximity.30 Sailors, timbennen, fishermen, merchants,
and even preachers moved easily across the border. American fishernlen had long
encroached on New Brunswick's shores, exploiting the fishing resources of
Passamaquoddy Bay, the Bay of Fundy, and even the Gulf of St. Lawrence. American
timbermen, too, had long participated in the region's economy, especially in St.
~te~hen.~'

Fishermen illustrate the growing accommodation with the American Revolution
in the Maritime provinces. Many lived in remote settlements, often on islands, and had
little direct contact with government. Furthermore, American markets consistently
provided not only better prices for their catch, but higher quality provisions at lower cost
These pragmatic concerns drove fishermen into illicit trade
than colonial n~erchants.~~
with their American counterparts, to the consternation of officials such as George
Leonard, who embarked on a vigorous campaign to stop it.33
Fishern~endo not seem to have been prone to ideological concerns; they came to
Passanlaquoddy Bay in pursuit of fish. They crossed and re-crossed the border at will,
paying little heed to international boundaries. James Kent is an example. Originally
from Boothbay, Maine, Kent arrived at Eastport in the 1780s. Sometime in the 1790s he
moved to Grand Manan, and in 1806 he swore an oath of loyalty to the British crown. In
1812, alarmed by the onset of war, Kent attempted to relocate to the United States where
federal officials promptly arrested him. Kent was clearly willing to go through the
motions of proclaiming loyalty to the crown, but when it came to war he refused to
support the British cause. Given his treatment by the U.S. marshal, however, Kent
returned to Grand Manan, where he eventually landed a coveted position as a lighthouse
keeper.34
Settlers also came to Passamaquoddy seeking refuge. Many colonials came to
Eastport fleeing debt prosecutions; Americans fled to New Brunswick for the same
reason.35 Others fled bad marriages, like Col. George Peck of Rhode Island, who despite
his Revolutionary War service fighting the British, fled to Campobello when his marriage
failed.36Yet others were criminals such as John Stedman Beckwith, who in 1812

assaulted David Owen while he was asleep. Owen raised a "hue and cry" against
Beckwith, who took refuge in Eastport, just a few hundred yards away from Owen's
Campobello home.37 Beckwith lived there, within site of Owen's house but beyond his
legal reach until his death in a boating accident in 1819.38
Perhaps the most remarkable refugee at Passamaquoddy was Tyler P. Shaw, an
American smuggler caught selling supplies to the Royal Navy that were destined for the
. ~jury
~ found Shaw guilty; the judge sentenced him
American garrison at Fort ~ u l l i v a n A
to hang. However, relatives helped Shaw escape federal authorities in Massachusetts in a
daring jailbreak, another example of popular resistance to state authority.40 Eventually he
found his way to New Brunswick despite a $300 reward for his capture. Once at
Passamaquoddy, Shaw published a newspaper article protesting his innocence, even
invoking his father's Revolutionary War service. President Monroe eventually pardoned
him, but Shaw never returned to the United States. He married into a Loyalist family and
eventually receiving land grants from the province after becoming a British subject in
1827.~'
The frontier experience on both sides of the border was remarkably similar North
American phenomenon.42 The post-war frontier in both Canada and the United States
shared remarkable similarities; most or all of their actions were marked by pragmatic
rather than ideological motives.43 Those at the top of the social ladder might have dreamt
of establishing stable hierarchical agricultural societies, but generally those dreams
crumbled.44 Daily life was a fierce struggle in which settlers attempted to farm the land
or more likely extract timber or fish from the forests and coastal waters; few had the time
Moose Island's settlers knew this
to reflect on the political nature of their c~rnmunities.~~

fact well, stating the following in a petition to the Massachusetts legislature: "The fate of
first settlers, in a new Country, is well known, to work hard, and fare hard."46 This
struggle to gain a competency consumed much of their energy, leaving little time for
ideological con~ems.~'

Wilderness Improvements

The North American frontier presented similar challenges and responses to both
American and Canadian settlers. For example, David Owen, the proprietor of
Campobello Island, described the situation of his tenants in terms that many settlers
would have found familiar, even if most of the people he described were fishernlen.
Owen found that the settler
fixes upon a spot for his house.- Takes his axe and cuts
down Fir Trees which he afterwards junks to twenty or six
& twenty feet length, dovetails them at the four comers of
his Cottage, which made up of these logs and well stuffed
in the seams with moss serves for his House.- A cellar is
built underground in the same manner to preserve his
potatoes from and thus in one year's time has something to
live upon.- A pig is next wanted and a cow.- The cow
feeds in the Woods with a Bell round her neck to discover
where she is.- And the Pigs are often two or three months
away & come home frequently in Autumn full fed & fit to
kill.
Owen discovered that initially, personal possessions were few, as were other amenities:
"The breakfast and supper of a Labourer is Fish, Potatoes
and Tea sweetened with Molasses-his Dinner Pork &
Potatoes.- His Bed a Blanket upon the floor.- Custom
makes his sleep easy-all Payments are made in Barter.There is no Specie in the Bay.- Dried Fish is the
Common Truck at 1216 a Quintal upon an average.- Fish
are not so plenty as formerly, so that now the land begins to
be cultivated: for a Fisherman will never cultivate.- He is
like an Indian in that respect.-- ,,48

Because the region straddled a border, Owen assumed that "Smuggling will naturally
take place," a phenomenon he did not seem to find offensive.49 In years to come, he
would on occasion defend smugglers from the wrath of New Brunswick's customhouse.
Owen's account of the settlers' lives in New Brunswick is especially important
because it matches closely with the American frontier experience as described in Charles
Seller's The Market Revolution: Jacksonian America, 1815-1846.50 Sellers found that
agrarian settlers in America possessed a number of values that were often at odds with
the state and the market. Like Owen, Sellers believed that many frontier whites were very
attracted to the Indian way of life. Both Indians and settlers practiced what Sellers
deemed a "premarket mode of use-value production" that emphasized subsistence rather
than profit.5' An important characteristic of Seller's model was the "hard-won folk
wisdom about how to utilize their labor-power and technology to extract sufficient use
values from their resource base."52 That folk wisdom prescribed both behavior and labor,
norms established through shaming and physical punishment. Sellers portrayed a
patriarchal society that attempted to reproduce the values of the parents in the children.
To reinforce those values, the oldest child was frequently named after its same-sex
parent, a pattern readily confirmed in Eastport's censuses in families known to have
smuggling connections, such as the extensive Clark family.53 These dynamics
discouraged individuality and competition not only between family members, but other
members of the community as weLs4
The economic impetus of premarket communities relied on a neighborhood
division of labor, a phenomenon detailed in Ulrich's A Midwife's

ale."

Frontier

neighbors constantly exchanged labor and con~modities,satisfying local needs before

offering them to an impersonal market. Money thus played a limited role in most
settlers' daily lives.56 The only real difference between Owen's and Seller's accounts of
pioneer life was that Sellers considered agrarian settlers, whereas Owen described a
fishemlan's life.
Many of Passanlaquoddy's settlers were fishermen, especially on the islands. A
census of Moose Island taken in 1800 reveals that out of 66 heads of household, over
83% were fishermen; only one individual was listed as a "fa~nler."~'Fishermen were the
most numerous on the region's islands; further up the bay and the St. Croix River
timbering dominated the economy. Farming on the side was common; Moose Island's
fishermen had a few cleared acres - generally less than ten acres - and some cows. On
both sides of the border families engaged in composite farming, whereby all family
members engaged in production both for the family's use and for exchange purposes.
There was never any question at Passamaquoddy of creating a "self-sufficiency."58 The
land was too poor to feed families; locals needed markets for their timber and fish so that
they could buy provisions, West India goods, and even salt to continue their commercial
fishing. Borderlands residents thus farmed, fished, timbered, and conducted other
activities to survive. These activities included weaving, making lime, shoes, or set
themselves up as traders and

merchant^.'^

Trade was a natural and everyday occurrence;

smuggling was a pragmatic premarket response to bothersome trade regulations that
interfered with family economies. Some officials found this way of life offensive;
George Leonard described Passamaquoddy's fishermen as a "lawless rabble," and
complained of their extensive violations of sovereignty and smuggling.60

Although farming was not the primary economic activity at Passamaquoddy, land
ownership remained important. Both Massachusetts and New Brunswick claimed
jurisdiction over Moose Island, preventing either from giving meaningful deeds to land
there. In the meantime a few hundred squatters quietly took possession, enjoying the fact
that contested jurisdiction meant they paid no taxes to anyone, a fact that annoyed both
governments. Finally, Washington County's sheriff took matters into his own hands. He
arrived at the island with an arnled party. After some hard words and an incident in
which the settlers destroyed his boat, he finally reached an agreement with them whereby
the island residents received legal deeds and guarantees of a five-year tax exemption in
Moose Island thus became
return for their adherence to the laws of ~assachusetts.~'
American soil not by the efforts of the federal government, but largely through armed
intimidation by local officials. Even after Eastport's incorporation as a Massachusetts
township, Moose Island residents remained indifferent to the sort of improvements that
marked a permanent community, such as public roads, schoolhouses, and even churches.
Most notably, they resented and resisted the idea of creating wider streets, preferring to
use the beaches as rudimentary roads, climbing over rocks where n e ~ e s s a r y . ~ ~
Moose Islanders' defense of their way of life was a reasonable response to
external forces attempting to impose order on the squatters, a struggle that played out all
over North ~ m e r i c a Their
. ~ ~ view was essentially local and libertarian, and extended to
other parts of their lives, including religion, social nornx, and commerce.

In settling what they considered a wilderness, Loyalists and revolutionaries shared
a common experience in which the border and ideology played little role. Within a
generation of the end of the Revolutionary War, Passamaquoddy's settlers created a

transborder society with its own values that often clashed with state interests. One of
those values was a right to land and resources, especially if the settlers had made
improvements to it or expended labor in procuring timber or fish. Taylor illustrated this
view in central Maine, and it clearly extended to New Brunswick and eastern ~ a i n e . ~ ~
Settlers on Campobello, Deer Island, and Grand Manan, who also engaged in collective
violence against wealthier proprietors, shared these North American views.65
Land was one of the contested resources. Sometimes officials would "quiet"
settlers with no legal rights to their land by confirming their property rights, as happened
on Moose Island. Sometimes matters were more violent. When David Owen arrived on
Campobello to reassert his family's claims to the island, he faced opposition fiom
Loyalists who thought they had a right to the land because of a provincial grant, and preLoyalists such as the Wilson family who claimed ownership through continued
possession and improvement. Owen easily swept aside the Loyalist claims because his
family's grant pre-dated the establishment of New Brunswick in 1784. But the courts
found in favor of the squ@atter
Wilson family.66 similar disputes, some of them violent,
occurred on Deer Island and Grand Manan, New Brunswick, and Calais, Maine; the
entire colony of Prince Edward Island experienced similar problems.67
The desire for land and independence was not purely a result of the American
Revolution. Most Loyalists were North Americans; their views toward land and their
right to improve wilderness were almost identical with their republican neighbors. When
settlers felt they were denied the right to wilderness land, they generally fought the
system or simply moved across the border. This attitude spilled over into other aspects

of the settlers' lives, even their sense of spirituality. When established religion failed to
ease their spiritual needs, settlers opted for an evangelicalism that transcended borders,
thereby reinforcing the premarket attitudes that tolerated activities such as smuggling.

Borderland Religion
To the followers of more established denominations, such as Congregationalists
and Anglicans, the emotional religious experience of the evangelicals appeared chaotic.
The emotional excesses, the lack of a trained clergy, the spontaneous meetings in fields
and barns during the week that sometimes ran late into the night challenged the
established order, both in the newly-created United States and in Britain's remaining
North American c~lonies.~'In the United States religious tolerance and a desire for
social acceptability brought most evangelical sects to a more conservative understanding
of their faith. Religious groups that had previously been considered as radical, such as
Calvinist Baptists, increasingly sought a more conventional form of worship led by a
trained minister in a proper meetinghouse. The exception was on the frontier, where
radical evangelicals prevailed, because as Taylor noted, they "harmonized with the
frontier's conditions and culture."69 Furthermore, the shared fervor of evangelical
religion reinforced the cooperative work ethic of the settlers and confirmed their
suspicion of hierarchy and authority.70
Maritime evangelicals conformed to these patterns of frontier religion.
Evangelicals such as Henry Alline (1748-1784) of Windsor, Nova Scotia, had a profound
impact on the Maine fr~ntier.~'
Alline embodies the transborder spirit of the borderlands
and the religious fervor of frontier settlers. Born in Rhode Island, his parents moved to

Nova Scotia in the 1760s. During the Revolution Alline had a dramatic conversion
experience that deeply influenced many Nova Scotians and New Englanders. Alline
emphasized an other-worldliness, undermining ideas of deference and loyalty to the
state.72 Religion, rather than nationality, formed the primary cultural identity among
~~
religious message prospered on both sides of the
evangelical ~ a r i t i r n e r s .Alline's
border because there was no significant difference between northern New England and
the Maritimes before 1783. Ethnically, one could find the same mix of Yankees and
foreign Protestants. Both societies were rough and tumble frontier communities, exactly
the sort of areas where sectarian impulses thrived. Alline's message, and that of other
evangelicals, resonated with American and Loyalist borderland residents because they
could recognize him and other lay preachers as people very much like themselves. Often
the established church, such as the Anglican Church in New Brunswick, was associated
with those in power who wished to oppress settlers. Campobello's proprietor was also
Anglican minister; the squatters whom he so detested were ~ a ~ t i s tAnglican
s . ~ ~ clergy
had a difficult time gaining converts among ordinary settlers, but recent immigrants and
colonial elites maintained the state-supported church.75 Another example is George
Leonard, a devout Anglican whose perpetual anti-smuggling campaigns mirrored that
faith's demands for social order.76 Despite Anglican efforts, evangelical faith continued
to flourish in British North America.

In the years between the Revolution and the War of 1812 Maritime Baptists
resisted conservative impulses and retained a radical, fervent, and highly emotional form
of religious experience. One Canadian scholar has suggested that because Baptists in
what is now Canada did not have to support the "baggage of civic humanism,

republicanism, and the covenant ideal and possessive individualism" propounded by the
Revolution, they became "more radical, more anarchistic, more democratic, and more
populist" than their American

counterpart^.^^ These Canadian forms of evangelicism

spilled across the border into northern New England in the years between the Revolution
and the War of 1812; much of Moose Island's American populace seems to have adhered
to Allinite religious principles.78
Two Maritimes Baptists who have been "silently excised from Maritime Baptist
history" reveal something about the religious principles of Passarnaquoddy's borderlands
population.79 James Murphy was a Nova Scotian of Loyalist parentage who became a
Baptist in 1793. Within the year he was spreading the Allinite version of Baptist faith in
eastern Maine. By 1800, Murphy had founded a church in Eastport, Maine. Like many
radical Baptist preachers, Murphy seems to have suffered from occasional doubts, and
sometimes his peers shared those concerns. Murphy was also typical of radical
evangelicals in that he refused to write a formal sermon, believing that "if the preacher
was sent by God he would be taught what to say."80 Furthermore, the community in
which Murphy settled does not seem to have accepted his presence wholeheartedly;
moreover, Massachusetts Baptist authorities criticized his brand of Baptist faith. Murphy
thus represents the radical nature of Maritime Baptist faith. His unfortunate death also
reflects the rowdy and non-genteel nature of Allinite preachers. Murphy had an argument
with his brother-in-law, who violently threw him to the ground. Murphy died within a
few hours.8'

Gilbert Harris was another Maritime Baptist who crossed the border and thereby
departed the memory of Canadian historians. Harris had long been a controversial figure
among New Brunswick Baptists, but when he illegally married a couple in 1811 - only
Anglican priests were allowed to officiate over marriages at that time - he had to flee the
province. In 1812 he found refuge in Eastport, where Murphy's death conveniently
provided him with a new flock. Harris's defiance of the law typified that of many Baptist
preachers, and represented the borderland rejection of state authority in all matters,
including spiritual, as well as how Passamaquoddy could shelter those hiding from the
law, even during time of war.82
Murphy and Harris were not alone in attempting to spread salvation south across
the border. There seems to have been a concerted Baptist "offensive" aimed at eastern
Maine until roughly 1802, with more sporadic attempts through 1 8 1 2 . ~The
~ implications
of this effort indicate that Maritime Baptists not only persisted, they also sought to
expand; typically they ignored the worldly concept of a political border in so doing. In
fact the Maritime evangelical tradition proved extremely resilient to American incursions;
the American Methodist church stopped sending missionaries to Nova Scotia when it was
found that these missionaries seem to have been more affected by Maritimes New Lights
than vice versa.84
Two connections linked borderland religion and smuggling. First, evangelical
faith reflected settlers' pioneer experience, dampening allegiance to hierarchy and the
state by emphasizing spiritual concerns. At Passamaquoddy, these religious impulses
spanned the border, thus encouraging locals to disregard the international boundary and
the officials who enforced trade laws. Second, evangelicals' religious beliefs correlated

with economic beliefs. Evangelical religion reinforced resistance to market rationality in
favor of communal bonds, by emphasizing "egalitarian l~calism."~'Borderland settlers
bolstered by this sense of duty to fellow congregants engaged in smuggling to help
themselves and their community.

Borderland Deference
Both the New England and Maritimes elite had a vision of the world whereby
"natural leaders" received the respect and deference of the rest of society. In return the
leadership would ideally create an economic order that benefited all, with the leadership
taking the lion's share.86 In contrast, American settlers believed that "laboring families
had a natural and divinely ordered right to free wilderness lands, a right that preexisted
and morally superseded all subsequent human acts and legi~lation."~'Taylor linked this
idea to the ideals of the American Revolution, but this leads to a paradox since British
colonial officials essentially gave away free land to settlers, even those with little or no
allegiance to the Crown, whereas in the United States land speculators attempted to force
settlers to pay high prices for frontier lands. New Brunswick's liberal land policy did
require that settlers pay a small fee, but squatters often ignored even that minor
requirement because they felt they had a "right" to unimproved wilderness lands.88 The
promise of free land drew many Americans, including Continental Army veterans such as
Dr. Faxon, to British North Ameri~a.~'
Ulrich and Taylor, along with many other American scholars, have attempted to
establish that the American Revolution produced a lessening of deference in American
society. But the same sort of comments about egalitarian attitudes existed in profision in

a loyalist colony like New Brunswick: for example, one British military officer
complained of his colonial escort at Passamaquoddy: "The manners of my boatmen
savoured of the American equality. They were perfectly familiar, joined in our
conversation, and not seemingly disposed to carry up our portmanteaus to the inn, we
took them under our own arms." Observers found that even Loyalist offspring behaved
in a "yankee" manner. Like the United States, poor New Brunswickers felt no
compulsion to observe deference because the availability of land elsewhere fostered
independence.g0
The island of Campobello offers further evidence of how poorly deference
worked in North America, even in a Loyalist colony like New Brunswick. The island's
proprietor was David Owen, a member of the Welsh gentry, educated at Cambridge,
sometime tutor to future British prime minister William Pitt the Younger, and Anglican
clergyman. Owen attempted to establish his superiority by expressing his contempt for
New Brunswick officials, defying other Charlotte County magistrates, and expressing his
contempt of Loyalists settlers. Owen even considered himself above trade regulations;
Royal Navy officers accused him of taking steps "in favor of the smugglers," and he
proved willing to rent wharves and warehouses to well-known American smugglers like
Jabez ~ o w r y . ~ '
Owen ran his island like a feudal estate, leasing out plots of land rather than
selling them, and by turn bullying and attempting to charm his tenants.92 Often Owen or
his tenants resorted to violence. Angry tenants assaulted Owen numerous times,
sometimes in his own house. Servants betrayed him, tenants in arrears burned
outbuildings, and Owen in turn physically attacked, swore at, and used legal proceedings

against his opponents. 93 Deference played little role in everyday life at Passamaquoddy
in part because most settlers possessed frontier ideas of equality that had little to do with
American revolutionary ideology.
Lack of deference meant that the people felt little compulsion about taking justice
into their own hands when necessary. The beating of a mariner in 1812 illustrates how
this violence was deliberate and planned. The witness testified that "three men pursued
us in a boat and when they came near to us, they then pull'd off their jackets, turned up
their shirt sleeves & took off their handkerchiefs very deliberately made their boat fast to
ours jurnp'd onboard of our boat & swore they meant to have a satisfaction." 94 The
methodical manner in which the three assailants stripped indicates that this was not a
random act, but a deliberate punishment. Furthermore, they did not seek the costly and
uncertain process of law to redress their grievances, prefening instead to take matters into
their own hands. This "rough justice" also reflected the same borderland communal
egalitarianism that allowed locals to condone smuggling as a form of community selfhelp.95
Lack of deference meant that borderlands residents naturally resented customs
officers as representatives of the state. The fact that customs officers demanded taxes
from them that had to be paid in scarce cash hrther aggravated locals. Worse yet, when
customs officers seized contraband goods and smuggling vessels, they profited at the
expense of their neighbors. American customs officers who sought popularity attempted
to ameliorate these circumstances through community boosterism and advocating

leniency to federal court officials and the Treasury Department; New Brunswick officials
sought accommodation through a "creole" strategem that profited themselves and
colonial merchants.
The lack of deference at Passamaquoddy seems to have been less a function of
American revolutionary ideology than a practical response to local conditions. Like other
North American frontiers, Passamaquoddy's borderland populace resented outside
authority because it usually meant taxes, bothersome regulations, and interference in how
they lived. Attempts to impose a deference-based system on the settlers failed, despite
the life-long efforts of men such as David Owen. The tenuous hold of the law and other
state functions in such a distant and newly-settled area compounded these factors. Most
borderlands settlers lived a subsistence lifestyle based on resource extraction. Their
views were essentially libertarian, and it shocked some outsiders who thought the
region's inhabitants ill-educated, heavy-drinking barbarians with a complete disregard for
authority and a penchant for smuggling.

Borderland Commerce
Passamaquoddy produced two staple items for export: fish and timber. Both
fishermen and lumbermen were proverbial for their poverty and disorder. A Loyalist
wrote in 1784, "The people, as a Body, will ever be poor and miserable-From

my own

observation at Passamaquoddy, I am persuaded that a coast calculated for fishing is so far
from being a benefit, that it really is a curse to the Inhabitants. Who ever knew a
~~
paid little heed to the border, pursuing schools of fish
Fisherman ~ h r i v e ? "Fishermen
throughout the bay, the small boats from both sides crowded together around the shoals

of fish. Many New Brunswick fishermen chose to sell their catch on the American side
of the border, where they could purchase flow and other necessities at a more reasonable
price.97 Even during the War of 1812, colonial fishermen came to Eastport to sell their
catch. 98 American fishermen frequently took advantage of this by trading with their
colonial counterparts; they could legally load their vessels with provisions, swap the
foodstuffs with a New Brunswick fisherman's catch, and both would benefit. Fishermen
were an ideal smuggling population, living on the border, with an intimate knowledge of
local waters, access to boats, and suffering a grinding poverty that compelled them to
augment their living any way they could.
Passamaquoddy varies somewhat from American economic models of the frontier
in that the local economy was based on exploiting the region's resources in fish and
timber, rather than on agriculture. A resource-extraction frontier closely matches the
"staples" economic model of Canadian historian Harold ~ n n i s Nonetheless,
.~~
the
hardships, poverty and hope described by American historians to an agricultural frontier
apply equally to the Passamaquoddy borderland. Passamaquoddy's fishermen shared the
ambivalent response to capitalism American scholars ascribed to agrarian settlers.Io0
They participated in markets, but commercial transactions were not yet impersonal events
that could be divorced from community needs.
On a resource frontier like Passamaquoddy, production for market had always
been crucial. Fishermen sold or bartered their catch, timbermen and sailors sold their
labor, and farming families engaged in weaving, construction, renting out oxen, or
making shoes. Self-sufficiency was never a way of life among the region's settlers, and
markets were absolutely vital to raise the money required to buy essentials like flour,

molasses, rum, and other goods. Fishing was primary experience for many, but if timber
prices rose, fishermen abandoned their nets and took to the woods.'01 Many sought to
engage in wage labor to load ships, mill timber, or construct buildings, returning to their
scratch farms and fishing boats when there was no demand for their labor. This
opportunism meant that when smugglers offered high wages to pull their oars or move
their contraband, locals jumped at the opportunity and asked few questions. For example,
when Robert Little was standing on a hill on the American side of the St. Croix River in
May, 1808, he told William Sherman he would pay $53 to get 53 barrels of tar across to
the New Brunswick side of the river. Sherman never asked if it was legal, nor did he
warn Little, despite the fact that Jefferson's embargo strictly forbade the exportation of
any American goods in 1 8 0 8 . ' ~ ~
When opportunities arose for borderland residents to profit by working in the
woods, they eagerly abandoned their fishing boats for timber camps. For example, when
timber prices rose dramatically in 1807 and 1808, many fishermen went up the St. Croix
to work in the woods.lo3 Again, they paid little heed to what side of the border they
worked on; during the War of 1812 many able-bodied men working in the New
Brunswick woods decamped for their native United States rather than serve in the militia.
Nonetheless, several American woodsmen served in the first drafts of militia made at St.
stephen.lo4 Yet timbermen were also poor. Their homes were rude cabins, and like
many fishermen, they lived in perpetual debt to merchants, the very sort of dependency
many North Americans abhorred.lo5 To external observers timbermen in both Maine and
New Brunswick were little more than a shiftless drunken banditti.lo6 New Brunswick
historian William MacNutt noted that the timber trade "induced free thinking rather than

respect for authority," including stripping Crown forests of their valuable trees.'''
Timbermen, too, were smugglers, often not from choice but because colonial merchants
paid them in British manufactured goods. When they crossed the border, American
customs officials could and sometimes did seize these goods as contraband.'''
This opportunism bridged the temporal world to the supernatural. Many frontier
settlers believed in what has been termed a "nocturnal" or supernatural economy.'09
Many settlers were undoubtedly superstitious. Passamaquoddy mariners sometimes
reported sighting sea monsters, like Freeman Smith of Lubec, an experienced whaleman
who reported the serpent's body was six feet in diameter, and that its head stood fifteen
feet above the water."'

Smith was just one of many New England mariners who claimed

to have seen sea-serpents after 1815."

' Passamaquoddy's fishermen sometimes believed

in witches, and nailed horseshoes to the masts of their boats for protection from them.'12
Some individuals manipulated folk beliefs for their own profit, such as Daniel Lambert, a
Maine farmer who claimed to have supernatural powers to uncover buried pirate treasure.
Lambert was a fraud, but when he was found out and fled, he was arrested while en route
. " ~ society, poor especially in terms of specie, fantasized
to ~ a s s a m a ~ u o d d ~Frontier
about buried treasure chests. Passamaquoddy had its own incidents, such as when a boy
reportedly found a large gold nugget on a beach at ~ a s t ~ o r t .The
" ~ idea of buried
treasure may have had even more currency at Passamaquoddy than other frontier regions
because of the remains of old French settlements in the area; Campobello residents
reportedly wasted much of their time digging for Captain Kyd's treasure.'15 Loyalist
officials in fact dug up Samuel Champlain's abandoned settlement on Bone Island to
protect the province from American claims to the Passamaquoddy region. If the British

and American border commissioners could dig up ruins to prove sovereignty, then surely
ordinary people could find buried treasure.'I6 Such superstitious beliefs may have served
smugglers well, allowing them to explain away sudden prosperity.
Passamaquoddy also had a uniquely nocturnal economy as well, both legitimate
and illicit. Fishermen frequently fished at night, a legal and legitimate practice, using
torches to attract fish to their nets. Smugglers operated at night in direct contravention of
both American and British laws that forbade loading or unloading vessels of any size
after dark. During peak smuggling times a man might make several weeks wages in one
night; the highest amount recorded in one night was $47, paid in cash."' Unfortunately
there is no recorded response of wives and children to tired husbands and fathers
returning at dawn after a night spent illegally transporting goods across the border. But
perhaps smugglers explained the unexpected appearance of cash or goods in supernatural
terms.
Borderland residents had complex attitudes toward commerce, possessing both
pragmatic and naive elements, in common with most of North American society. The
basic goal for most families was survival and ideally a comfortable independence from
debt or competency, but none could hope to avoid engaging in a market economy. At
Passamaquoddy this pragmatic response, and the need to cross and re-cross the border to
take advantage of the region's natural resources and opportunities, meant that common
people paid little heed to the border, and asked few questions when opportunities to make
a quick profit arose. Smuggling was just another way to augment family incomes on a
poor frontier. But borderland merchants smuggled for other reasons, including capital
acquisition and issues related to the balance of trade.

Borderland Merchants
Passamaquoddy's merchants were the most significant component of the
borderland population in terms of smuggling. The merchants were the vital link with the
outside world. They understood markets and profit, and they owned the wharves,
warehouses, and ships that made smuggling possible. Like the less wealthy borderland
population, the region's merchants engaged in varied mercantile pursuits; few merchants
could afford to specialize in any one activity. Clearly this was a group that engaged in
smuggling for profit, as opposed to fishermen and laborers who resorted to illicit trade to
augment their meager incomes. Yet they were also pursuing culturally supported goals.
Financial success increasingly defined the American character after the War of
Independence, an attribute frequently ascribed to a distinctive American culture that
honored individual initiative.Il8 Many of these merchants came to Passamaquoddy
specifically because they wanted to engage in smuggling. Three groups of merchants
dominated Passamaquoddy's commerce, both licit and illicit: Scots, Loyalists, and
Yankees.
The common denominator for Passamaquoddy's mercantile community was the
need to connect North America with external markets. Almost always these markets
were somehow connected with British imperial interests. For example, American
merchants from Eastport were heavily concerned in exporting flour to Portugal and Spain
from roughly 1809 to 18 14. Yet that flour was not headed for markets in Lisbon or
Cadiz; instead it was destined for the British army fighting in the Iberian Peninsula. As
they attempted to establish themselves in the decades after the American Revolution,

Passamaquoddy's merchants had to develop new markets for themselves because older
well-established mercantile firms in the metropolitan core already dominated traditional
trade routes. Thus Passamaquoddy's mercantile community had to break into the British
commercial system, not an easy task given the fierce commercial rivalries of the age.'l9
Passamaquoddy's merchants broke into the British commercial world by
establishing trade relations with British conquests in the Napoleonic Wars. For example,
Britain wrested Demerara in South America from Dutch control in the early 1800s. By
1808, Passamaquoddy supplied Demerara with large quantities of timber and provisions
to support its slave plantation economy.'20 The Caribbean islands with which
Passamaquoddy merchants tended to trade in this period were often those recently
captured 6om the French, or Spanish colonies whose usual mercantilist policies were
disrupted by Napoleon's invasion of the imperial homeland.
Lowland Scots held a large amount of economic influence within the British
Empire. Keenly competitive and clannish, they were often detested by non-Scots. An
example of this is Loyalist merchant and smuggler on Campobello, who resented
Charlotte County's predominantly Scottish officials and blamed his political problems on
them.'*' As a whole Scots merchants in British North America seem to have been avid
free-traders who chafed under the mercantile domination of English ports, especially
London. For these men Scotland was finally achieving the wealth it deserved. This
ethnic viewpoint meant that Scots tended to trade with their homeports such as Greenock
and Leith, thus developing a reputation as being cliquish or narrow in their views;
certainly they tended to trade almost exclusively with fellow Scotsmen. Their
unpopularity may also have been because of their success. Scots merchants dominated

both Halifax and Saint John, and initiated the true capitalist institutions in the region,
such as banks, insurance, and steamships.'22 Successhl ethnic minorities frequently
received criticism for their secretiveness, clannishness, and kinship links, and in this
sense the Scots were no different from contemporary Jews and ~ u a k e r s . ' ~ ~
There did seem to be some grounds for this resentment. Many of the foremost
commercial figures in Charlotte County were Scots, including Robert Pagan, Colin
Campbell and his son, the McMasters family, and Christopher Scott. All belonged to the
St. Andrews Society in Saint John. 124 They controlled the county's courts, the region's
most advanced and productive dam and sawmill complex at St. Stephen. Scott
established the area's first bank, and built St. Andrew's Presbyterian church.I2' All of
Charlotte County's Scottish merchants were well-known smugglers or colluded with
them, including Colin Campbell, a customs officer who colluded with smugglers. Yet the
numbers of these Scots merchants was never large, just a few dozen at most in both New
Brunswick and Nova Scotia.
Foremost among the Scots at Passamaquoddy was Robert Pagan (1 750-1 82 l), of
St. Andrews, New Brunswick. Pagan emigrated to America in 1768, establishing himself
at Falmouth, ~ a s s a c h u s e t t s . 'The
~ ~ Revolution forced him to flee; Pagan chose to
remain as close to the American market as possible. First he established himself at the
British post at Penobscot. While there, Pagan smuggled British goods into British
territory by arranging for the sham capture of his vessels.12' When the British evacuated
that post Pagan settled in what became St. Andrews, New Brunswick, within eyesight of
the American side of the border. Significantly, many of Pagan's activities were illicit in
some manner. Pagan plundered Crown timber reserves, illegally imported American

timber, sold fish to American merchants contrary to the law, and actively violated
Jefferson's embargo.'28 Many of his fellow merchants and countrymen pursued similar
endeavors. Even in shipbuilding, Pagan and other Scots had to smuggle American
ironware and Scottish copper fittings to complete the ~ e s s e 1 s . l ~ ~
Loyalist merchants, in this instance meaning those born in North America who
fled to the remaining British North American colonies after 1783, were equally
avaricious. They participated in all the illicit economic activities that the Scots did, and
engaged in illicit trade in the West Indies as well. One important difference is that
Loyalist merchants did not have the narrow ethnic viewpoint of the Scots. The Loyalist
merchants were also more provincial and lacked the connections to places like Lowland
Scotland where the Industrial Revolution and capitalist institutions such as the banking
system were developing so rapidly. Instead, in keeping with their conservative ideology,
Loyalist merchants sought to reconstruct the old trade patterns that existed before 1775,
~~
with the Scots and the Yankees,
especially the West Indies c o n n e ~ t i o n . 'Compared
Loyalists made poor capitalists; rather than compete or be innovative, they often looked
to government for bounties or trade privileges. Neither Nova Scotia nor New Brunswick
flourished until roughly 1808, when British demands for colonial timber and Jefferson's
embargo combined to invigorate the colonial colonies in no small part because the British
Board of Trade encouraged smuggling British manufactured goods into the United States
via the Maritime provinces.'3'
Because aggressive American merchants success~llyshut out Maritime
merchants from the West Indies trade, New Brunswick and Nova Scotian traders soon
found themselves in a secondary role. Loyalist merchants sold their fish and timber to

Americans who camed it to the West Indies. Direct trade with the West Indies was
limited to small vessels that operated on a seasonal basis.'32 At Passamaquoddy, the most
prominent Loyalist merchant was Christopher Hatch. Originally a Boston merchant,
Hatch served with distinction as a captain in the Loyal American Regiment during the
War of Independence. After the war he established himself as a merchant on Campobello
before moving to St. Andrews, where he specialized in the plaster trade.133Hatch
maintained friendly relations with Benjamin Lincoln, a fellow Bostonian and general in
the Continental Army during the war. Lincoln established one of his sons in Dennysville,
~ ~ there is no hard evidence besides his
just across the border fiom St. A n d r e w ~ . 'While
participation in the notorious plaster trade, it seems likely he smuggled. But Hatch never
fully committed himself to commerce. He retained an interest in military matters, serving
as a colonel in the militia, and was one of Charlotte County's foremost magistrates, as
well as an occasional member of the assembly.135Given his powerful political position
as both a justice and a militia officer, it is not surprising that no one pointed an accusing
finger at him. So many of Charlotte County's leaders participated in smuggling that the
chances of one of them upsetting the widespread illicit trade that benefited them all
appear slim.
American merchants were aggressive and forward-looking like the Scots, but
without ties to specific ports. Rather than link themselves with one or two ports in
Scotland, American merchants actively and aggressively sought new markets the world
over, even if those markets were closed to legal trade.136New Englanders especially
were known for their sharp bargaining.13' Smuggling was just one tactic among many to
secure profits, and Yankees even took some pride in their pre-revolution smuggling. One

Massachusetts congressman confessed, "The habit of smuggling pervades our country.
We were taught it when it was considered rather as meritorious than criminal."138 Postrevolutionary Americans, too, could justify smuggling as an expression of American free
enterprise and democracy. American borderland merchants were mostly Jeffersonians;
they generally disliked big government, high taxes and the patrician principles of the
Federalists. Even during Jefferson's embargo, when the federal government attempted to
completely halt all sea-borne commerce, Eastport remained a Democratic-Republican
s t r ~ n g h o l d . 'Those
~ ~ voting patterns should not be surprising when one considers that the
erratic commercial policies of Jefferson and Madison ironically brought prosperity to
Passamaquoddy just as surely as they ruined merchants in Baltimore and Philadelphia. In
the United States smugglers could claim with some justification that if what they did was
illegal, it was the government rather than themselves who were in the wrong.I4O
Foremost among Passamaquoddy's Yankee smuggler merchants was Jabez
Mowry of Eastport and later Lubec. Mowry specialized in importing plaster and
exporting provisions; he moved to Passamaquoddy from Rhode Island in about 1806 to
engage in this trade. Mowry emerges from the written records as a central figure in
Passamaquoddy smuggling. His reach was transatlantic; he even shipped flour from
Eastport to Cadiz, Spain. He had warehouses on both sides of the border to facilitate his
activities. Mowry appears frequently in court documentation, yet he remains as elusive a
figure in death as he was in life. For example, when U.S. Deputy Marshal George Smith
attempted to serve Mowry papers in 1816, he reported the following:
I went down to Lubeck the moment I received
information that Mowry had returned-- my arrival in that
quarter was not known, excepting at the major's [Trescott],
until I landed at the Narrows-- On inquiry of W. Wheeler

(after I had been in Mowry's store) where Mowry was, I
was informed that he had gone from the Narrows & which
proved to be the case, he having passed me in the fog on his
way to the customs house.-- It appears that he landed a
little way below the majors & sent a man up to look out for
me. 141
Mowry then "went immediately to Campobello where he had some plaister vessels
landing plaister, directly opposite the stores at the Narrows & where he keeps all the time
except when he shuts himself up on this side." Mowry slipped across the border
whenever American law officials anived, taking advantage of his local connections and
even the fog to evade them. Mowry proved equally adept at dodging British officials. He
even dressed in woman's clothing when he visited Eastport during the British occupation
to conduct business. His fiiends met him at the beach to "proffer the attentions due to a
lady, were sorely tasked to preserve their gravity as they accompanied him through the
streets; because he stepped off so long and in other respects demeaned himself with so
little grace and propriety as a woman, that both he and they, in spite of all hints and
lessons, were objects of attention to passing persons by whom they did not wish to be
recognized."'42
While Mowry was one of a handful of Federalists in a sea of frontier
Jeffersonians, a smuggler and trader with the enemy, he is remembered in popular history
as a local booster, a man who gave freely for the construction of churches and Lubec's
first schoolhouse, and a merchant who employed dozens.'43 In his old age he delighted in
telling stories about his smuggling e ~ ~ 1 0 i t s . l ~ ~
Scots, Loyalists and Yankee merchants, like all smugglers, justified their
smuggling for various reasons. Scots claimed it was their due because English
commercial policies discriminated against them. Loyalists asserted that the British

government's debt to them for their loyalty and suffering remained unpaid, and thus they
were reclaiming what they had lost in the Revolution. During Jefferson's embargo and
the War of 1812, they could even claim smuggling as a patriotic enterprise that
undermined the American economy. In the United States, American smugglers could
claim that the Revolution freed them to pursue the wealth that guaranteed d e m o ~ r a c ~ . ' ~ '
Practical aspects of commerce also encouraged borderlands merchants to engage in illicit
trade, the foremost of which was the region's perpetual shortage of specie and credit.
Coins were rare, and even paper money scarce: both were readily counterfeited,
Bills of exchange and letters of credit were also easily forged, and
even by 10cals.l~~
relied on merchant's personal contacts with other

merchant^.'^^

As David Owen pointed

out, fish were often used as a sort of currency in the 1790s at Passamaquoddy.148 A
decade later, timber or lumber was a common form of paying debts to merchants like
Joseph Porter, a St. Stephen "late ~ o ~ a l i s t . "Sometimes
'~~
when dragged before a judge
for smuggling, individuals claimed they tried to get cash for their goods on the other side
of the border, but there was no specie to pay them, so they took contraband goods
instead.'''
Had cash or credit been available, smugglers probably would have preferred to
conduct their business legitimately, but the underdeveloped economic institutions of the
day prevented it. The answer for merchants was the creation of banks that would pool
credit, create a stable paper money, and increase the speed with which money passed
from one merchant to another.I5' Borderland merchants, including Lemuel Trescott,
sought the creation of a state-chartered bank at Eastport as early as 1807.''~ In 1820
Eastport had its first bank, the "Bank of Passamaquoddy," with none other than Jabez

Mowry as its president. By 1825 St. Andrews had a bank as well, with the equally
notorious smuggler Christopher Scott as its president.

Smugglers, self-proclaimed

"free traders," were also early capitalists. Banks and capitalist institutions that promoted
free trade gradually lessened the need to smuggle.

Conclusion
After the Revolution the common frontier experience brought Americans and
Loyalists together, encouraging cooperation even if it meant smuggling. The ideological
differences between Loyalists and Patriots rapidly faded.lS4 For the ordinary settlers this
was largely a pragmatic consideration that ensured survival, an outgrowth of the

frontier's egalitarian communalism. But the region's merchants rationalized illicit trade
for other reasons, including ethnicity, perceptions of social standing, or revolutionary
ideology. The justifications for smuggling are as diverse as the people who participated
in illicit trade. Participants in the "dark trade" made excuses for their behavior, acting in
ways that sometimes appear hypocritical, devious, or even traitorous. Examining these
contradictions reveals that everyday life brought borderland peoples into conflict with
social ideals, national ideologies, and the power of the state. These struggles existed
throughout North America, but the presence of the border meant that Passamaquoddy's
settlers had unusual stresses and opportunities that brought these contradictions to the
fore, as they did with Dr. Faxon when he went to that Eastport tavern in 1807.
The smuggling merchants were especially important at Passarnaquoddy because
they also made up the overwhelming majority of the local political machinery, including
the county-level judiciary. As early as 1796, a New Brunswick customs officer found

contraband tea and liquor in the homes, warehouses, and other outbuildings belonging to
the leading figures and magistrates on Grand Manan, Indian Island, and Campobello.
The list included Grand Manan's Moses Gerrish and Campobello's Thomas Henderson,
who in subsequent years would serve as a highly indulgent customs 0 f f i ~ e r . lMost
~ ~ of
the American magistrates at Passamaquoddy were also involved in smuggling to some
degree. Somehow these individuals rationalized their borderlands experience, permitting
them to defraud the state and organize banquets celebrating their patriotism
simultaneously.
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CHAPTER 6:
ADVENTURERS AND ENFORCERS

Introduction
A letter dated from 1812 indicates the game of cat-and-mouse played between
smugglers and government officials at Passamaquoddy. Unsigned, addressed to a New
York City merchant and smuggler conducting business on the border, the letter concludes
with the warning "look out for the Revenue Cutter at East Port. LOOK OUT."' It is
exactly the sort of mysterious correspondence one would expect a smuggler to write. The
importance of this letter and the others that accompany it lies not only their content,
which is rich in detail about smuggling and includes codes to conceal participants'
names, for they also reveal something about those who came from distant places to
engage in illicit trading on the remote shores of Passamaquoddy Bay. A number of
merchants from Manhattan came to Passamaquoddy and vicinity to trade, as did
Philadelphia, Boston, Salem, Portsmouth, and Portland traders. Crossing the border into
British territory, even during the War of 1812 posed few problems, and the United States
Supreme Court actually upheld American citizens' rights to cross into enemy territory at
~assarna~uodd~.~

A variety of government officials arrayed themselves against these adventurers.
The representatives of law and order could be a troublesome presence to locals. Military
and naval units, revenue cutters, customs officials, and other law officers came to impose
order and trade restrictions. Community leaders on both sides of the border dealt with
these external forces cautiously. Magistrates usually felt obliged to support these
external forces. As leaders charged to protect the community, however, these
representatives of the law threatened to upset the harmonious borderland relationship.
Certainly some leaders worried that these outside law enforcers would ruin the smuggling
trade and the region's prosperity. All were concerned that these government officers,
who were often heavily armed, would initiate violence that could devastate the region.
As a result external forces often received only tepid welcomes, and occasionally faced
outright hostility from the borderland populace.
Outsiders helped to create the borderlands identity both as lawbreakers and law
enforcers, often trapping local residents between their conflicting demands. Smuggling
merchants sought obedience to the laws of supply and demand, while government
officers required allegiance to the state and its laws. These differing viewpoints created
unusual stresses within the borderland community itself, changing conventional attitudes
toward authority, the pursuit of wealth, and the importance of the ideologies that emerged
from the American Revolution. Tom between welcoming the outsiders who could bring
prosperity and the need to create a civil society that respected legal authority, locals did
their best to moderate the actions of both extremes. Essentially they were caught in a
struggle between capitalism and the state, between "adventurers" and "enforcers."

The Adventurers
At the cutting edge of the transition from mercantilism to capitalism were a set of
ambitious young merchants deemed by many as "adventurers," young men unconnected
with Passamaquoddy who came to make money fast. Most departed as soon as their
business concluded, but others remained in the area for years, and some even settled at
Passamaquoddy. These were men on the make with few constraints on their personal
They
ambition, exactly the sort of entrepreneurs who led the way towards ~a~ita1ism.j
were also the smugglers who Adam Smith described in Wealth of Nations. Smith thought
smuggling "the most hazardous of all trades," and bemoaned the fact that unfortunately,
"The dangerous and hairbreadth escapes of a life of adventures, instead of disheartening
young people, seem frequently to recommend a trade to them."4 Ambitious, worldly, and
clever, these adventurers worshipped profit, and seldom appear to have paid much mind
to the demands of the state: as Smith himself lamented, merchants were not necessarily
the citizen of any particular country.5 Nova Scotia's attorney general mirrored Smith
when he complained, "I am sorry to say that we are surrounded by a description of
unprincipled men [smugglers] who are one day British subjects and the next citizens of
the United States, as it best suits their

interest^."^

Smith's model of a smuggler was an over-optimistic adventurer drawn by the lure
of easy profits, and the fate of smugglers was almost always bankruptcy due to seizures
by customs officers and other penalties for being caught.' Smith deplored this travesty
since he defined a smuggler as "a person who, though no doubt highly blamable for

violating the laws of his country, is frequently incapable of violating those of natural
justice, and would have been, in every respect, an excellent citizen had not the laws of his
country made that a crime which nature never meant to be so."* Smugglers reacted
against unnatural laws imposed by the state; at first their actions might be "rather
imprudent than criminal," but in Smith's mind the smuggler "too often becomes one of
the hardiest and most determined violators of the laws of society."9 As a customs
administrator, Smith believed that part of the blame lay with a lax customs
administration; he argued that "not many people are scrupulous about smuggling when,
without pejury, they can find any easy and safe opportunity of doing so."" Smith also
found that the public generally sympathized with smugglers who offered the consumer
low-cost goods. Public tolerance encouraged smugglers to consider themselves as
engaged in an innocent activity; thus when customs officials did move to seize
contraband goods, the smugglers often fiercely defended themselves and their 'rjust
property."11 Passarnaquoddy smugglers defended their actions by terming themselves
"free traders," a label that underscored their freedom from commercial regulations.12
This freedom and the rise of capitalism came at a cost, however. American
sociologist Robert Merton argued that American society more strongly than other
capitalist societies held out the goal of personal wealth and success to all its citizens.
Often this commitment to wealth and success meant that individuals had to break the law
to achieve these goals. Merton's sociological arguments are echoed in those of historians
such as Appleby, who found that the American Revolution created "a distinctive
American society that honored individual initiative.13 The argument may also be held out
for elitist Loyalist society as well. New Brunswick's merchants and leaders constantly

sought more money to recoup their losses from the Revolutionary War and support their
social pretensions.14 Many did not hesitate to break the law or subvert state interests to
do so.
However, government control, geography, and other factors limited the ability of
aspiring capitalists to achieve their goals. Efforts to support the ideologies that emerged
out of the American Revolution conflicted with the economic imperative to acquire
wealth. The tension between ideology and economy created stresses too great for
borderlands society to cope with, resulting in what sociologists term "anomie," a
condition often associated with economic disaster, rapid economic growth, or
deregulation of business.15 Jefferson's embargo and the War of 1812 were economic
disasters for the United States that severely upset social relations, especially in New
England where pro-trade Federalists openly debated secession.16 During this period the
ability of society to regulate itself deteriorated and social norms and expectations became
twisted. Adventurers and troublemakers could be warmly accepted into a community
while the agents of state control faced hostility. The machinations of the state in
controlling, restricting or forbidding trade were less comprehensible to borderland
residents who preferred lax or nonexistent commercial regulations.17 At Passamaquoddy
this meant that magistrates sheltered smugglers, but prosecuted soldiers for performing
their duty.

Despite diverse backgrounds, the adventurers shared several characteristics. First,
they were all young and single men. Second, they were ruthless in their search for profit.
Third, they were often only a temporary presence at Passamaquoddy. The experiences of
James Colles, Richard Hasluck, Constantino Llufrio, and John McMaster illustrate how
adventurers interacted with the community and conducted their illicit trade.

James Colles
James Colles of New York City is an ideal representative of the American
adventurers, in no small part because so much of his personal correspondence survives
today. Colles came from a prosperous Manhattan family of Irish descent. About 1810,
he became a clerk in Hugh Kennedy Toler's mercantile firm,which was heavily engaged
in importing British manufactured goods, especially textiles, from ~ i v e r ~ o o lNew
.'~
York had already achieved fame as the home of commercially aggressive entrepreneurs
and the heart of the American market.lg New York smugglers began to use
Passamaquoddy as an illicit trade center during Jefferson's embargo and continued to
come to the region in subsequent years. Collector Trescott estimated in 1811 that "not
less by estimation than one hundred Merchants from New York and other places"
engaged in smuggling at ~ a s s a m a q u o d d ~ . ~ ~
New Yorkers continued to come to Passamaquoddy to smuggle during the War of
1812. As a result of the troubled relations between Britain and the United States, Toler
Once his
and other merchants began to deliver goods to ports in British North Ameri~a.~'
goods arrived there, Toler could either import them legally, or smuggle them into the

United States if Congress banned trade with Britain. To that end, Toler sent Colles to
Passarnaquoddy in the spring of 1812 to bring goods stored in St. Andrews and Saint
John into the United States.
Colles moved on both sides of the border in 18 12 and 18 13 in order to illicitly
introduce Toler's goods into the United States. Most of these were British manufactured
goods such as textiles, including silk ribbons and other luxury items. On occasion
American privateersmen harassed Colles on suspicion of smuggling, but he apparently
talked himself out of trouble.22 Colles's method of smuggling at Eastport was to
cooperate as closely as possible with American customs officials. He used his social
acumen and promised financial remuneration for the officials' time and trouble. Colles's
tactic was to smuggle Toler's goods fiom New Brunswick into Eastport and then turn
informant against his own cargo. The officials then seized the goods with Colles's
permission, and auctioned them off after an uncontested court hearingz3 Colles, at his
employer's urging, arranged to have the goods under-appraised by at least fifty percent,
apparently by providing the appraisers with a good meal, as "a good dinner has a great
tendency to soften men's hearts."24 Because of the false appraisal, Colles bought back
the goods at a fraction of their true value, pocketed twenty-five percent of the proceeds of
the auction as the informant, and acquired customhouse certification that the goods had
legally entered the United States. In the meantime, Toler petitioned Maine's federal
district court for remission of the seizure entirely.25 While this was a convoluted and
expensive way of conducting business, high wartime prices ensured a sizeable profit.

A variety of local merchants assisted Colles, including Jabez Mowry in Eastport,
Robert Pagan in St. Andrews, Nehemiah Menitt in Saint John, and Edward Blackford in
Halifax, most of whom were well-known borderland smugglers. Colles sometimes
stayed in their homes, received mail at their offices, borrowed money from them, and
~ ~ were business
undoubtedly paid to store his contraband in their w a r e h ~ u s e s .These
transactions, but there was a social element to them as well, primarily a recognition,
despite their various nationalities and degrees of wealth, that they all pursued similar
goals. Face-to-face transactions, kinship and marriage links, and socialization remained
an important part of conducting business because it was a means of transmitting the
information so vital for

merchant^.^'

In this way commercial society promoted personal

relations, a concept in direct opposition to one shared by many scholars who maintain
that the market revolution and commodification discouraged or dissolved social bonds.28
Nonetheless, it reinforces Adam Smith's perception of commercial friendships. The
adventurers who came to Passamaquoddy depended on the sympathy and cooperation of
locals to evade commercial restrictions, thereby creating a mutual dependence that
reinforced suspicion of government anti-smuggling efforts.
Not all of Colles's plans succeeded, despite his charm and connections. In
February 1813, Colles attempted to bring forty-two packages of English goods from St.
Andrews into ~astport.~'
Working in concert with Toler, Colles carefully laid the
groundwork for introducing the goods into the American market. First they employed the
services of Jabez Mowry, one of the wealthiest American merchants at Passamaquoddy
and a veteran smuggler. Together Colles, Toler, and Mowry approached Collector
Lemuel Trescott. They presented their case, and asked what Trescott would do if they

brought the goods to Eastport. Trescott stated he would seize the goods and transport
them to Portland for auction after adjudication, a satisfactory answer because it brought
the goods into the American market via an auction process that could easily be
manipulated, especially if Toler or Colles informed against the packages themselves.
They planned to bring the goods directly into Eastport and land them on John Kendall's
wharf, where the deputy collector, William Coney, would seize them."
Toler and Mowry then proceeded to meet with the commander of the American
garrison to procure a pass to cross the border into British territory. Typical of most
smugglers, they chose to work within the law whenever possible. The commander,
Colonel George Ulmer, gave the men a pass to cross the border. But Ulmer must have
suspected their intentions to smuggle goods into the country. Or perhaps somebody
tipped him off. Ulmer ordered a party of soldiers to go to Clark's Head, some three miles
north of the American army post and four miles north of Kendall's wharf. The soldiers
spotted a vessel coming from the British side of the border and boarded the suspected
smuggling vessel, which turned out to be the schooner Polly of St. Andrews, loaded with
Toler's contraband goods. The sergeant in charge questioned Colles about his intentions,
but on receiving what they deemed as evasive answers, the soldiers seized the Polly and
sailed for the town landing in Eastport.

In the meantime, the would-be smugglers were waiting at Kendall's wharf with
the deputy collector. Soon word arrived that soldiers had seized the Polly; the deputy
collector immediately set out to intercept the Polly in the customhouse boat, and boarded
it within half an hour of its seizure. Deputy Collector Coney questioned the sergeant's
authority to seize the vessel, and called the soldier's actions illegal. Coney claimed he

had jurisdiction over the vessel and seized it in the name of the United States in an
attempt to avoid a potentially very embarrassing ~ituation.~'Arguments about whose
jurisdiction the seizure fell under continued; ultimately Collector Trescott was awakened
and Colonel Ulmer consulted on the matter, but they disagreed as well. Ulmer resolved
the issue by ordering twelve soldiers to take custody of the vessel, and threatened to
remove the goods by force if necessary to the safety of Fort Sullivan's b l o c k h ~ u s e . ~ ~
The scandal continued, as Trescott and Coney complained bitterly about Ulmer's
interference in what they saw as customhouse affairs.33 Ulmer in turn charged the
customhouse officers with actively colluding to facilitate smuggling. Trescott sent the
contraband to Portland under federal custody, libeled in the name of Ulmer's troops.34
However, the federal district court favored Trescott's version of events. The federal
court condemned the goods and auctioned them for roughly $100,000; Trescott and
Mowry each received $25,000 as their share of the seizure, with Mowry immediately
remitting his share to ~ o l l e s . ~Toler
'
apparently lost out, but nonetheless seemed pleased
at how the U.S. marshal auctioned the contraband; he later sent U.S. Marshall Thomas G .
Thornton one hundred dollars "as a gift" via Colles, who continued to operate in Maine
and New Brunswick for another year.36
The Polly incident reveals that adventurers such as Colles cooperated closely with
locals, both merchants and customhouse officers, to bring contraband across the border.
The adventurers chose to cloak their activities with a veil of legality, a tactic that
promised success so long as other outsiders, in this case the U.S. Army, did not intervene.

The non-violence of the methods also stands out; Colles and Toler interacted closely with
locals. Only Col. Ulmer threatened violence. Moreover, Colles seems to have possessed
a charisma that smoothed his way in the commercial world.
Colles's correspondence reveals a man at home in the Loyalist salons of Saint
John, where he was familiar with the influential Wetrnore family. His easy interaction
with Loyalists was no doubt aided by his own Federalist politics. Colles also moved
among an elite circle in New York, including the Roosevelt family. He lived at a
fashionable Manhattan address -42 Pearl Street- and drank his tea from custom-ordered
monogrammed china from Canton. Colles was an ambitious young man, full of selfconfidence, tightly bonded with his social peers, accustomed to a life of privilege, yet
unceasing in his pursuit of wealth.37 Yet at the same time Colles was quite capable of
haggling on the docks of a rough-and-tumble a frontier town like Eastport in order to
move British manufactured goods across the border. He hired experienced smugglers
such as one Captain Osgood to bring contraband goods concealed under plaster of paris
to New York
When Colles's business was done at Passamaquoddy he moved on to other
ventures. He became a merchant in his own right, and even served as president of the
New Orleans branch of the Bank of the United States. Unlike Smith's image of the
typical smuggler, Colles did not become bankrupt, although he did face trial before the
New York Federal District Court on charges related to illicit trade.39 In fact Colles
became very wealthy. He had a long life, a large family, toured Europe, and built a
thirty-room mansion in Morristown, New Jersey, that still stands today.

Richard Hasluck
While Colles represents the efforts of American merchants desperate to bring
contraband goods into the United States, Richard Hasluck represents British merchants
who were equally desperate to enter the American market, even during time of war.
Hasluck, like Colles, was an adventurer, an ambitious young merchant willing to take
risks to conduct illicit trade at Passamaquoddy. He also embodied some of the problems
adventurers brought with them to Passamaquoddy, both as victims and as victimizers.
Hasluck came to Passamaquoddy during Jefferson's embargo when large profits
could be made smuggling American provisions into New Brunswick. Originally Hasluck
came fiom Birmingham, at the center of the English industrial heartland. Hasluck
operated as an agent for Birmingham hardware merchants Alexander Walker, Sr. and his
brother Thomas H.

as luck.^'

Hasluck's job was to bring British hardware into the

lucrative but often closed American market. Hasluck also engaged in the contraband
provisions trade during Jefferson's embargo. His abilities as a smuggler were limited;
American authorities interfered with his operations several times. The first of these
occasions was on the night of April 5, 1808, when customs officials caught Hasluck
attempting to illegally export 135 kegs of butter in a gondola fiom Calais, Maine, to St.
Stephen, New ~runswick.~'
Undaunted, Hasluck continued to engage in the illicit exportation of American
foodstuffs. Undoubtedly he was successful some of the time, but in October 1808, he
once again ran into problems. Hasluck had procured a large quantity of American flour
and loaded it on his partner's ship EIiza at Snug Cove, Campobello, within sight of
American customs officers at Eastport. The customs officers must already have

suspected the Eliza was carrying contraband, but somebody who had helped smuggle the
flour onto the vessel -whom Hasluck referred to as "a notorious b

d"-informed

Collector Delesdemier of the ship's illicit cargo.42 While the vessel was in British waters
the collector could do nothing, but the Eliza strayed into American waters almost
immediately after raising anchor; Passamaquoddy's fierce tides almost wrecked the
vessel on some rocks, and the captain brought his vessel to anchor near Rice's Island,
which Americans claimed lay within their jurisdiction. An American customs officer
immediately boarded the vessel, soon followed by U.S. Navy gunboat No. 43, which
anchored alongside the Eliza and took possession of the British ship. Probably alerted by
Hasluck, the captain of a nearby Royal Navy vessel demanded that the commander of the
gunboat immediately release the Eliza, but received the answer "that he had possession of
her and nothing but bloodshed and hard fighting should take her from him.'43 The Royal
Navy officer responded by anchoring a warship in British waters in Snug Cove, just a few
hundred feet from where the Eliza lay. The situation was extremely tense; in the
aftermath of the Chesapeake incident, American naval officers were anxious to assert
their fighting ability. A shooting war could easily have broken out between Britain and
the United States. Fortunately, Collector Delesdernier agreed to return the Eliza, thereby
defbsing the crisis.
Hasluck's luck continued to be bad however. Thieves robbed the messenger
carrying the $2700 Hasluck used to pay for the cargo of the Eliza. Hasluck posted a
reward of $500, apparently without success.44 Hasluck was a victim of the very
lawlessness that customs officers accused adventurers of bringing to Passamaquoddy.

Hasluck remained at Passamaquoddy after the embargo, engaging in both licit and
illicit trading, especially in Birmingham-produced hardware. During the War of 1812 he
continued smuggling, encouraged by the depressed prices of Birmingham manufactures
and the conversely inflated price of British manufactured goods in the United
Hasluck stayed for several years, married into the locally prominent loyalist McMaster
family, and eventually returned to England with his wife.46
As an adventurer, Hasluck represents the need for industrializing societies to find
new markets for manufactured items, using means both fair and foul. Hasluck's
involvement in the Eliza affair illustrates the mischief adventurers could bring to the
border, and how these minor border matters threatened to become major incidents that
could result in war. But the chaos adventurers brought with them to Passamaquoddy
could have unintentional consequences, as when robbers stole a large sum of money from
Hasluck's messenger. Like James Colles, Hasluck developed local connections that
made business possible. Ultimately, however, he left Passamaquoddy despite his
marriage connections to the area.

Constantino Llufrio
When looking through legal records that consider smuggling at Passamaquoddy,
the name of Spanish Floridian merchant Constantino Llufrio stands out. How did this
individual come to engage in smuggling in as remote a corner of the world as
Passamaquoddy? The answer, in part, seems to be that Llufrio was one of a number of
merchants who combed the Atlantic world, seeking profits where they could find them,
even if it meant breaking the laws of one nation or another. Llufrio claimed that, "trading

on my own account," he had made about twenty voyages before 1812 to the West Indies,
the Spanish Main, the United States, Holland, and

Having engaged in illicit

trade at Amelia Island between American Georgia and Spanish Florida, another
borderland where smuggling was rife, Llufrio eventually made his way to Saint John,
New Brunswick, where he learned of the potential profits to be had at ~ a s s a m a ~ u o d d ~ . ~ ~
Llufrio was born in St. Augustine, Florida, in 1787, a Spanish subject. His
nationality made him a neutral during the War of 1812, thus he could trade legally with
both British and American merchants. Llufrio capitalized on his neutrality by using it to
ship high-value British manufactured items like textiles to Eastport from Saint John.
When British forces occupied Eastport, Llufrio simply moved his destination to nearby
Lubec on the American mainland. During the British occupation of Castine, Llufrio
again moved his base of operations to that port. Under the laws of neutrality, this was
legal; but under British commercial law, foreign merchants were not allowed to live and
conduct trade in colonial ports. Llufrio also had a difficult time persuading American
judicial authorities that he was the true owner of these goods passing into the United
States. A fellow passenger on the brig Llufrio was on when captured by a privateer said
that the Spaniard claimed the goods as a ruse to fool his captors; in fact the fifty-two
packages of dry goods belonged to a British merchant, and thus were liable to seizure.49
Another remarkable aspect of adventurers like Llufrio is that borderland residents
seemed to have accepted him with few questions. Llufiio operated in Passamaquoddy for
months on a vessel flying the neutral Spanish flag, surely a rarity in that part of the world.
Yet his enduring presence was ignored; he only appears in the legal record because an
American privateer captured him, thereby giving officials an opportunity to interrogate

him. The acceptance of Llufrio at Passamaquoddy stands in contrast to places like
Liverpool, Nova Scotia, where the presence of a Spanish merchant created some concern,
even an official inquiry by local magistrates. But in Passamaquoddy, the presence of
such foreigners passed with little remark, probably because the community recognized
the need for di~cretion.~'
Llufrio represents the international character of smuggling at Passamaquoddy. By
using his neutral status as a cover to introduce contraband British goods into the United
States, Llufrio displayed just how aware smugglers were of the various technicalities and
laws that could be used to smuggle goods across the border. The presence of Llufrio and
other neutrals at Passamaquoddy is testimony not only to the widespread recognition
Passamaquoddy received as a smuggling center, but also to the ability of a community to
maintain almost perfect silence about the presence of so many foreigners. If it were not
for the legal record, there would be no recoverable memory of the presence of these
relatively exotic strangers' at Passamaquoddy. This silence should be contrasted with
that of Liverpool, Nova Scotia. When a Spanish merchant appeared there in 1810,
magistrates immediately confronted the man, and a local diarist noted the e ~ e n t . ~ '
Passamaquoddy was a region that could keep its secrets.

John McMaster
John McMaster was the most troublesome of the adventurers at Passamaquoddy,
and in some respects best reflects Adam Smith's model. McMaster is the only adventurer
who can be associated with a smuggling-related murder. It is impossible to pin down
McMaster's nationality; he seems to be one of those smugglers who changed their

nationality at will. McMaster also delighted in defying state authority, what Smith termed
"hair-breadth escapes."52 McMaster also suffered the fate Smith prescribed for
smugglers: bankruptcy due to government prosecution.53
McMaster arrived at Passamaquoddy during Jefferson's embargo. He was a
slippery character; in various documents he claimed to reside in Castine, Buckstown, and
Eastport in Maine; Boston, Massachusetts; and Halifax, Nova Scotia. He may have had
connections with the McMaster family of St. Andrews, New Brunswick, which had
branches in Halifax and Augusta, Maine. McMaster engaged in the profitable provisionssmuggling trade at Passamaquoddy in 1808. In the spring of that year customs officials
found McMaster illegally exporting flour, and confiscated the cargo. Undeterred,
McMaster ordered a shipload of American flour to be delivered to him at Passamaquoddy
in the autumn of 1808, but Collector Delesdernier refused to permit McMaster to unload
the vessel and forced him to store the flour in a warehouse guarded by federal officers on
remote Isle au Haut, almost one hundred miles west of Passamaquoddy.
McMaster's reaction to this setback was to plot to free his flour and get it to
market in Nova Scotia. He hired the Nova Scotia schooner Peggy and recruited a large
crew at Passamaquoddy that he armed with muskets and other weapons. The Peggy
sailed to Isle au Haut, and on a dark night the crew landed and attacked the guards at the
warehouse holding his flour. One guard died in the gunbattle and one of the Peggy's
crew suffered a severe wound. The smugglers succeeded in carrying off McMaster's
flour, but a revenue cutter pursued the Peggy and captured the smuggling vessel without
resistance. Federal prosecutors uncovered McMaster's connection with the Peggy
incident, and tried him in Maine's federal district court in September, 1809. A jury found

him guilty of breaking the embargo laws and fined him $10,000.~~
Unable to pay this
staggering sum, McMaster went to the Lincoln County jail in Wiscasset for debt. He
remained there for years, initially chained and confined to a cell, but later was given the
liberties granted to other debtors. He petitioned Congress on several occasions for
release. Congress ignored his pleas, and McMaster was still confined in Wiscasset when
a drunken sailor murdered him in August 1815.55
McMaster's failure reinforces Smith's model of a smuggler. McMaster's
violence and persistence in continuing to smuggle even after being caught reflects his
own ruthlessness. His ability to recruit what amounted to a gang of mercenaries at
Passamaquoddy also indicates that the region had truly become a refbge for the lawless.56
McMaster's punishment also displays the determination of the American government to
suppress smuggling.

The Enforcers
Adventurers were a troublesome presence at Passamaquoddy, encouraging
lawlessness and violence on the border. But law enforcers proved just as bothersome a
presence as lawbreakers, by adding to the violence and disorder. Military and naval units
especially brought many problems with them, and were often resented by borderland
settlers. Outside forces brought into Passamaquoddy to establish law and order on the
border appear to have been considerably less popular with locals than the adventurers,
who enjoyed some level of local support. Locals often ostracized outside law enforcers.
Pressure fiom borderland society meant that the longer these representatives of external
authority remained in Passamaquoddy, the greater the chance that they would conform

with local expectations of their conduct. The power of borderlands society to overwhelm
external forces should not be underestimated; while the methods were generally nonviolent, they were extremely effective.
If the adventurers represented the advent of unrestrained market forces at
Passamaquoddy, then the military and naval units brought in to control the rampant
smuggling represented the determination of nation-states to bring their populations under
control." Even in the United States, despite its revolutionary rhetoric, the national
government sought to impose its values on the people, using military force if necessary.
While it is widely recognized that American Federalists attempted to overawe certain
segments of society with a military presence during the so-called "Whiskey Rebellion," it
is less known that Presidents Jefferson and Madison did exactly the same.58 The issue is
equally thorny in Canadian historiography, in which British naval and military forces are
generally perceived as protection from an aggressive United States. In both British North
America and the United States, military and naval units often policed restive populaces,
especially in newly settled regions such as Passamaquoddy.

Naval Officers
British warships, sent there to enforce British sovereignty and to pursue
smugglers, were a common presence in the waters of Passamaquoddy Bay. They acted as
occasional and often reluctant allies to customs authorities; naval officers seldom pursued
this mission with enthu~iasm.~'Locals did not always resent their presence; Britain was
almost continually at war with France after 1792, and merchants frequently sought
additional protection for their vessels. In 1796 a British warship pursued and captured a

French privateer at Campobello. British merchants also sought the protection of Royal
Navy warships,during Jefferson's embargo, fearing that American gunboats might enter
British waters and seize suspected smugglers. Until at least 1815 however, the presence
of British warships had a lethal effect on all water-borne traffic in Passamaquoddy, licit
or not. If a British naval vessel was nearby, both American citizens and British subjects
stayed off the water, for fear of being impressed into the Royal ~ a v ~ . ~ '
American naval vessels came to Passamaquoddy as well, although not with the
frequency of British warships. During Jefferson's embargo and after the War of 1812
American naval units patrolled the area for smugglers and attempted to establish national
. ~most
' important difference was that American
sovereignty in Passamaquoddy ~ a ~ The
warships could not impress men into service. Furthermore, locals could bring political
pressure more effectively on the tiny American navy than the vast British fleet. The use
of United States warships in domestic waters to enforce commercial laws was an unusual
role for the American navy, which until the War of 1812 engaged primarily in protecting
American shipping overseas and engaging enemy fleets in the undeclared Quasi-War
with France (1798-1801) and the Barbary Wars of 1801-1805. When the U.S. Navy did
patrol American waters to regulate commerce, it proved unpopular with both the public
and naval officers.62
Royal Navy officers were proverbial for their imperiousness.63 The conduct of
officers such as Lt. Flintoph of His Majesty's schooner Porgey did nothing to enhance
the image of the navy at Passamaquoddy. When Flintoph embarked on his ill-fated
attempt to suppress Passamaquoddy smuggling in 1807, his use of force outraged
magistrates on both sides of the border.64 Notably, Flintoph resigned his commission

within months of his two raids on Passamaquoddy Bay, probably pressured to do so by
his superior officers. But the antipathy sometimes felt both by Americans and colonials
toward Royal Navy officers was not unique to Passamaquoddy. Attempts to impress
sailors in Saint John and Halifax met with resistance, sometimes devolving into riots.65
Royal Navy captains threw local magistrates off their vessels, expressed disdain for
colonial society, and on one occasion kidnapped a young woman from Saint ~ o h n . ~ ~
American naval officers were apparently no better. After USS Wasp arrived in
the region during Jefferson's embargo, its captain arrested a number of smugglers and
held them on board his vessel for days.67 Not content to merely grumble about American
warships patrolling against smugglers, borderland residents took action against their
perceived oppressors. The same gunboat commander who almost precipitated a war in
the Eliza affair suffered from the retaliation of locals who correctly perceived his
weakness for liquor. Somebody plied the young officer with an abundance of alcohol, to
the point that he did not emerge from his cabin for weeks at a time. His incapacity
became known locally. Soon an anonymous letter tipped off the Secretary of the Navy to
the gunboat commander's behavior and he was relieved of his ~ o m m a n d . ~ '
A more significant case of resistance to naval authority occurred in the summer of
1809. American resentment of British naval activities at Passamaquoddy ran high.
During Jefferson's embargo both adventurers and locals experienced problems with
British naval units. Residents resented it when the commander of vessels such as HM's
schooner Plumper threatened to impress any British subject engaged in violent acts while
smuggling.69 On the other hand, merchants applied to the commander of HMS Squirrel
to protect them from USS Wasp, which had seized a British schooner involved in evading

the Embargo ~ c t . ~In' spring 1809, however, there was no fear of American warships
anymore, and a good deal of resentment that British warships were interfering with the
smuggling trade. In addition, people expressed the usual concerns about impressment.71
Throughout North America, whether in the United States or British North
America, there was one popular weapon with which to strike back at imperious naval
officers: encourage the desertion of sailors. The sailors needed little encouraging. Many
were in the service involuntarily, and the conditions on naval vessels were notoriously
bad. Mutinies were an occasional threat, although they were seldom s u c ~ e s s f u l . ~ ~
On July 4, 1809, a mutiny broke out on HMS Columbine as it lay at anchor
between Campobello and ~ a s t ~ 0 1 -The
t . ~date
~ itself was significant for the mutiny was
lead by an American sailor, but the location may have been a bigger factor; if the sailors
could cross the border, they would be fiee men. Over the course of twenty-four hours
many of the crew attempted to jump ship. Some stole ship's boats, others simply jumped
in the water and swam away. Some drowned, others escaped, and yet others were shot by
loyal crewmembers. The captain himself shot the ringleader, and placed more than
twenty men in irons under guard. However, he had by this time lost so many men that he
could not move his vessel, and had to send for assistance from British army units
stationed in Saint ~ o h n . ~ ~
The captain knew that many of the deserters had taken refuge in Eastport under
American jurisdiction. He asked Eastport's magistrates to return the men; the selectmen
replied the deserters had already departed, and could not be returned unless the
Columbine were in American waters.75 Hills attempted to impress sixteen men from

nearby shipping to supplement his depleted crew. Four of the impressed men persuaded

seven of the Columbine's crew to desert with them to the American shore.76 The captain
soon learned that the deserters remained at Eastport, and discovered a few were hiding on
Campobello in British territory, but magistrates on both sides of the border refused to
give up the sailors.77 Eventually Columbine left, and the men presumably went free. But
why did locals shelter these deserters?
Taking in Royal Navy deserters was one way to strike back against state
authority. Borderland residents resisted the centralizing tendencies of the state, and in the
age of sail warships were an icon of state power. Passamaquoddy residents may also
have realized what the fate of the sailors would have been had they returned to their ship.
The Royal Navy brutally flogged several of Columbine's mutineers with 300 to 500
lashes, ordered others transported to Australia, and hanged six men. Authorities hung six
of the mutineers' corpses at the mouth of Halifax harbor, a public warning that the
authority of the Royal Navy was not to be taken lightly.78
But the attitudes of borderland residents toward the Royal Navy were not always
hostile. When it served their purposes, locals might be happy to have British naval units
nearby. During the War of 1812, American citizens often welcomed the Royal Navy
because the presence of a British warship anchored on the boundary discouraged
American officials from pursuing smugglers too closely. After the British occupation of
Eastport in 1814, the Royal Navy found itself actually promoting American smuggling.
The British garrison desperately needed provisions, and so Royal Navy officers such as
Thomas Masterman Hardy wrote permits that allowed American smugglers to pass

unmolested by British naval units.79 The commanders of some Royal Navy vessels, such
as HMS Boxer, also profited by escorting American smugglers along the Maine coast,
protecting them from American officials and privateers.80
Passamaquoddy residents remained ambivalent at best when considering the
presence of naval vessels in Passamaquoddy Bay. For example, when the War of 1812
broke out, colonial subjects clearly appreciated the protection of the navy. After the war
however, they often resisted British warships that attempted to enforce the Navigation
~ c t s . ~Smugglers,
'
both British and American, continued to undermine the authority of
both British and American naval officers when they rescued seized vessels, attempted to
avoid seizure through flight, or argued with naval officers face-to-face.

Army Units
Attitudes towards army units were equally mixed in the borderland.
Land-based army units came to Passamaquoddy for the same reasons naval units did: to
defend national sovereignty and suppress smuggling. Just like their naval counterparts,
military units represented external authority attempting to police a sometimes unruly
populace.82 For example, British military units were called in to quell election riots in
Saint John in 1 7 8 5 . ~However,
~
whereas naval units were constantly on the move, army
units stationed in fortifications had to confront civilians on a daily basis. Army units thus
faced even more pressure from borderland communities to conform to local expectations.
Fort Sullivan in Eastport best illustrates the problems army officers, both British
and American, had with the borderlands community. The American government built
and garrisoned Fort Sullivan in 1 8 0 8 . ~In~ 1814 a British force captured the post and held

it until 1818, when international arbitration determined that Moose Island lay within
American jurisdiction. After 1818 American forces again occupied it. No matter
whether British or American, military garrisons were unpopular with locals, who
correctly perceived that the primary role of these forces was to police their behavior. For
example, during the War of 1812 the American government manned Fort Sullivan not
because of its strategic importance, but to stop smuggling8'
~~
Captain Moses Swett commanded the first garrison at Fort ~ u l l i v a n .The
American federal government ordered Swett's unit to Passamaquoddy to enforce
Jefferson's embargo. Swett initially reported that Eastport was in a virtual state of
rebellion, a view echoed by the local customs collector and naval officers. Swett's
sentries fiequently challenged, and occasionally shot at embargo violators. In turn, the
locals undermined Swett's authority by encouraging his men to desert; within a few
weeks of arrival almost a quarter of Swett's men, encouraged by cash bribes and liquor,
absconded across the border.87 Yet by the time he departed in 1810, Swett had become
so popular that local worthies asked him to stay. 88 HOWcan this change in popularity be
accounted for?
Swett was able to persuade locals that his intentions were not hostile. The federal
government's repeal of the embargo acts early in 1809 did a great deal to soothe local
qualms. But Swett also proved able to understand borderland issues. The best example
of this is Swett's attempts to recover deserters from New Brunswick and Nova Scotia.
He held British deserters, and then exchanged them for his own American deserters.89
Swett also made himself useful, offering to incarcerate some men charged with piracy in
Fort Sullivan's blockhouse until local officials could transfer these dangerous criminals

to another facility.90 Swett also celebrated the end of commercial restrictions with Britain
in 1809 by firing the fort's cannon and participating in a dinner with guests from both
sides of the border, thereby establishing a sympathetic bond between the garrison
commander and the borderland populace.9'
Other American commanders did not fare so well. Locals and adventurers
threatened to tar and feather Colonel George Ulmer in 1813, for example.92 It was
Ulmer's very great misfortune to have orders to eliminate illicit trade with the British
~
faced all manner of opposition such as
provinces during the War of 1 8 1 2 . ~Ulmer
personal threats, encouraging his troops to desert, and supplying the garrison with poor
provisions. Eventually Eastport suffered from escalating violence between the garrison
and borderland populace, including rioting and assaults against his soldiers. At issue was
Ulmer's draconian methods in attempting to stop smuggling. Locals succeeded in having
Ulmer removed from command in August 1813, less than nine months after he arrived in
Eastport. The subsequent commander winked at smuggling; his successor did not. After
firing on a smuggling vessel with the fort's cannon, the local community ostracized him
and his officers, cutting them off from society and other comforts of Eastport. For its last
few weeks in Eastport, the garrison was under a virtual siege. It lifted only when a
British fleet anchored off the port and demanded the fort's surrender, which the American
commander did without firing a shot."
The British garrison was considerably larger than its American counterpart, but
nonetheless it faced problems controlling smuggling. The British commander usually
ignored smuggling, an approach that made it considerably easier to govern the populace
and provided the garrison with smuggled American provisions. By 1817 it became

evident that Eastport's population was introducing large quantities of American
contraband not only onto the island, but into New Brunswick proper as

New

Brunswick's lieutenant governor, George Smyth, a military man himself, complained that
"it is notorious that in the present state of that Island, under colow of providing supplies
for its Inhabitants, it is made a Depot for the reception of American manufactures and
merchandize of every description."96
British military officers attitudes towards smugglers is illustrated by an incident in
which Saint John's customs collector came to Moose Island to search for contraband
from ~ u b e c . ~On
' arrival he immediately informed the commander of the garrison why
he was there and asked his permission to search for the smuggled goods, which was
granted. The collector and his men searched the store of Leonard Pierce, and seized two
chests and two boxes of tea, a bag of cotton wool, a quantity of saddlery, and several
casks of cut nails. In another store belonging to a merchant named Child he seized a cask
of French red wine. Both Pierce and Child freely admitted these goods came from
Lubec. Wright put the contraband goods in a military warehouse that was always
guarded by a sentry, and continued his search. But when Wright attempted to enter other
stores in Eastport, he found their "doors & windows industriously & effectively closed,
thus rendering the farther peaceable prosecution of my duty impracticable." Wright
asked the garrison commander for a writ of assistance or search warrant, but the officer
refused, thereby stopping the search for smuggled goods. Much to the disgust of the
collector, Leonard Pierce later broke into the military warehouse "in defiance of the
sentry," and rescued his goods.98

The military and naval officers operating at Passamaquoddy experienced the same
challenges that customs officers did. Customs officers and military officers were both
bureaucrats, in that they were state servants promoted by merit based on the technical
knowledge.99 Like the creole customs officers, army and navy officers faced continual
pressure to conform to community standards. But the military, especially the navies but
to a lesser degree the armies in both Britain and the United States, were becoming more
professional by 1808.loo This included eliminating aristocratic prerequisites for entry and
requiring a basic level of technical training and competence. Professional officers,
imbued with the idea of service to the nation state, found it nearly impossible to conform
to regional ideals. The exception was the British army, which continued to adhere to the
older aristocratic model.lol The British officers on Moose Island pursued a leisurely
lifestyle, racing horses, walking about town with their hunting dogs, and eating off silver
plate.102New Brunswick's smuggling problems were not theirs to solve; there was no
honor and a great deal of trouble to be had in strictly enforcing commercial regulations.
The result was that the American residents of Moose Island found the British garrison a
tolerable presence; when the British relinquished control of Eastport in 1818, the leading
citizens sent the last garrison commander a letter thanking him and his predecessors for
their good conduct.lo3
The impulse to professionalize bureaucracies was largely a result of the
development of capitalism, which needed sophisticated, stable and efficient institutions to
develop.lo4 In this way the same forces that brought adventurers to Passamaquoddy
brought military and naval officers as well. On the one side of the border however,

American ideology tended to extol the virtues of commerce, and regarded a professional
military with deep distrust, a conflicting desire that added tensions to the already
fractious transition to a market economy.'05 Smuggling adventurers and the professional
military officers who attempted to stop them both represented different forces within
capitalism. In many ways they were similar, ambitious men seeking prestige and social
recognition, constantly on the move advancing their goals. Capt. Swett, a young
professional military officer, recognized those similarities with his opponents and used
them to advantage. Col. Ulmer, an aging veteran of the American Revolution, failed
merchant and occasional politician, did not understand the new direction American
society was taking. Stuck in a revolutionary dichotomy of patriots and traitors, Ulmer
could not identify with the people of the borderland, nor could they sympathize with him.

The Transition to Capitalism
Explaining the impact of capitalism on Passamaquoddy poses a challenge. The
adventurers and enforcers who represented the onset of capitalism were both a blessing
and a curse. The adventurers brought the promise of wealth and development, yet they
also brought disruption and potential violence to the region. Law enforcers, too, were
viewed with mixed feelings. Whlle they brought the promise of order to Passamaquoddy,
they also could destabilize the fragile borderland agreements that benefited people on
both sides of the border; fkrthermore, these agents of state authority brought with them a
threat of violence far greater than that posed by the adventurers. How are we to
understand the conflicting desires of Passamaquoddy's borderland society?

Scholars in a variety of fields have noted that the onset of capitalism could be
tremendously disruptive to rural communities, and this seems to hold true for
Passamaquoddy. In many ways the adventurers represent the disruptive elements of
capitalism. Unconnected with the community, pursuing wealth with little regard for the
consequences to others, and roving the Atlantic world, these adventurers were at the
forefront of those building a society where the unconstrained pursuit of profit was seen as
a positive good. Note that Colles became a wealthy merchant and banker; Richard
Hasluck was an agent to the burgeoning industrial might of Birmingham, England;
Constantino Llufrio roamed over Latin America, Europe, and North America in his quest
for profit. Only John McMaster completely failed, suffering bankruptcy, imprisonment,
and an ignoble death. Smuggling clearly beckoned as a means of rapidly attaining
individual wealth, as opposed to supporting communal ideals of self-help.
Why risk the fate of McMaster? Personal greed is part of the answer, but that
greed was part of a cultural construction that increasingly emphasized the importance of
wealth. Western society was becoming increasingly market-based and capitalistic,
freeing property from community-based constraints and separating producers from the
means of production through a division of labor. Passamaquoddy's merchants and
mariners eagerly participated in the commercial system of the day and advocated trade
unrestrained by state rules when it suited their needs; conversely they also sought state
protection when market conditions were less favorable. Merchants wanted to accumulate
wealth, create new markets, and pursue the development of their own ports. While their
resources, capital, and credit were limited compared to those of merchants in bigger
communities, there is no evidence that they shrank from either competing or cooperating

with bigger mercantile interests. When abroad, the region's merchants and mariners
participated in risky ventures in distant parts and acted the part of the outsider, just as
adventurers came to Passamaquoddy when the conditions were right to conduct a
profitable trade. Similarly, Passamaquoddy residents acted in other places like
adventurers did in their own region, conducting smuggling operations in Chesapeake Bay
or even committing piracy off Demerara.Io6 Conducting maritime trade was a rough
business. Passamaquoddy's mercantile community had no interest in becoming victims
of changes in the world economy, and should be considered as full participants in the
process. Their transatlantic connections and their full participation in the commercial
transactions of the Atlantic world demanded that they accept outsiders, even adventurers
as dangerous as John McMaster or as exotic as Constantino Llufrio, just as they hoped to
be accepted in foreign markets.
The ability of Passamaquoddy's mercantile community to adapt to different
situations was critical because the English-speaking world experienced a profound
economic change in the period from 1783 to 1820. Capitalism, defined by Joyce
Appleby as "a system that depends upon private property and the relatively free use of it
in economic endeavors," was changing society.lo7 The leadership of Britain and the
United States was increasingly adopting the economic liberalism of Adam Smith, freeing
markets from old paternalistic regulations that confined the activities of merchants and
manufacturers. This transition was regarded with some trepidation by the colonial
leadership in Nova Scotia and New Brunswick who relied on imperial protections for

their markets.lo8 In the United States there was also concern about this economic
transition, with political leaders such as Thomas Jefferson and Andrew Jackson actively
seeking to curb commercialism, especially as represented by banks.lo9
The American transition to capitalism was fractious and inconsistent, yet the
pursuit of wealth as a staple of American identity continued to grow. This unrelenting
pursuit of gain was best personified in the itinerant Yankee peddlers who revolutionized
the retail trade."'

The aggressive and clever Yankee peddler was a familiar icon in the

Maritimes as well. For example, Thomas Chandler Haliburton's fictional peddler, "Sam
Slick," represented many of the American virtues Nova Scotians should have
emulated."' In New Brunswick, Yankee peddlers were also associated with
smugglers.1l 2
Historians have identified the American Revolution as the crucial event in the rise
of capitalism; the worship of work was central to the American contribution to
capitalism. Early economic commentators such as William Manning (1 747- 18 14) saw a
huge social struggle between those who labored and those who did not work; in the latter
group he placed great merchants, professionals, and judicial officers of government.'13
Manning's ideals are especially important when compared with the Loyalist ideals of
New Brunswick's leadership, which was composed of merchants, lawyers, and judges.
Trade was regarded with some disdain by New Brunswick's founders, as is illustrated by
the removal of the provincial capital from commercial Saint John to more agrarian
~redericton.
"4

This is not to say that New Brunswick and Nova Scotian society was adverse to
gain, profit, or the market economy, but even the most doctrinaire of Loyalists noted the
American propensity for business. For example, George Leonard railed against the

'

prosperity of the American settlements at Passamaquoddy. l 5 Yet many Loyalists
preferred the strictures of the paternalist mercantile economy that reinforced traditional
social relations to the capitalist economy that eroded concepts of deference and privilege
even as they deplored their miserable economic condition. Similarly, Loyalists looked to
the government for bounties and protectionist policies such as the Navigation Acts, and
looked to Britain as the source of dry goods such as textiles, tin ware, and

porcelain^."^

Sometimes adherence to these policies brought a degree of wealth to the fortunate; New
Brunswick's timber trade flourished under imperial protection after 1807, and Nova
Scotia benefited from military spending during the War of 1812, but very little of that
wealth remained in the Maritime ~rovinces.'"
The historiography of economic development in the Maritime Provinces and
much of the rest of Canada is dominated by the staples theory of Harold 1nnis.'18 Much
of it is backward looking, defeatist, or depicts the region's populace as passive victims of
external economic forces. A popular myth of prosperity during an age of wind, wood and
water has prevailed until recent scholarship revealed that Nova Scotia and the Maritimes
in general never did enjoy a golden era of prosperity.''9 Marxist-influenced scholars
have attempted to establish the Maritimes as an "underdeveloped" economy that suffered
from the propensity of the larger United States economy to strip away badly needed

capital from Atlantic canada.120 Unlike American historiographical trends, there is no
Canadian parallel to the American "transition to capitalism" debate sparked by James
Henretta, with the possible exception of ~ u e b e c . ' ~ ~

An exploration of Atlantic Canada's transition to capitalism quickly reveals that
loyalist ideals clashed with the economic realities of living in newly settled colonies with
long winters and short growing seasons. Americans frequently derided Nova Scotia as
"Nova Scarcity," and seldom deigned to notice New Brunswick at all. Few Britons paid
much attention to the colonies around the Bay of Fundy either, with the exception of Lord
Sheffield, the last great champion of mer~antilism.'~~
Sheffield's economic policies
matched the backward-looking ideals of the loyalist elite, who sought to profit from the
West Indies trade under the protectionist policies provided by the Navigation Acts. New
Brunswick held him in so high esteem that the Assembly - at the instigation of George
Leonard, who may have admired Sheffield's strong anti-smuggling stance - hung
Sheffield's full-length portrait over the Speaker's chair.'23 But Britain was already
moving away from mercantilism and adopting the economic liberalism of Adam Smith.
Smith's principles were not unknown in British North America; in fact one of his
~~
servants emigrated from Scotland to the Miramichi in New ~ r u n s w i c k . 'Scottish
emigrants to the colonies such as John Young, a famous Nova Scotian economic reformer
and smuggler, in 1814 ordered his son to read Smith's Wealth of Nations as preparation
for a life in trade.'25 Yet Smith's free trade principles were anathema to most commercial
interests in New Brunswick and Nova Scotia. In part this was because the United States
federal government adopted Smith's principles so whole-heartedly, but mostly because
economic liberalism threatened to strip away the privileged trade status of British

colonies, a factor on which Saint John and Halifax merchants relied for their
prosperity. 126 Merchants, in common with other settlers in the region, had to make
difficult choices when faced with the economic changes brought on by capitalism.

Conclusion
The adventurers and enforcers who came to Passamaquoddy to engage in
smuggling during times of diplomatic and commercial crisis between Britain and the
United States provide a sample of how the transition to market economies created strife
and conhsion in the borderlands community. Adventurers found a welcome at
Passamaquoddy, whereas agents of state authority were often regarded with hostility.
The economic and social stresses broke down existing social and political
obligations, W h e r weakening the borderland's tepid identification with the parent state.
The strongest manifestation of this phenomenon was the rampant smuggling that
occurred even during wartime at Passamaquoddy. Adventurers not only perceived
Passamaquoddy as a geographic area appropriate for smuggling, but also realized that the
local population was disposed to assist them in their endeavors. Governments had to
react to smuggling by posting military units at Passamaquoddy to defend their
sovereignty. This external realization by both law breakers and law enforcers that state
authority and loyalty was weak at the periphery was a crucial element in the formation of
a borderlands identity.
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CHAPTER 7:
THE FLOUR WAR

Introduction

The trial of the New Brunswick sloop Industry in the United States federal court
system reveals some of the difficulties American officials at Passamaquoddy had in
enforcing commercial laws when opposed by determined smugglers.' David Way,
captain of the 47-ton Industry, left Eastport on March 18, 1808, with the stated intention
of sailing for Halifax. But instead of proceeding to Halifax, Way hovered just outside of
United States jurisdiction, receiving American produce on board from small boats, in
direct contravention of federal law. Way conducted his business in plain sight; American
customs officials watched while smugglers loaded the Industry with contraband, such as
Virginia superfine flour. Finally, on March 28, Way wandered into American
jurisdiction, and Collector Delesdernier seized the vessel in the name of the United
States. However, federal law made no provision for arresting or otherwise detaining
people involved in breaking the embargo. Only the vessel and cargo were detained,
leaving Way fiee to act as he pleased. Something about Way's actions must have alerted
the collector. Fearful that Way might attempt to rescue the vessel, the collector arranged
to have the vessel sent to another port for safekeeping.2

The trial of the Industry and its contraband cargo illustrates the tensions involved
when people in a small community turn on themselves. Witnesses and depositions
revealed something similar to a small war being fought between customs officials and
smugglers. In fact local historians have ternled it the "Flour War," after the most popular
~ontraband.~
A question put to customs inspector John Swett by the United States district
attorney is especially telling: "Have you found difficulty in preventing the running of
goods across to the British line-in
"Yes: a great deal-we

executing the Embargo laws?" Swett responded,

have been fired at-people

have come over from the other side.'*

Collector Delesdernier, usually tolerant, even supportive of borderland smuggling,
suddenly found himself in the very awkward position of attempting to stop all
commercial intercourse with New Brunswick.
United States v. the Sloop Industry was a struggle in which the defense attorney

pitted his evidence against that of Maine's U.S. district attorney. Witnesses disagreed on
events; some probably tried to distort the facts. Perhaps the defense's attorney, Jonathan
D. Weston, a man well known for his sympathy with smugglers, prompted them to do so.
John Kendall, the owner of the warehouse the flour was stored, swore he saw no boats
from the American shore approach the ~ n d u s t r y .Yet
~ a witness for the prosecution swore
he had personally assisted in the smuggling. The defense countered by questioning that
witness's ~ r e d i b i l i t ~ . ~

A closer look at the sources reveals more troubling facts, however. The Industry
not only contained American contraband, but items forbidden by British commercial
regulations from entering New Brunswick as well. For instance, the American customs
officers found trunks of tea on board the ~ndustry.' Tea could not be legally exported

during the embargo; nor could tea fiom the United States be legally imported into New
Brunswick because all tea consumed in British North America was supposed to have
been brought from Britain, where the East India Company held a legal monopoly on all
tea sales.' The Industry's owner, Stephen Humbert of Saint John, New Brunswick,
knowingly violated the laws of both the United States and the British ~ m ~ i r e . ~
Local residents had grown increasingly used to engaging in illicit trade at
Passamaquoddy, and local customs officers had largely tolerated, and even encouraged
illicit trade. Accustomed to official sanction, American and colonial smugglers used the
border to their own advantage. True to Smith's model, when government attempted to
stop their accustomed trade, smugglers proved willing to use violent methods to defend
their illicit trade.''
However, American borderland residents were not united in their opposition to
the embargo. Some, such as Delesdernier and his supporters, attempted to enforce the
embargo. Others played both sides, taking every opportunity presented during the
embargo to make money. Examples of these include the smuggler who turned inforn~ant
against the Industry, and even some of Delesdernier's customhouse employees, who
aided and abetted embargo violators. The embargo thus divided Passamaquoddy society,
creating tensions between neighbors. Adventurers fiom as far away as Britain and New
York con~poundedthese tensions when they incited further resistance by taking
advantage of borderland opportunism and smuggling expertise. Adventurers opposed the
embargo wholeheartedly, and did everything in their power to undermine the American
government's measures to enforce it. On the New Brunswick side of the border, the
reaction was less con~plex,yet equally opportunistic. For Maritimers, breaking

Jefferson's embargo was a profitable patriotic chore that promised to bring a new degree
of wealth to New Brunswick and Nova ~cotia." The borderland community was already
ambivalent about government before Jefferson's embargo. The crisis brought about by
the American government's total cession of trade sparked resentment against commercial
restrictions; adventurers and colonial merchants fanned that resentment into open
resistance.
The American government's ability to police the region was already weak, as
evidenced by Delesdemier's collaboration with smugglers. When faced with the
opposition of both settlers and adventurers, federal civil authority in the region collapsed,
and the military had to be called in. Ultimately the contest between smugglers and the
state led to the downfall of Collector Lewis F. Delesdemier who failed to reconcile
differences between his community and his nation.

Jefferson's Embargo
Jefferson's embargo was the result of increasing diplomatic tensions between the
United States and Great ~ r i t a i n . 'Aggressive
~
American commercial policies were at
odds with Britain's naval strategy during the war against Napoleon. The issue of
impressment, whereby British naval vessels removed seamen fiom American ships was
an especially sensitive one.I3 The issue came to a head when Rear Admiral Berkeley the same officer who had sent the Porgey into Passamaquoddy Bay in 1807 - gave orders
for the recovery of British naval deserters to the commander of HMS Leopard. The
captain of the Leopard aggressively followed his orders, to the point where he attempted

to stop the American frigate Chesapeake off the coast of Virginia. When Chesapeake
refbsed to con~ply,Shannon fired into the unprepared American warship, quickly
overwhelmed it, and removed the suspected deserters.14
The Chesapeake incident sparked a vociferous anti-British movement in the
United States. Many people called for war; Congress began a program of expanding the
military and building coastal fortifications; and the British envoy departed Washington.
President Thomas Jefferson could have asked Congress for a declaration of war and
undoubtedly would have received it. Yet he did not. Under the influence of Secretary of
State James Madison, Jefferson chose a different route. Late in 1807, Jefferson asked
Congress for a complete embargo on overseas shipping. American vessels were
forbidden to depart for foreign markets, and foreign vessels could not bring American
cargos away from the United states."
Jefferson's embargo was gambled on Britain's need for American agricultural
produce, especially flour. British North America, the West Indies, including a whole host
of colonies recently captured from Napoleon and his allies, and even British armies
operating on the Iberian Peninsula relied on American provisions produced in the MidAtlantic states and Upper ~011th.'~
Jefferson and Madison hoped that this embargo would
force Britain to negotiate with the United States without having to resort to war."
Congress complied with Jefferson's wishes, and on December 22 passed the Embargo
Act, which was followed by supplementary embargo legislation and various enforcement
acts that gave federal officials a wide range of powers.

Jefferson's embargo was a complete failure. It created an American economic
crisis and political problems that affected all sectors of society. Seaports suffered huge
unemployment and a near cessation of all economic activity. Farmers lost the lucrative
overseas markets for their produce, which declined drastically in price; land speculators
could not afford to sell land on credit to frontiersmen; sailors found themselves
unemployed. Intricate credit network collapsed throughout the nation. Resistance to the
embargo sprang up across the country, especially in the form of exporting American
goods illegally to British colonies. This happened in every American port and along the
borders with British North America and Spanish Florida. With more resistance to the
embargo came more federal efforts to enforce it, including increasingly draconian laws.
President Jefferson and Congress authorized the use of the militia, regular military, and
naval units to enforce civil laws. At least one scholar has attributed the collapse of the
embargo in part to the borderland interests that combined to defeat it.'*
The embargo also failed because it did not produce the desired effect on British
colonies. Between American smugglers and alternate sources of provisions, the embargo
proved but a small hindrance to British colonies, and for some it proved an economic
boon, such as New Brunswick and Nova Scotia. American shipping had forced colonial
vessels out of the lucrative West Indies trade.19 But with the United States merchant
marine locked in port, Maritimes merchants suddenly had no competition. American
sailors flocked to New Brunswick to work onboard British shipping. Eager to promote
colonial trade at the expense of the Americans, colonial administrators opened trade with
the United States. In New Brunswick, the acting administrator and the council agreed to
legalize American imports of provisions and naval stores, as did their counterparts in

Nova ~ c o t i a . ~A' royal decree later sanctioned actions that encouraged both British and
American merchants to violate the embargo.21 For instance, they permitted American
ships to arrive in colonial ports even if they did not have the appropriate paperwork.
Soon a number of American ships did just that, having escaped from American
a~thorities.~~
Passamaquoddy was one of the regions most affected by the embargo, which
reinforced the region's reputation as a smuggling

enter.^'

Passamaquoddy ranked

second to none in terms of the federal government's effort and failure to enforce the
embargo; the smugglers' scale, persistence and success in evading the law; and in the
stresses that fractured the community. In part these stresses emerged because New
Brunswick and Nova Scotia officials undermined the embargo by encouraging Americans
to illicitly export goods through Passamaquoddy.

The Colonial and British Response to the Embargo
The extent to which the British undermined the embargo has seldom received any
attention from American scholars, who tend to concern themselves with the federal
enforcement effort when considering the embargo's failure. A royal directive dated April
11, 1808, ordered British naval vessels to not interrupt neutral vessels loaded with
provisions, timber and other enumerated goods that were sailing to British colonies in the
West Indies or South America, "notwithstanding such vessels may not have regular
clearances and documents on board."24 This order was clearly designed to encourage
Americans, the primary providers of provisions and timber to the West Indies, to break
the embargo. A further incentive was added, pernlitting those same neutral vessels to

take cargoes away from those same colonies.25 An extract of a letter published in
American newspapers gives some clues as to colonial and British attitudes toward the
embargo. Dated Halifax, May 25, 1808, and addressed to an unknown American, the
letter concluded, "Your Embargo may ruin your own merchants, and many others; but if
it is continued, will make the fortunes of the traders in this province." Nova Scotia and
New Brunswick merchants saw the embargo as a great opportunity to revive their
flagging trade, especially with the West in die^.^^
At Passarnaquoddy local loyalist merchants such as Robert Pagan and James
McMaster acted to undermine the embargo.27 They eagerly participated in the
contraband provision trade, and cooperated with adventurers and local American
merchants to bring tens of thousands of barrels of flour, provisions, and naval stores
across the border. During the embargo, these merchants bought flour and other
commodities at low prices fiom a glutted American market, and sold them at high prices
in the West Indies. Flour worth $6.50 at Eastport fetched $12.50 on Indian Island, New
Brunswick, and up to $40.00 per barrel in West Indian markets such as St. Thomas.
Smith's "invisible hand" of the market created a wide divergence in prices that created
more incentive to smuggle.28
New Brunswick officials eagerly worked to subvert the embargo because they
correctly perceived that it would benefit the province's trade. The colony's agent in
London wrote as early as May, 1808, that "The American Embargo must be highly
advantageous to New Brunswick in many respects-A

great Emmigration of shipwrights,

sailors, and fishermen must take place, as well as of other settlers." He continued, "I
applaud Jefferson very much as an Englishman, and especially as a New Brunswick agent

and planter for the measure of the Embargo." In 1810 the provincial secretary expressed
his opinion that "The late American embargo has given a spring to the commerce, and
thereby extended the improvements to an incredible degree. The banks of the St. Croix
(formerly Scoudiac) which in 1796, were on both sides deserts, now exhibit uncommon
scenes of enterprize-industry

& activity, the American settlements being directly

opposite to ours causes a spirit of emulation which is highly beneficial to both." He
concluded his thoughts on the embargo: "Their [the Americans] trade-their
their comfort-have

all been sacrificed on the altars of envy & spite.-Such

wealth and
are the

effects of their imbecile measures that hundreds of their industrious inhabitants
merchants mechanics & others are now soliciting admission into this province."29
New Brunswick officials worked to undermine the embargo. They created a
scheme whereby "the port of St. Andrews, Indian and Marvel1 Island and other places in
Passarnaquoddy Bay might be pointed out as places of deposit, where such craft having
nothing but enumerated articles on board would find an asylum and the proprietor be at
liberty to sell to whom they pleased or reship them in British bottoms to a British
market-by

this means His Majesty's ships would be supplied with tar; pitch, turpentine

& rosen." The Royal Navy would not be the only beneficiary of this plan. Other parts of

British North America and the West Indies would receive American tobacco, provisions,
and other articles, all transported on New Brunswick vessels once smugglers brought the
contraband across the border. The British customs inspector on Indian Island was
especially blithe in considering the mountains of provisions that appeared at night on the

small island. According to local tradition, as he strode along he would playfully tell the
smugglers: "Just clear away a path for me to walk through, so that I will not break my
legs, and that will do!"30
The embargo and subsequent commercial restrictions benefited New Brunswick
and Nova Scotia because their laws only permitted the export of these comn~oditiesin
British-flagged vessels. New Brunswick, already experiencing an economic revival by
1807 due to increased British demand for timber, witnessed a revival of its moribund
West Indies trade.31 St. Andrews, New Brunswick, was already enjoying an economic
revival due to the resurgent New Brunswick timber trade; between March 1 and August

1, 1808 twenty-two brigs, fifteen ships, and numerous schooners and sloops entered the
port.32 The embargo compounded the port's prosperity by providing a steady source of
cheap American labor to work in the forests and on the ships involved in the timber trade.

Collector Delesdernier and the Embargo
Uncovering Delesdemier's activities during the embargo is a difficult task. Very
little of his correspondence survives, although it is often alluded to in correspondence
between Secretary of the Treasury Albert Gallatin and President Thomas Jefferson.
Clearly Delesdemier faithfully attempted to enforce the embargo, an act that must surely
have distressed a man who had so actively promoted the region's shipping interests. It is
just as clear, however, that Delesdernier ultimately failed in his effort to enforce the
embargo when his subordinates betrayed him. Understanding Delesdemier's actions
offers a glimpse into the conflicting desires of borderland residents to obey the law while
pursuing their own economic interests.

By February 1808, the Treasury Department indicated its concern that it would be
difficult to enforce the embargo at Passamaquoddy. Gallatin wrote to his old friend
Delesdemier and asked him to watch both warehouses and boats suspected of attempting
illegal exportation. He also authorized hiring more customs inspectors and two or three
boats to be armed with swivel guns and muskets. In addition, Gallatin ordered the
d ~March,
. ~ ~ Gallatin warned
revenue cutter New Hampshire to ~ a s s a m a ~ u o d In
Delesdernier that many embargo violators from Boston and New York were headed to
Passamaquoddy with vast quantities of flour and other American goods intended to be
smuggled into New Brunswick, Nova Scotia, and to markets as far away as Jamaica and
Demerara. These reports came from customs collectors in northeastern ports. For
example, the Boston customhouse warned that: "vessels are daily loading here for
Eastport with Flour, Beef Pork & c . " ~In~ early April, the captain of the revenue cutter
reported that Delesdemier's "vigilance has defeated attempts to evade the Embargo
c.~~
Laws," but that officer's assessment appears to have been o v e r ~ ~ t i m i s t i Newspaper
accounts indicated that Passamaquoddy suffered extensive smuggling, both in American
and British vessels.36 One summed up the situation at the end of March:
Within these few days, the collector, who is extremely
vigilant, has received additional instructions from
Washington, in consequence of which he has appointed a
large number of inspectors to watch every place where
property is stored, and has engaged several boats in his
service which were intended for transport business.
Several seizures have been made-one the last night, a
sloop with flour. Boats are employed rowing round the
island every night that weather will permit, so that no
property can be passed over without manifest danger.37

The federal government responded to this threat by forbidding any vessel to clear
for Passamaquoddy without presidential pennission. Realizing that Passamaquoddy and
other customs districts near the border with British North America already had a huge
amount of American provisions and naval stores, Congress passed an act in mid-April
that authorized customs collectors to take these goods under federal custody. On passage
of this act, Gallatin immediately ordered Delesdernier to take all flour, provisions, lumber
and other American goods into his custody, and if necessary to remove them to a safe
place where they could be guarded "both for the protection of the articles & to prevent
their being carried away [to be smuggled across the border]." The secretary of the
treasury ordered Delesdernier to seize any goods not voluntarily placed under his control;
he was to hire inspectors, boatmen, and other revenue officers "with out regarding the
expense." Any person who wanted to remove their property from federal control had to
pay a bond worth twice the value of the goods as a security that the goods would not be
exported illegally.38
The federal government further reinforced Delesdernier with military and naval
units. At the end of April, the secretary of war wrote to Delesdernier that he was sending
troops to Passamaquoddy to assist him.39 This must have been welcome news indeed for
the collector, who was under increased pressure from adventurers. Newspapers reported
a letter from Delesdernier wherein he complained that "there were upwards of a hundred
vessels at that place, and he found it impossible to execute the laws. The mob had
threatened to burn his house, and unless a force was immediately sent there, he was
apprehensive that he should be obliged to quit his station.'40

Passamaquoddy became an armed camp during the embargo. In June, an artillery
unit commanded by Captain Moses Swett arrived to support Collector Delesdernier in his
efforts. They occupied the blockhouse of Fort Sullivan as soon as it was completed.4'
The American government also stationed two gunboats at Passamaquoddy, No. 42 and
No. 43. Occasionally larger vessels such as USS Wasp and even USS Chesapeake - the

same frigate attacked by HMS Leopard in 1807 -joined them. Just across the harbor,
British war vessels such as HMS Squirrel anchored directly on the boundary line to keep
an eye on the American military presence and to protect British sovereignty from
American aggression.42 Armed American revenue cutters patrolled Passamaquoddy as
well.
Despite these efforts by the federal government, flour and other American
products continued to be shipped to Passamaquoddy. Customs officials reported that as
many as 19,000 barrels of flour entered Passamaquoddy in one week alone in May.
Newspaper articles supported this figure. One reported in May that "there were entered
at the custom house in Passamaquoddy, from the 2d to the 7" May, from different ports
of the U.S. 19,000 bls. flour, 2,700 do. pork and beef, 1,700 do. bread, 3,059 do. naval
stores, 4,500 bushels corn, besides great amounts of butter, lard, E ~ c . When
' ~ ~ these
goods arrived at Passamaquoddy, Delesdernier promptly impounded them, and took all
the keys to the warehouses in his district into his personal custody. Even the owners of
the warehouses could not enter their buildings unaccompanied by a customs officer.44
But these measures were not sufficient to stop embargo violators, a fact that came
to the attention of President Jefferson. He wrote to Gallatin, "I hope you will spare no
pains or expence to bring the rascals of Passamaquoddy to justice," and asked him to

cooperate with the secretaries of the navy and army to bring the border under control. By
the end of May, the USS Wasp arrived with half an artillery company to assist
Delesdemier. Sentries stood guard at the door of every warehouse, and customs guards
looked over piles of flour barrels on the beaches. The Wasp, the New Hampshire, and
other vessels patrolled the harbor. Workmen erected the battery of Fort Sullivan on a
bluff overlooking a town and harbor thronged with smugglers. The calls and challenges
of sentries broke the night silence. Gunfire occasionally broke out, but, despite this
display of force, flour and other contraband continued to flood across the boundary into
New ~ r u n s w i c k . ~Newspapers
'
began to question Jefferson's use of military force
against civilians. One such article, printed in Virginia, clearly described the situation in
Passarnaquoddy :
Come with me, sir, to yonder eminence that overlooks the
union-- cast your eyes eastward- do you see that vessel-that battery-- those armed men-- it is the Wasp sloop of
war-- she is stationed there in conjunction with the soldiers- for what? To attack our enemies? No such thing. All the
energies of Mr. Jefferson are exhausted against our citizens.
These warlike preparations are intended to prevent our
merchants from selling their produce to those who would
purchase.46
Despite this display of force, smuggling continued. By early June Delesdernier
complained of the "nefarious schemes of miscreant Individuals having no motive but
illicit gain." These adventurers bombarded Delesdemier with arguments and pleas to
permit them to land their cargoes, undoubtedly so that they could be smuggled across the
border at an appropriate moment. Frequently the meetings between Delesdemier and
merchants turned into shouting matches. A newspaper described the tensions building in
Eastport: "we have infonnation that there is no relaxation of Business, at that place,

notwithstanding the government force stationed there. The inhabitants were employed at
2 dolls. per day to keep guard over the stores, and yet under cover of every fog, hundreds

of barrels, a day would find their way across to the British side, where the price was
12:50. So profitable was the boating business [smuggling], and the standing guard, that

the poor people had suddenly become

Gallatin responded by sending Maine's

federal district attorney to Passamaquoddy to collect evidence against embargo violators,
and the secretary of the navy dispatched two gunboats to patrol the region for the
remainder of the embargo. On the gunboats' arrival, their commander reported: "there
are nearly a hundred merchants and adventurers with immense quantities of flour etc.,
who do not hesitate to bribe sentinels for the purpose of smuggling their property.'48
How effective were the federal government's efforts to impose the embargo on
Passanlaquoddy? Federal court records and newspaper accounts indicate that the
American government failed despite its extraordinary efforts to control the border at
Passamaquoddy,just as it did at other border regions such as upstate Vermont, Spanish
Florida, and New Orleans. Indeed, national control over major seaports such as New
York and Boston eroded to the point where President Jefferson ordered coastal forts to
stop ships from leaving port.49
Because the embargo was a federal law passed by Congress, offenses against it
went to Maine's federal district court. Delesdernier, assisted by Maine's federal district
attorney, provided the evidence to condemn contraband goods and to indict individuals
caught breaking the various embargo acts. The first case Delesdernier brought to the
district court was against Stephen Humbert's sloop Industry. Ironically, it was the last to

be resolved, since Humbert appealed the case, which went to the Massachusetts Circuit
Court. Delesdernier brought approximately fifty cases to trial in 1808, (see Figure 7.1).
T h s was more cases than he had initiated in the entire period from 1789 and 1807.
Delesdernier's seizures resulted in numerous formal proceedings in the district
federal court held at Wiscasset in September. The beaches of Eastport must have been
crowded with impounded boats awaiting condemnation in court during the summer of
1808. Seized goods had to be guarded, too, providing more headaches for Delesdernier.

Figure 7.1 : Federal Court Cases v. Embargo Violators at Passamaquoddy, 1808

Source: "Final Record Book," National Archves and Records Administration RG 21,
Federal District Court Records, Maine District, Ms. at NARA Northeast, Waltharn,
Massachusetts. [Note: dates could not be determined for 2 cases.]

In November the U.S. deputy marshal advertised in newspapers that he would auction off

the numerous seizures at Eastport's customhouse (see Figure 7.2). Yet this number was a
tiny fraction of the tens of thousands of barrels of flour and other contraband smuggled
across the border. Delesdernier was neither incompetent nor unwilling to enforce the
law, but he faced many problems enforcing the embargo. Among those difficulties he
faced was betrayal by his subordinates and allies.

Local Resistance to the Embargo
Passamaquoddy residents on both side of the border increasingly resisted the
embargo, While resistance was initially non-violent, it grew increasingly deadly over
time. Much of this resistance was based on the con~munalegalitarian ideals born of
borderland residents' frontier experiences. Ultimately, this opposition resulted in the
death of a customs guard and the dismissal of Collector Delesdernier from office.

Table 7.1 : Contraband Auctioned, November 2 1-22, 1808
Item
Quantity
Boats: 27
Schooners: 1
Flour: 413

Source: "Marshal's Sales," Gazette of Maine (Buckstown, ME), November 12, 1808.

The premarket communal egalitarian ideals of Passamaquoddy's settlers had
always placed them somewhat at odds with the American federal government, but
because the federal government had relatively little impact on the region there had
seldom been conflict between locals and federal officials. Delesdernier, the only
American government official in the area, reduced tension between the state and locals
through his tolerance of plaster smuggling and by creating tangible benefits such as
successfully petitioning Congress for a lighthouse on West Quoddy Head. The embargo,
however, meant that borderland residents now faced massive state intervention into their
everyday lives. They opposed these unprecedented government actions by invoking their
egalitarian ideals, especially those regarding property rights, honor, and the use of
violence in defense of their rights.
Locals invoked these values to defend themselves against government officials.
An illustration of these values is related in the region's local history. The American
military commander, the captain of USS Wasp, and Collector Delesdernier combined
together to confront Samuel Wheeler, a local merchant and suspected smuggler. The .
federal officers demanded the merchant place his goods under federal custody. The man
immediately refused to comply. Despite the threats the merchant knew that he had as yet
violated no law, and stated to the federal officers: "Gentlemen, I am here on my own soil,
in defence of my own property, and-as

you have seen fit to conduct-f

my personal

honor. Heed me, then, when I say, as I now do, that no man, be he who he may, touches
a barrel of this flour except at the peril of his life. I have said: now take care of
yourselves."s0 While this is an uncorroborated anecdote, it touches on the difficulties of
enforcing an embargo in a nation where property rights were sacrosanct. According to

the story, the federal officers withdrew, perplexed by the smuggler's self-righteous
determination and bluster based on premarket values.
The premarket resistance to state intervention at Passamaquoddy grew both more
unified and more violent as time passed. Initially, at least some borderland residents
supported the embargo. Collector Delesdernier and his supporters - many of them family
members or in-laws - dutifully attempted to enforce the unpopular law, but public support
eroded and even the customhouse officers bowed to community pressure. One symptom
of borderland antipathy to the embargo and its enforcers was a notable rise in the use of
guns to defend smuggling operations or even to attack customs officers.
The community consensus to oppose the embargo was not immediate, and at least
some locals stepped forward to enforce the embargo. For example, Eastport resident
Joseph Livennore joined the crew of the revenue cutter New Hampshire as second
mate." But others chose to forego federal employment. It proved especially difficult to
recruit a U.S. deputy marshal for Passamaquoddy. Delesdernier recommended two men
for the position before finding a third man who finally accepted the post in August, his
neighbor William
Nonetheless Delesdernier successfully recruited a number of assistants. But local
historians noted that the men Delesdernier hired as guards were in fact allied with the
smugglers. One stated, "the collector received into his service persons whose habits
rendered them needy, and who had never been trustworthy; and thus, undoubtedly,
yielding to the temptation which beset them, they were paid by both sides."53 The
popular account claimed that all but three such guards took bribes. But even those three
were rumored to assist friends involved in smuggling by going to sleep on duty. The

communal egalitarianism practiced by the region's inhabitants forbade individuals from
profiting by other's losses, or interfering in others pursuit of what was regarded as a right
to trade. Rather than escalate a conflict within the community, the guards arrived at a
compromise that profited both themselves and the smugglers. While guards received
$2.00 per day from Delesdernier to watch over the contraband goods stockpiled in
Eastport, the smugglers paid them fifty cents for every barrel of flour they took away.
The temptation was clearly too much for the guards, and the piles of contraband goods
quietly melted away at night or during foggy days.
If necessary, the smugglers tied up and confined the guards as a ruse to cover the
latters' cooperation.54An example of this occurred on May 27, when four men assaulted
customs guard Thomas Pettigrove Jr. at Schoodic Falls while he was guarding several
hundred barrels of flour, tar, and other contraband goods. The men captured Pettigrove,
took him a half-mile from the wharf he guarded, and confined him for six hours.
There were many other similar incidents, most involving little violen~e.~'
Smugglers
enlisted other tactics against the forces arrayed against them. For example, smugglers
plied the commander of American gunboat No. 43 with drink. The young officer quickly
succumbed to this tactic, to the point that he did not appear on deck for weeks at a time,
and suffered delirium tremens. Not only did the officer's alcoholism neutralize his ability
to pursue smugglers, but it resulted in the Secretary of the Navy dismissing him from the
ser~ice.'~
Bribes, liquor, and other encouragements to desert lured soldiers away from
warehouses full of contraband." Another tactic was to involve British naval units
stationed at Passamaquoddy. Smugglers sought to convince Royal Navy officers that
American officials enforcing the embargo violated British sovereignty when pursuing

smugglers. For example, an American naval commander con~plainedthat "there is a
number of fortune-hunters on Moose Island, who, on acct. of being frequently overhauled, and examined by our boats, would willingly embrace any opportunity of
embroiling us with the subjects of Great ~ r i t a i n . "With
~ ~ American and British naval
units acting towards opposite ends in close proximity, tensions ran high. In October
1808, smugglers protested to a Royal Navy captain when an American gunboat seized a
British-flagged ship for violating the embargo. The Royal Navy officer, in command of a
frigate, demanded the American gunboat officer surrender the vessel. The American
officer, despite the fact that his tiny command boasted only one cannon to the British
vessel's twenty-four, refused and proclaimed that "nothing but bloodshed and hard
fighting should induce him to give her up." Only the hasty intercession of Captain Swett
and Collector Delesdemier prevented bloodshed and the outbreak of an Anglo-American
war.59
The smugglers did on occasion resort to violence. While violence was not
unknown at Passamaquoddy before 1808, murder, beatings and other violent crimes
dramatically increased during 1808 as the stakes became higher. Royal Navy officers
noted as early as May that "the conduct of the inhabitants of late has been very improper
in the conducting the Flour from the opposite side, by using Force, and arming boats with
Harpoons or Instruments similar by which several custon~house officers have been
wounded."60
Not all of this violence can be traced to the embargo. Some of it was collateral
violence brought on by the unusual stresses that the embargo brought to Passamaquoddy.
For instance, British deserters from the 101st Regiment, brought to New Brunswick

because of the threat of war with the United States, shot and killed a local magistrate just
east of Passamaquoddy in October 1808. Charlotte County militia arrested the deserters
on Pain's Island in Passamaquoddy Bay, just a few miles short of the border that meant
freedom for them. A court found the men guilty of murder, and hanged two of the men
publicly a few weeks later.61
The many unemployed sailors who drifted through Passamaquoddy on their way
to the British dominions also caused trouble. American farnlers attempting to drive their
cattle to market in New Brunswick also threatened violence if customs officers interfered.
With specie and banknotes flooding into the region, robberies became more common, as
adventurer Richard Hasluck found out to his detriment when he was robbed.62 Even in
Eastport itself, shop robberies, heretofore unknown, began to occur. Many smugglers
openly carried arms in the streets; the impression is one of a community suddenly
swamped with armed men, walking the streets, skulking about hidden coves, all waiting
for nightfall or a heavy fog to continue their illicit trade.63
Adventurers such as John McMaster promoted violence by offering cash to locals
for their services. Residents on both sides of the border eagerly responded to these
incentives, which could amount to several months of wages for one night of work pulling
oars and moving barrels.64 Some were prepared to fire back at customhouse authorities,
as John Swett complained of in the Industry case. Thus when McMaster sought a crew to
repossess his impounded flour on Isle au Haut, he recruited the men at ~ a s s a m a ~ u o d d ~ . ~ ~
McMaster's crew of smugglers did not balk at the armaments on board his schooner
Peggy, which included muskets, blunderbusses, and cutlasses. Only one refused to

involve himself with attacking the custon~sguards on Isle au ~ a u t The
. ~ landing
~
party
from the Peggy shot and killed one of the guards, and callously threw his body into the
ocean.67
Clearly there was a connection between smuggling and violence, as Adam Smith
noted.68 This is true of the crew of the schooner Mark, an "embargo breaker" whose
crew later committed piracy and murder. Passamaquoddy's U.S. deputy marshal called
their actions "the most atrocious and barbarous that has occurred in this country for some
time."69 The Mark arrived at Passamaquoddy from nearby Addison, Maine, in the late
autumn of 1808. One night the crew hoisted anchor and pern~ittedthe vessel to drift into
British waters, where American authorities held no power. Despite the fact that the
vessel had no official papers, New Brunswick customs authorities allowed the vessel's
owner to sell the vessel. They could do so because they acted under power of the Crown
order that permitted the entry of American vessels despite irregularities in their
documentation. New Brunswick customs authorities also permitted the vessel to load a
cargo and clear for Demerara in South America. On the return from that port, the crew
threw the owner's agent overboard and sold the vessel in Cuba for their own profit.70 On
their return to Eastport, word soon leaked out, and federal authorities arrested the men
and placed them in irons in Fort ~ u l l i v a n . ~ '
Local resistance to the embargo grew more violent as the embargo dragged on.
Passamaquoddy residents aimed this violence at those who enforced unpopular laws.
The American state reciprocated by posting military and naval units to the region, but
even these forces failed to impose order. Frustrated by the government's commercial

policies, locals and adventurers from both sides of the border, abetted by British colonial
and imperial govenments, foiled President Jefferson's plan to peacehlly coerce Britain
into respecting American maritime rights. One of the local impacts of this embargo
resistance was that the American government removed Collector Delesdernier from
office.

Delesdernier Betrayed

The embargo pulled Passamaquoddy's population in two directions. On the one
hand locals craved stability, law, and order. On the other hand, they needed to provide
for their families. The long-established regional smuggling tradition, compounded by
Delesdernier's own encouragement of illicit border trade, hrther clouded the issue.
Divided and confused, the community's ability to police itself suffered as societal noms
collapsed due to the enomous strains placed on it by the freetraders and state agencies.
Delesdernier ultimately became a victim of the conhsion for which, in part, he was
responsible.
The greatest challenge Delesdernier faced stemmed from his inability to stop his
own guards from colluding with smugglers. Federal court records document only one
guard prosecuted for cooperating with smugglers. A federal grand jury found that
William Sheman of Schoodic Falls [modem Calais, Maine] on the night of May 29,
1808, "in nowise regarding his duty and undertaking aforesaid, took and received
corruptly and deceitfidly, a bribe, reward, and compensation, for conniving at &
pernlitting the stores aforesaid to be broken open, & allowing the goods and merchandise

aforesaid to be taken and carried away." However, Maine's federal district attorney
refused to pursue the indictment, probably because Sherman had fled to New Brunswick.
In another indictment the grand jury found that Sherman had participated with others in

an assault and unlawful confinement of another customs guard. But again, those indicted
never faced trial. Like the contraband they smuggled, these freetraders simply vanished.72
Guards such as Sherman were a nightmare for Delesdernier, for he could not trust
the men he hired. Ultimately it was his own friends and neighbors who betrayed him,
resulting in his downfall as customs collector. The incident that most contributed to his
removal occurred on October 27, 1808. The crew of a customhouse boat conspired with
a sentry guarding contraband goods in a warehouse. The sentry and the boat's crew took
forty barrels of naval stores and a bale of cotton and delivered it to a British vessel
anchored in Snug Cove, just a short row across the harbor from Eastport. The master of
the vessel paid them in cash and with 170 pounds of coffee.73 Delesdernier soon found
out about the missing goods and was able to recover some of them, and the next day
initiated proceedings in the local court against his own men. Nathaniel Sevey, the man in
charge of the revenue boat, posted a bond of $400 for his appearance in court. But sentry
Stephen H. Kankey was too poor to post bond, and so was sent to the county jail in
Machias. However, he escaped in March and never faced
The tinling of this betrayal coincided with the Eliza affair, an event that surely
alarmed and displeased adventurers and locals alike.75 It seems likely that Delesdernier's
popularity waned as the embargo continued. A symptom of his weakening influence in
the community was an assault made by Aaron Olmstead, a local blacksmith and trader.
Federal court records reveal that on November 17, 1808, Olmstead did "beat bruise

wound insult & ill treat" Delesdernier's son, Lewis Jr., with "cruel heavy & grievous
Lewis Jr. was a customs inspector. Like so many other customs collectors at
the end of Jefferson's embargo, Delesdernier found himself less able to enforce the laws
as community attitudes hardened against federal interference in their everyday
livelihoods,
Delesdernier suffered fiom the criticism of federal officials as well. On arrival at
Eastport, Capt. Swett wrote to the secretary of war that the situation was made much
worse by Delesdernier's initial slackness in enforcing the embargo. President Jefferson
himself made inquiries concerning the collector's abilities; Gallatin had to assure him that
"the Collector of Passamaquoddy is, as you perceive, a very bad writer, but he is a man of
great integrity, zeal, and activity, and full reliance may be placed on his facts as on his

exertion^."^^

But the treasury secretary's protection, based on his experiences with the

Delesdernier family during the American Revolution, could only go so far.
Like other collectors during the final months of the embargo, Delesdemier found
that it became virtually impossible to enforce the draconian measures passed by
Congress, Capt. Swett's garrison had shrunk due to desertion; alcoholism incapacitated
one of the two gunboat's commanders; the revenue cutters were called away to their
homeports; his own men could not be trusted. After taking vigorous action in the Eliza
affair, the collector's resistance to popular opinions against the embargo seems to have
crumbled. He pursued no more actions in Maine's federal court after A U ~ U S ~ . ~ ~

Delesdemier was an official torn between community loyalties and state demands.

In typical borderland fashion, he attempted to accommodate both sides. He continued to
act as a community booster. Even as he seized local shipping for embargo violations,
workers completed West Quoddy Lighthouse at the western entrance to Passamaquoddy
Bay. During the embargo Delesdernier poured over $17,000 in payroll into the
community, an enormous sum of money in 1808. Delesdernier even went so far as to
assist an Eastport smuggler by paying his fines to the federal court.79
Despite Gallatin's assurances, Delesdernier's name had been presented in a poor
light to the secretaries of war, state, and probably navy as well. After an investigation,
Madison removed Delesdemier from office, and instituted federal legal proceedings
against the collector that led to his financial ruin. Locals responded by immediately
voting the man into office in the state legislature.80The former collector retained local
popularity despite his role in attempting to enforce the embargo and his fall from power.

Conclusion: "The Harmony of Social Intercourse"
Delesdernier rejoiced with the rest of Passamaquoddy when the embargo ended in
early 1809. After receiving the news he immediately rowed across the border to infoml
the magistrate on Campobello Island. According to the magistrate, the good news
brought Delesdemier "great happiness and peace of mind.""

When full trade relations

were reestablished with Britain on June 10, 1809, residents from both sides of the
boundary joined to celebrate at Eastport; undoubtedly Delesdemier was among their
number. At noon the cannon of Fort Sullivan and the local militia company fired
celebratory salutes, after which some fifty notables gathered for a dinner. Sixteen toasts,

each punctuated by the discharge of a cannon, followed the meal. There were obligatory
toasts to the American president and the British king, and a waggish toast to "The
American Fair-We

prefer Commerce to Non-Intercourse." But the most relevant toast

was, "May the 'Harmony of Social Intercourse' remain uninterrupted between the
Inhabitants of both sides of the Saint Croix." Borderland residents here expressed their
continuing hope that the border would not divide them, but bring a mutual prosperity.82
The hope was not unfounded. Borderland residents had combined to defeat the
embargo at Passamaquoddy and other ports and border communities. But while the
embargo was repealed in the last days of President Jefferson's tenure in office, the
underlying diplomatic, commercial, and military problems between the United States and
Britain remained unsolved. Congress replaced the embargo with the 'Non-Intercourse
Act," which allowed foreign trade except with Britain and France in an effort to wring
concessions out of those warring nations. For Passamaquoddy residents this measure
solved one problem in that owners and operators of small undecked vessels were no
longer required to load or unload in the presence of a customhouse officer, nor did the
law require these craft to post expensive bonds to comply with commercial laws. The
measure had some initial success when the British minister to Washington supported the
measure, but officials in London rejected the measure. President Madison declared trade
with Britain and its colonies illegal again on August 9, 1809. Congress allowed that law
~
days Congress attempted another effort at peaceful
to lapse on May 1, 1 8 1 0 . ~Within
coercion through commercial restrictions in May 1810. Known as Macon's Bill No. 2,
this measure restored commerce with Britain and France if they stopped harassing
American shipping. Britain failed to do so, and on February 2, 1811, the American

government once again stopped all commerce with Britain'and its colonies. This measure
remained in force until early 1812, when Congress passed a complete embargo on
American shipping in preparation for its declaration of war on Britain in June.
These measures created enormous problems for American merchants and British
merchants. Uncertain of when trade was legal, many began shipping their goods to
British North American ports such as Montreal, Halifax, and Saint John. Once there, the
goods could either be sent to the American market on short notice if legal trade opened
again, or they could be smuggled across the border at places like Passamaquoddy.
Between 1809 and the declaration of war, Passamaquoddy remained an important
smuggling center.
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CHAPTER 8:
THE WAR OF 1812

The Venture Incident
Eastport resident John Burgin had been watching the activities of a large sloop in
the harbor for some days. Rumored to be loaded with a valuable cargo destined from
Saint John, New Brunswick, to Halifax, Nova Scotia, the vessel had been skulking about
Passarnaquoddy Bay for about a week.' Most recently it had anchored close to two
British warships just over a mile from Eastport's wharves and warehouses. On the
morning of November 7,181 3, the vessel hoisted anchor and proceeded up the bay,
apparently destined for St. Andrews. Burgin recalled the following:
The sloop stood over near the American shore and when
nearly opposite the fort at Eastport was very near the shore,
so much so I expected they [the U.S. Army garrison] would
fire upon her. I looking up to the fort I saw them making
preparations to fire, and in about a minute they did fire.
The sloop then bore away for the other side. They fired six
or seven shots at her when she hove to & some of the
officers & soldiers went from the shore and boarded her
and brought her into my wharf.2
It was the first time that the cannon of Fort Sullivan had fired in anger, although Britain
and the United States had been at war since June 18, 1812. The region had avoided much
of the bloodshed that had scarred other regions on the border between the United States

and British North America. When Fort Sullivan fired on this British vessel - the Venture
of Saint John - it appeared that the peaceful relations in the Passamaquoddy borderlands
had come to an end.
But nobody was in a rush to instigate combat at Passamaquoddy. Captain Henry
Senhouse, the commander of HMS Martin, witnessed Fort Sullivan firing on the Venture,
and immediately wrote to the American commandant. He expressed his concern that
active hostilities had commenced, and outlined how his own actions had minimized the
impact of the war on the local population:
As it is the first instance of active hostility that has come
within my knowledge on the part of the United States
military force stationed on this part of the frontier, I have to
request you will be so good as to grant me the following
information, that under the present circumstances we may
be acquainted how far it may be desirable to abstain from
such measures as may be likely to involve the immediate
inhabitants of the lines on either side in a predatory war
injurious to individuals, but of little general consequence to
the two belligerents stated.
Under the impression that you will receive this
communication in the favorable light in which it is made, I
will frankly state to you that since my anchorage in this
roadstead, I have abstained from all hostility within the
range of Moose Island, and that I have invariably liberated
the property of all the inhabitants of the interior of
Passamaquoddy Bay, that has fallen into my hands, making
known to them in general that they may continue to trade
uncontested in the innocent articles they may hitherto have
been accustomed to barter without any interference or
annoyance. Other vessels which have been boarded in the
Quoddy Passage at a distance from Moose Island, with
cargoes from a distant part of the coast, and which are in no
way connected as to proprietary right with the inhabitants
of the approximating boundaries I have detained; and I
conceived they were not entitled to the neutral character of
those within the Bay, but these even have been treated with
as much leniety in their persons & property as could be
observed in such occasion^.^

Captain Senhouse's letter is the very model of borderlands accommodation.
Britain and the United States may have been at war, but there was no need to bring that
conflict to Passamaquoddy. Senhouse himself perniitted local coasters and fishing boats
to proceed unmolested. Why, Senhouse demanded, had the American garrison engaged
in an act of aggression?4
The commander of Fort Sullivan, Capt. Sherman Leland of the United States 34th
Regiment, had an ingenious answer to that question. He claimed that his primary mission
was to "act as an auxiliary to the revenue department," and that it was "the uniform
practice to bring to & examine all boats & small craft of suspicious aspect sailing in the
American waters."' Leland suspected the Venture was engaged in smuggling, and this
belief had been upheld by the curious absence of any ship's papers on board the sloop.
Therefore his actions were not an act of military aggression, but of law enforcement.
Senhouse replied that he was completely satisfied by Leland's letter, and concluded "It
will be my study to promote this spirit of conciliation during my continuation on the
frontier, and in prosecuting this object towards the mitigation of the unnecessary
penalties of war, I shall be very happy to attend to any communication you may at any
future period be willing to make."6 Accommodation somehow prevailed over conflict at
the Passamaquoddy borderlands.
Accommodation during wartime was one manifestation of how borderland
residents thwarted state influence, as the Venture incident illustrates. But by looking
deeper into the written record one discovers that the event was far more complicated than

mere accommodation, and in fact bordered on treason. Borderlands society not only
tempered the state's centralizing tendencies during the War of 1812, but also twisted the
state's authority against itself in order to pursue illicit trade.
In the Passamaquoddy borderlands where illicit trade flourished, events were
seldom what they appeared to be on the surface. The Venture was indeed a smuggling
vessel, loaded with a valuable cargo of British manufactured goods - valued at fiom
$100,000 to $200,000 - destined for the American market.' Leland's soldiers found the
vessel's cargo manifest and other papers concealed between a beam and the vessel's deck
in the cargo hold.* The owners of the Venture's cargo were in fact two Eastport
merchants. They had arranged for the sloop to come to Passamaquoddy, where a rowboat privateer they owned would conduct a sham capture of the vessel. This would bring
the goods into the country legally and at a considerably lower tariff rate than otherwise
possible. However, the presence of the Royal Navy prevented the privateer from
venturing out, and the strong currents of the bay brought the vessel within range of Fort
Sullivan's guns.9

-

The story did not end there. Maine's federal district court awarded Capt. Leland
thousands of dollars for capturing the Venture. Although he had used the fort's cannon
and soldiers under his command to take custody, Leland alone received the "informer's
part" of the proceeds of the Venture's cargo. When he and his soldiers left Eastport to
join their regiment in Vermont, Leland received his funds fiom the U.S. marshal at
Portland. He promptly resigned his commission after receiving the funds, thus avoiding
active combat on the northern frontier. He next appeared in Dorchester, Massachusetts,
where he made a patriotic Independence Day speech in which he concluded "None but a

servile wretch would sell his country's honor for gold." Leland's ideals of American
patriotism based on the Revolutionary experience appeared to be at odds with his
personal experience. 10

Background to the War of 1812
The road to war was a long and complicated one dating back to the conclusion of
the American War of Independence. The two nations frequently disagreed over the
border with British North America, trade policies, relations with revolutionary and
Napoleonic France, the rights and treatment of Native Americans in the continent's
interior, and British naval policy toward American merchant shipping. Tension between
the two was virtually constant, but could usually be handled through diplomatic channels.
Relations took a dramatic turn for the worse in 1807 after HMS Leopard fired on USS
Chesapeake and forcibly removed British deserters fiom the crippled American naval
vessel. While both sides averted war in this episode's aftermath, they also began to
prepare for a future military conflict. The American government sent spies into British
North America; the British military governors of Nova Scotia and Upper Canada
reciprocated by sending their own agents to the United states.''
During this pre-war period, the American federal government attempted several
times to force concessions out of the British government by imposing trade sanctions.
The first of these was the fourteen-month long Jefferson's embargo, from December,
1807, to March, 1809, which forbade any cargoes leaving American ports. Less
sweeping trade restrictions aimed at Britain and its colonies followed under the NonIntercourse Act, which was in force fiom August, 1809 to May, 1810, and the Non-

Importation Act, sometimes known as Macon's Bill No. 2, which was in effect from
February, 1811, until Congress imposed another total 90-day embargo in the spring of
1812. These laws faced the same problem the embargo did: a popular lack of support
that resulted in massive smuggling, especially at Passamaquoddy and other border
communities.l 2
Further aggression at sea and ashore exacerbated the situation. On the night of
May 16, 1811, USS President happened across HMS Little Belt off the Virginia coast; the
ships fired on one another, with the much smaller British vessel suffering many dead and
wounded. Americans felt vindicated for the Chesapeake incident, but the British
government was outraged. The perceived and sometimes real British support for Native
American peoples resisting American expansion in the west irritated the American
government and settlers. Revelations that British spies had been operating in the United
States gauging popular sentiments against the federal government in New England
further excited anti-British sentiments.
Many Americans, especially in the West and South, became increasingly hostile
to the British. The picture was less clear in the Northeast, where a long mutual border
and commercial and social connections had created fairly close connections between
American citizens and British subjects. Many Americans had moved to Upper Canada
and New Brunswick even after the Revolution, and Loyalists moved back and forth
across the border as well. In general, coastal commercial regions tended to be more proBritish, while inland agrarian areas were often anti-British, although there were notable
exceptions to this rule. The Jefferson and Madison administrations never enjoyed warm
relations with Britain, and after the Chesapeake affair in 1807 struggled to keep the

United States out of war. But by 1812, with the continuing failure of diplomatic efforts,
non-importation, a fractured Republican party, and Madison's desire for reelection, antiBritish rhetoric escalated. "War Hawks" quickly dominated the twelfth Congress;
congressmen and senators from the South and West desired war with Britain, and in June
they received what they wanted.13
Historians largely agree that the War of 1812 was fought over maritime
commercial rights. One of the rallying slogans for Americans was "free trade and
sailors' rights!"14 In asking Congress to declare war on June 14, President Madison listed
the numerous American complaints against Britain. The most important and longstanding grievances were the Royal Navy's harassment of American merchant vessels,
such as impressing American sailors and interfering with the United States neutral trade
with Europe. Congress only narrowly complied with Madison's request, but on June 18,
he signed an act declaring war on Great Britain.15
One of the ironies of the War of 1812 was that just as the Americans declared
war, the British became prepared to concede to almost all their demands. The British
were fighting against Napoleon, and by 1812 were on the verge of losing their last
continental ally as Napoleon marched on Moscow, sweeping aside Russian resistance.
North America, including both the United States and the colonies to the north of it, was
very much a sideshow as far as the British were concerned. By 1812, the British military
situation both in Europe became serious enough that Parliament considered concessions
to the United States so that the nation could focus on defeating Napoleon. On June 16,
even as Congress was considering its declaration of war, the British foreign secretary
announced to Parliament that most of the restrictions on American maritime commerce

were to be lifted. The one notable exception was impressment. The war thus proved to
be an unnecessary one, but the American invasion of Upper Canada in the summer of
18 12 ensured that the British would finally have to defend their remaining colonies in

North America.16
The military actions were only a part of this conflict. Congress declared war
ostensibly because of trade conflicts. These trade issues did not cease with the
declaration of war; commerce became another theater of the war. Congress ensured the
central role of commerce in the war by doubling tariffs on imported goods when it
declared war. The purpose of that measure was to create additional income to fight the
war and decrease dependence on foreign

manufacture^.'^

Jeffersonians had long dreamed

of breaking the American reliance on foreign manufactured goods, and the embargo and
War of 18 12 did succeed partially in encouraging American manufactures.l8 But
American merchants generally continued to spurn manufacturing and many continued
their mercantile pursuits, even if it meant smuggling or trading with the enemy.19 The
British wanted to ensure their access to American markets after the war. They were
suffering from over-production at home, and thus they wanted to continue trade as well;
~ ~ the American Congress attempted to cut
they also needed American f o o d s t ~ f f s .While
off trade with the enemy through legislation, American, British, and colonial merchants
eluded government trade restrictions. The American government's efforts to interdict
trade operated on a trial and error basis that left most of the initiative to the smugglers,
who quickly learned how to elude government measures. Studies of wartime trade have
found that such illegal intercourse with the enemy is normal, but that it was a central
issue for the American government during the War of 18 12.21 If trade is considered

another front in the War of 1812, then Passamaquoddy takes on a great importance in that
conflict. Smuggling at Eastport would then represent a defeat as profound as the loss of
Detroit in 1812, or the capture of USS Cheasapeake in 1813.22

Historiography of the War of 1812

The War of 1812 was an inglorious contest marked by ambiguity, confusion, and
incompetence. The titles of scholarly monographs on the subject reflect this confusion.
For example, a standard Anlerican scholarly title is Donald R. Hickey's The War of 1812:
A Forgotten

Another example is the Canadian work by J. Mackay Hitsman:

The Incredible War of 1 8 1 2 . ~The
~ titles indicate that the War of 1812 is either obscure
or difficult to understand. Older titles are scarcely more helpful. The titles to Patrick
White's A Nation on Trial and Roger Brown's The Republic in Peril clearly indicate
danger, but who is conducting this trial, and what exactly is the nature of the peril the
American republic faced?25
The historiography of the War of 1812 is further complicated by historians who
have used it to reinforce nation-building myths. Thus it is a war that everyone can claim
to have won.26 The Canadians, for whom the war was an important victory that
successfully established their resistance to American military might, have written the
most about the conflict and place it high within the events that led to the creation of their
nation. The most aggressively nationalistic Canadian works are Pierre Berton's popular
The Invasion of Canada, 1812-1813 and Flames Across the Border: The CanadianAmerican Tragedy, 1813-1814.27 For Americans, the conflict is less important in the
nation's developn~ent,certainly more ambiguous and therefore less interesting to many.

Some works claim that the war was necessary to establish American identity, seeing it as
a second American

evolution.^^

Like the Canadians, Americans, too, claim to have won

the war. The British tend to ignore the conflict as a sideshow to the Napoleonic Wars but
they, too, claim vict01-y.~~
The historiography is also heavily slanted toward military aspects of the war,
especially tactical-level studies of specific battles fought on or around the Great Lakes.
Recent years have seen the publication of many monographs and articles, and it is no
longer possible to claim that the subject is under-studied.30 There is a relative
overemphasis on military operations, especially in the Great Lakes region, when
compared to studies on the social and commercial effects of the war. The exceptions are
Canadian studies of the war's impact on Ontario, such as George Sheppard's Plunder,
Profit and Paroles: A Social History of the War of 1812 in Upper ~ a n a d a . ~ '
New England and the Maritime Provinces, where the primary activity of the war
was smuggling, remain largely untouched by scholarly inquiry.32 This is largely because
military operations in the region were minimal, with the exception of the 1814 British
capture of Eastport in July, and the Castine expedition in September. American scholars
have done some work on the Hartford Convention, during which New England's
Federalist leadership contemplated secession, but no efforts have been made to
understand just how widespread and popular opposition to the war was.33 Canadian
scholars such as Walter Ronald Copp have published articles on military themes, but
neither Canadian nor American scholars have published full-length monographs on the
social or econonlic impact of the War of 1812 in New England or the ~ a r i t i r n e s . ~ ~

Naval operations in the waters off the Maritime Provinces and northern New
England are better documented, especially the duels between USS Chesapeake and HMS
Shannon and USS Enterprise and HMS ~ o x e r But
. ~ ~until Faye Kert published her work
on Canadian privateers, there were few scholarly works that examined the guerre de
course as anything but a patriotic endeavor.36 Notably, Kert placed privateering
alongside smuggling as a means whereby merchants continued their search for profits.37
The relatively thin historiography of this conflict on both a national and a regional
scale reflects the complex background to the war. Especially confounding to historians
are the cross-border links that defy easy categorization or placement within larger
national frameworks. Smuggling ranked high among those wartime bonds between the
people of Canada and the United States, and Passamaquoddy ranked preeminent as a
smuggler's haven.

The War of 1812 at Passamaquoddy
The War of 1812 at Passamaquoddy demonstrated the ability of borderlands
society to temper the centralizing tendencies of the state. Borderland residents adopted
three major tactics to frustrate the American government's attempts to exert control over
the border. Those tactics were neutrality, deception, and twisting the law against the
federal government. On occasion those tactics required confrontation as well, including
physical violence against government officials or soldiers. Using these tactics,
borderland residents paralyzed and ultimately destroyed an entire regiment of soldiers

sent to stop smuggling. Accommodation rather than conflict was the rule at
Passamaquoddy during the War of 1812. Much of that accommodation involved trade
with the enemy.
As political scientists have noted, trading with the enemy is a manifestation of
international, domestic, and personal relationships that are simultaneously cooperative
and c ~ n f l i c t u a l .Because
~~
this ambiguity and accommodation clashed with later ideals
of patriotism, participants and historians writing about the war have skewed many of its
events. Scholars should be aware that when considering the War of 1812 at
Passamaquoddy, events were seldom what they appeared to be on the surface.
Researching the War of 1812 at Passamaquoddy is a difficult task, in large part
because so much of what happened there was covert or illicit. While local histories have
emphasized the cross-border accommodation and peacefulness of the region, primary
documents detail a region rife with treason. For example, many Americans suspected
that John Brewer of Robbinston, Maine, was a traitor. Despite his military rank as a
major in the Massachusetts militia and his position as a federal postmaster, some
Americans suspected he could not be trusted. An American army officer wrote of
Brewer, "No man in this part of the country has manifested more inveterate hostility to
the country than he has."39 Across the river in New Brunswick, some people also
engaged in traitorous activity. In particular, Aaron Rogers, a nearly illiterate American
who had moved from the Kennebeck region in Maine to St. David in 1809, claimed that
New Brunswick's population was divided. Rogers believed that the ordinary settlers
were "for the States which I believe is true republikins the other party is strong for king
Gorge witch they consist of old Torys and Scotch men." Rogers encouraged Maine's

militia commander to invade, claiming that the colony's poor would rise up and assist the
American forces.40 British regulars placed little reliance on Charlotte County's militia;
one officer estimated less than half were reliable and even Grand Manan's militia
commander doubted the loyalty of his own men.41
While not all settlers at Passamaquoddy plotted treason, most seemed to have
opposed the war and more especially the efforts of governments to extend their influence
over the everyday lives of locals. People at Passamaquoddy resisted the centralizing
tendencies of the state via neutrality, deception, and twisting the law in order to continue
illicit trade. The goal of these tactics was to ensure that trade remained uninterrupted
during the war, a pragmatic accommodation that sought to ensure the safety and
continuing prosperity of borderland residents. When these attempts at accommodation
failed, locals occasionally resorted to violence against the agents of state authority.
Neutrality was the first and most popular option. News of the declaration of war
reached Passamaquoddy on June 25 by a U.S. government courier, who roused Collector
Trescott out of bed to inform him. Trescott's reaction, and that of Passamaquoddy's
residents in general, was to attempt to see to the safety of the community through
accommodation. The morning after the news arrived, Eastport residents gathered in a
meeting and "unanimously agreed to preserve a good understanding with the Inhabitants
of New-Brunswick, and to discountenance all depredations on the property of each
other." Toward that end, a committee of safety was forn~ed,with Trescott as its
chairman. This committee drafted a letter assuring their New Brunswick counterparts of
their peacefid intentions. They sent it to Robert Pagan in St. Andrews, who in turn
forwarded it to the lieutenant governor in Fredericton. In the meantime, a number of

Eastport's inhabitants fled for fear of attack by the Royal Navy, and sought safety in
Portland, Portsmouth, and Boston. Merchants removed their merchandise, and many
goods from Indian Island were smuggled across the border in the c o n f ~ s i o n . ~ ~
A few miles to the north on the St. Croix River, the reaction to war was similarly
unhappy. The day after the news of war reached the area, parishioners from both sides
flocked to the Methodist meeting house in St. Stephen. The Methodist minister found
that his congregation, both American citizens and British subjects wept and sobbed
loudly, "thinking withal that this should be the last time they could see each other in
peace.'"3 The Methodist minister, however, soon discovered that he could continue to
freely cross the border to visit parishioners. Here, too, neutrality and accommodation
appeared to be the rule.
Neutrality involved the region's Native American population as well. At the
outbreak of the war, many of the Passamaquoddy withdrew into the interior. Both
Americans and Loyalists hastened to make overtures with the Indians, who had played an
important role in the American War of Independence. New Brunswick council member
Robert Pagan agreed to protect the Indian's chapel at Pleasant Point; American
representatives provided gifts. The Passamaquoddy remained neutral and played little
part in the war.44
The proprietors of Campobello and Grand Manan sought neutral status as well;
both resisted the province's efforts to drill militia off-island. David Owen, Campobello's
proprietor, initially feared privateering attacks on his island estate, and went so far as to
place all his valuables and documents in a dry well. He also kept loaded muskets in
every room of his home. Early in the war, Owen captured an American privateersman

who was raiding his island estate. Instead of turning the man over to provincial
authorities, Owen returned the man to his vessel earning the gratitude of the crew. As a
result of this act, Owen was no longer plagued by American raiders.45 Moses Gerrish, the
proprietor of Grand Manan, also resented efforts to take local militia off-island. Owen
and Gemsh occasionally joined forces to resist provincial demands for militia.46
Some of the most jarring evidence of the strength of borderland neutrality was the
continued acceptance of the enemy at Passamaquoddy. Americans and colonials
continued to n i x at church, at Masonic meetings, and dinners. Among those who
continued to cross the border freely was the American sheriff of Washington County,
who also held a commission as a general in the Massachusetts militia. Sheriff John
Cooper made such traitorous statements during after-dinner toasts at St. Andrews that he
offended even English observers who thought he should have displayed more loyalty to
his nation.47 But the most common form of accommodation was commercial intercourse.
The war was seldom allowed to interfere with trade.
Eastport, the commercial center of Passamaquoddy, offers the most vivid
examples of tolerance for the enemy. The American Department of State ordered that all
"enemy aliens" register with deputy marshals to prevent any mischief such as espionage;
~ ~Eastport, some 35 heads of
similar provisions were made in the Maritime ~ r o v i n c e s .At
households registered as enemy aliens; with their families the number was at least 208
(see Appendix C) out of a total population of approximately 1,200. Many of these enemy
aliens were merchants engaged in smuggling. Yet the numbers are more dramatic than
that, for many so-called enemy aliens did not register for fear of persecution. For
example, Ethel Olmstead, a merchant and captain of Eastport's militia artillery company,

was an enemy alien. He begged a correspondent not to reveal his true nationality, as "I
am an Englishman & would be delt [sic] with roughly should some people in this country
hear of ityA9Olmstead was not alone in serving in the Massachusetts militia; at least four
others in Eastport served in local militia companies as well (See Appendix E). Moreover,
these militia units had a reputation for pennitting smuggling to proceed unmolested. One
complaint to Maine's militia commander complained that local militia officers
encouraged
The continued presence of enemy aliens at Eastport and their clandestine
activities indicates a link between neutrality and borderland residents' active deception of
the state. Like Olmstead, other enemy aliens took advantage of their ambiguous status to
conduct illicit trade. Thomas H. Woodward had been living in Eastport with his family,
but left for his father-in-law's hometown of Horton, Nova Scotia, after the war broke out.
Woodward soon returned to Eastport to continue smuggling flour into the Maritime
Provinces. He invested everything he had in a scheme to bring flour from Baltimore to
Eastport in two schooners, and even traveled to Maryland to oversee the matter. Posing
as an American, he purchased approximately 1,200 barrels of flour that he planned to sell
at Halifax. Sadly for Woodward, the Royal Navy captured his two American-flagged
schooners and burned them, despite his protests that he was a British ~ u b j e c t . ~ '
Another mixture of neutrality and deception was the use of neutral-flagged
vessels, especially Spanish and Swedish, to introduce British manufactured goods into
the American market. Because the United States was not at war with Spain or Sweden,
trade was legal with those nations. The United States had been a major neutral carrier
during the Napoleonic Wars. For many years, American officials had argued that the

cargoes of American-flagged vessels were American, no matter what their origin or
destination had been. This policy, knows as "fiee ships-fiee

goods," was strongly

opposed by the British. During the War of 1812 smugglers used the principle against the
government. Swedish merchants, often Americans who became naturalized Swedish
subjects at St. Bartholomews in the West Indies, bought cargoes of British manufactured
goods in Halifax and Saint John. Under the "fiee ships-fiee

goods" policy those British

manufactured goods now became Swedish, and therefore could freely enter the United

Another way to abuse neutral rights was for an American vessel to file clearance
papers for a neutral port, but then sail for Halifax. The schooner Rebecca sailed with a
cargo of 570 barrels flour fiom New York with a stated destination of Cadiz, Spain.
However, HMS Boxer captured the Rebecca off West Quoddy Lighthouse, hundreds of
miles off course fiom New York to Cadiz. The captain's excuse for his ships presence at
Passamaquoddy stressed a leak in the vessel's hold. When American privateersmen
boarded the vessel suspecting it was smuggling flour to New Brunswick, the captain
opened a pre-prepared leak; after twenty minutes of hard work at the pumps, the
privateersmen left the vessel to its original crew, convinced that the vessel would sink.
The captain quickly repaired the leak, but soon fell into the hands of the British warship
Boxer, upon which he presented his importation license from the lieutenant governor of
Nova Scotia. The Boxer's commander sent the Rebecca into Saint John where the viceadmiralty court could sort out the legal technicalities. In court the Rebecca's captain
claimed he had to change course to Saint John because the license would expire before he

could arrive at Halifax. The court found however that the Rebecca was liable to seizure,
and condemned it.53
The neutral trade brought adventurers such as Constantino Llufrio, a Spanish
subject, to Passamaquoddy where they used their nationality to cover their smuggling
activities. Jonathan D. Weston, an Eastport lawyer, even went so far as to become a
Swedish vice-consul to facilitate this trade. When the British captured Eastport in 1814,
they found considerable amounts of allegedly neutral goods stored there. Besides
Llufrio, fellow Spaniards Joze Deganttes and J. De Sola, and Swedes Johan Nyrnann and
Andros Armidson made Moose Island their smuggling base, aided and abetted by
American and colonial n ~ e r c h a n t s . ~ ~
The use of licenses furnished by the British became another form of deception.
The British military was reliant on American provisions, and encouraged American
merchants to ship flour to destinations such as Saint John or Halifax. An example of these
licenses follows:
I the undersigned George Stacey Smyth President and
Commander in Chief of the Province of New Brunswick
and the territories thereunto belonging in America, in
pursuance of the authority given to me by order of Council
bearing date the 13thday of October 1812.--do hereby
Grant this License, and do hereby authorize and permit Mr.
James Congdon to import in any ship or vessel, excepting a
ship or vessel belonging to France, or the subjects thereof,
into the Ports of Saint Andrew and St. John in NewBrunswick, from any Port in the United States of America,
from which British vessels are excluded, a Cargo of wheat,
grain, bread, biscuit, flour, pitch, tar or turpentine, without
molestation on account of the present hostilities and
notwithstanding the said ship or goods shall be the property
of any subject or inhabitant of the United States of
America, or of any British subjects trading therewith.

This license to continue in force for Four Months,
dated the eighth day of August one thousand eight hundred
& thirteen.
[Signed] G.S. Smyth
By his Honor Command.
Signed Jon. 0de11.~~
Smyth was the military governor of New Brunswick. In this license for Janles Congdon,
an Eastport smuggler, Smyth permitted him to import provisions or naval stores into the
province for four months. Unfortunately for Congdon, this license fell into the hands of
American federal authorities. Figure 8.1 displays just how much American flour reached
Halifax during the war. Halifax flour importation peaked in the fourth quarter of 1813,
' ~ of that
when more than 22,000 barrels entered the port from the United ~ t a t e s . Most
flour remained in Halifax, feeding not only the local populace, but the burgeoning British
military and naval forces there. Out of that number, 2 1,474.5 barrels came in American
vessels that sailed under British licenses."
After December 1813, a number of factors combined to lessen both the supply
and demand for American flour. Congress passed another American embargo that
forbade all ships except privateers from leaving port.58 An increasingly effective British
blockade prohibited even licensed vessels from leaving American ports, and made it
easier for American merchants to supply the British fleet directly. Finally, the war in
Europe turned against Napoleon and freed the Baltic grain lands that traditionally
supplied Britain's flour demands.59 Passamaquoddy's role in the Halifax flour trade
peaked in the fourth quarter of 1812. During that period, 2,236 barrels -just over fifty
percent of the total for that quarter - entered at ~ a l i f a x . ~ '

Figure 8.1 :Nova Scotia Flour Imports, 1812-1815
barrels of flour

Source: C.O. 22 1132, 'Nova Scotia Shipping Returns"

Table 8.1: Flour Prices at Boston v. Halifax, 1812-1815

Date
January 1812
June 1812
January 1813
June 1813
January 1814
June 1814
January 1815
June 1815

Boston
$10.25
$9.50
$12.50
$15.25
$14.50
$12.50
$1 1.75
$7.50

Source: Boston Gazette and Halifm:~ o u r n a l . ~ ~

However, that number is considerably less than the 17,792 barrels of flour exported from
Saint Andrews during the second quarter of 1812, despite an American embargo.62
The licensed flour trade could be very profitable for those willing to take risks.
British demand inflated prices for much of the war, but by mid-1 814 the increased
availability brought flour prices down considerably. Table 8.1 indicates the profits a
Boston merchant could make if he engaged in the licensed flour trade with ~ a l i f a x . ~ ~
British licenses could be problematic for smugglers, however. If American
officials, privateersmen, or naval units found an American ship with such a license they
would seize the vessel and send it back to the United States for trial. Early in 1813, the
Supreme Court ruled that such licenses were grounds for seizure.64 Congress reinforced
that ruling by outlawing licenses. Masters of merchant vessels concealed their licenses
when boarded by armed vessels until they deternlined the nationality of the boarding
party. If the boarders were British, it was important to produce the papers; if American,
they had had to be kept concealed. An example is the case of the American schooner
Joanna, captured by the New Brunswick privateer Dart in June 1813. The Joanna's
papers stated that the vessel was sailing for Eastport with a cargo of corn. Captain
Alexander Newcomb of the Joanna's claimed he really intended to sail for Halifax, but
filed a clearance with American customs officers "in order to deceive any American
Cruizers [privateers or warships] that might chance to fall in with them." At first
Newcomb thought the Dart was an American privateer and concealed his license. When
he found out it was a colonial vessel, Newcomb rowed over to his captor in a small boat
and presented his license to sail to Halifax with provisions. But Captain John Harris of
the Dart said "he did not care for it, that it was good for nothing, and that he would take

all vessels worth sending in and told this Deponent if he did not pull away from the
Privateer he would sink the Boat in which he was and positively refused to give him a
Passage in either of said vessels."65 Licenses thus offered only limited protection.
The license trade was a ticklish business; American naval officers often pretended
to be British officers, and sometimes British naval officers and privateersmen did not
accept the licenses and sent the vessel into a British port as a prize.66 A typical example
of this is the case of the American schooner Lucy, captured by HMS Martin off West
Quoddy Light in March 1813. The captain of the Martin seized the Lucy and took the
vessel to Saint John, but when the Lucy's captain produced a British license, the court
released the
If deception failed, smugglers could turn to other methods that relied on
manipulating the legal system to their own benefit. One such scheme was to use regional
hostility against the national government by pressing cases against federal officials in
local courts. The use of local courts devastated an American unit known as Ulmer's
Volunteers, while the second method was an especially well-documented phenomenon
known as "collusive capture." Both methods built directly upon the long tradition of
smuggling at Passamaquoddy.

George Ulmer's War and Woes

The American military had little interest in Passamaquoddy; in strategic terms the
region was a backwater. The Madison administration and its generals had determined
that the Great Lakes region and Upstate New York would be the springboard for an
invasion of British North America, and thus dedicated most of its resources there.

Alarmed by the massive smuggling occurring at Passamaquoddy, however, the War
Department belatedly assigned a regiment of one-year volunteers to guard what was
termed the "Eastern Frontier." Its primary mission was to suppress smuggling.
The commander of this unit was George Ulmer, a Revolutionary War veteran,
failed merchant, and Jeffersonian politician.68 Ulmer received his conmission in
November, 1812, and immediately proceeded for Eastport, where he relieved several
companies of Massachusetts militia commanded by his kinsman, Jacob Ulmer. Ulmer
made an effort to bring the Passarnaquoddy borderland under control and to stop
smuggling entirely. His efforts raised the ire of local residents, who successfully struck
back through a variety of tactics.
Ulmer faced a number of difficulties. Eastport was packed with adventurers and
enemy aliens, many of them smugglers who openly wore arms. Ulmer estimated that
almost two hundred people in Eastport were involved in supplying the British with
provisions.69Among these was Jabez Mowry, one of the region's most active smugglers.
Early in the war, he successfully smuggled $50,107 worth of beef and pork to the British
commissary at ~ a l i f a x . ~He
' also supplied the American garrison on Moose Island, and
then reported information about American troop strengths to the British commander at St.
~ndrews.~'
Ulmer faced more problems than just smugglers, however. For example, the
regular Army officer who commanded Fort Sullivan did not cooperate with a force of
.~~
supply routes to
undisciplined volunteers, and quarreled with ~ l m e r Furthermore,
Passamaquoddy were tenuous at best, and the Royal Navy and privateers from Maritime
d ~ at
. ~least
~ one occasion the
ports controlled the ocean approaches to ~ a s s a m a ~ u o d On

master of a vessel destined to Eastport with supplies for Ulrner instead simply sailed for
New Brunswick, and sold the provisions to the ~ r i t i s h His
. ~ ~troops largely consisted of
old men and young boys with little equipment and no uniforms, and his officers bickered
among themselves. Provisions were scarce and expensive. The local contractor who
supplied them was a prominent local smuggler named Jonathan Bartlett. Ulmer accused
Bartlett of informing the British about the quantity of provisions he supplied Ulmer, and
of giving the American soldiers spoiled flour and substandard meat, the salted pork
mostly pig heads, the salt beef including internal organs.75
Despite these obstacles Ulmer attempted to perform his duty. His primary
mission was to suppress smuggling; otherwise his orders were to act strictly on the
d e f e n ~ i v e He
. ~ ~even refrained from attacking the British when a Royal Navy warship
lay helpless under the guns of his fort one morning.77 Ulmer was more aggressive in
acting against Eastport's smuggling community. He required all enemy aliens to register
with him and take an oath of loyalty or face trial for treason. All persons crossing the
border required a pass from him; his officers examined all mail going to New Brunswick.
His actions resulted in a substantial reduction in smuggling, but deeply offended the
borderlands community, which initiated a campaign to harass him.78 These efforts
included threats made by smugglers to tar and feather the colonel.79
Standard techniques used during the embargo were reinitiated, such as bribing
soldiers who guarded impounded contraband with both liquor and money.80 Local
merchants and magistrates, adventurers, and even the port's deputy customs collector
colluded against Ulmer's anti-smuggling campaign. When one of Ulmer's soldiers shot
and wounded a smuggler, Sheriff Cooper arrested the soldier and sent him to jail at

Castine to await trial for attempted m ~ r d e r . ~Ulmer
'
eventually forbade magistrates to
arrest his soldiers.82 Merchants engaged in a letter writing campaign against Ulmer.
Smugglers actively defied his edicts; on March 20, 1813, smugglers took nine barrels of
tobacco from Josiah Little's wharf in Eastport. One of Ulmer's patrol boats pursued, but
was unable to seize the craft when a nearby British vessel opened fire on them.
Nonetheless, the officer was able to identify the smugglers and Ulmer ordered his troops
to keep an eye out for them.83 The post at Robbinston observed the men trying to cross
back into the United States a few days later, and captured them and the boat they were in.
Ulmer's men took possession of the boat and made the men prisoners. As one of the
young soldiers recalled, "We boarded her & found Robert Nowlin Capt. Hutchins a Mr.
Fowler & a Mr. Monroe. We took possession & the sargeant put myself & Dickey
another man into Nowlin's boat. Nowlin was still at helm the boat jibed at which
Hutchins catched & threw our gun over board & with Fowler ketch the other gun &
Fowler discharged the priming-- They carried us to St. Andrews & delivered us to the
c ~ r n t n d ' t . "Not
~ ~ only did the smugglers turn the table on the soldiers, but they handed
them over to the British garrison at St. Andrews. The British commander quickly
returned one, but discovered that Private John Dicky had only recently emigrated from
New Brunswick to the United States. Dicky was in fact a British subject bearing arms
against his king. The British officer therefore kept Dicky a prisoner and made him face
trial for treason.85
The masterstroke against Ulmer was a piece of legal trickery made possible by the
remoteness of Fort Sullivan. The federal government failed to supply Ulmer's troops
adequately, and thus he went into personal debt to buy them provisions. In addition, he

had many old debts remaining from before the war. In mid March 1813, several
merchants pressed Ulmer to pay his debts to them.86 When he failed to pay, they had him
incarcerated for debt in the Washington County jail at Machias. Ulmer remained there
for a few weeks until he persuaded local justices that it was illegal to prevent a military
officer from performing his duties during wartime. When Ulmer returned to Fort
Sullivan, he found the garrison in chaos. He attempted to reestablish order through a
draconian decree that banned civilians from Fort Sullivan, strictly prohibited all crossborder traffic, and forbade civilian officials arresting his troops. In effect he declared
martial law?' But Ulmer's power to control the region was slipping away; even his
command over the soldiers was rapidly eroding. Ulmer also apparently took to drinking
too much, further diminishing the confidence of his officers and men.88
During Independence Day celebrations in 1813, Ulmer's troops and locals clashed
in a riot.89 Local residents celebrated the day by fornling a procession that wound its way
to Eastport's sole schoolhouse, where local worthies read aloud the Declaration of
Independence and George Washington's "Farewell Address." While locals did this,
some of Ulmer's troops disrupted the proceedings by celebrating the holiday in their own
manner, by shooting their muskets in the air, and thereby halted the event in the
schoolhouse. When the locals continued their parade, some of Ulmer's troops gathered
to shout insults and hurl pieces of brick, broken kettles, and stones at them. Determined
to continue their celebrations, the locals proceeded to Young's inn to drink toasts and fire
salutes from the local militia artillery company's cannon. Notably, Ulmer had
complained that inn keeper Young was one of the individuals who was most troublesome
to him, and the commander of Eastport's artillery company was Ethel Olmstead, a

smuggler and enemy alien.90 About one hundred soldiers vented their many frustrations
by surrounding Young's inn and terrifying the locals within, throwing rocks and gravel at
the windows, and shouting that only the American flag displayed for the holiday
protected the terrified celebrants within. Furthermore, the soldiers seized the militia
cannon and fired it, and even threatened to throw it over a cliff. The efforts of Ulmer's
officers to control the rioting troops proved fi-~itless.~'
When local officials approached Ulmer to do something, he intervened personally
to stop the rioting. Ulmer went to the barracks where his men were firing muskets in the
air, and ordered the soldiers to stop. When the soldiers continued to fire their guns,
Ulmer ordered cannons "to be charged with grape shot & pointed to the barracks, and
went himself and told the men as sure as they fired again he would have the field pieces
discharged at them. He had scarcely got at the distance of fifty rods from the barracks
before they began to fire."92 The soldiers manning the cannon refixed to fire on their
comrades, and the rioting continued into the night, and culminated in the burning of
figures in effigy.93
Ulmer's own officers turned on him as well. Capt. Sherman Leland, a local
attorney who joined the Volunteers for one year, abruptly left Ulmer's unit when he
acquired a regular commission in the 34thU.S. Infantry. Leland then began recruiting
troops away from his former regiment, not only taking away his fornler commander's
men, but their equipment as well. Leland had a grudge against Ulmer; perhaps because
Leland as an Eastport resident resented the heavy-handed tactics of an outsider like
Ulmer. According to one soldier, Leland complained openly about his former
commander, saying "he believed Ulmer had taken bribes of smuanlers to pay his private

debts, adding that he did not calculate he would hold his station long. but would soon be
removed from his post-I

have also heard sd. Lealand say, that Ulmer was a ~ a s c a l . " ~ ~

With some fellow officers, Leland complained to the district commander about
Ulmer's conduct.95 In August 1813, the region's commander relieved Ulmer of his
command and placed him under arrest. Leland eventually succeeded Ulmer as the
commander of Fort Sullivan, and anti-smuggling operations were reduced to a minimum,
with the exception of the Venture incident in which Leland profited so handsomely. A
military court of inquiry held in May 1814, found Ulmer innocent of any criminal
charges, but the damage was already done: the federal government had disbanded his
regiment entirely in December 18 13.96
Ulmer's downfall was the product of borderland hostility to his anti-smuggling
measures. No matter whether one blames the adventurers, local magistrates, or his own
subordinates, borderland residents effectively removed him from power. Notably, locals
used local courts to harass a federal official, and even used the military justice system
against itself; very little direct action had to be taken against Ulmer, although borderland
residents did threaten to tar and feather him once.97 Eastport continued to be a
smuggler's haven for the remainder of the war despite the continued presence of a
diminished American garrison at Fort Sullivan. One of the most aggressive methods used
was to subvert the legitimate practice of privateering into a form of smuggling.

Collusive Capture
Collusive capture was a method of smuggling whereby borderland residents and
others distorted the state's manner of waging war and turned it against itself. In a
collusive capture, merchants arranged for a privateer to conduct a pre-arranged sham
capture of an enemy vessel. Privateers were privately-owned vessels conmissioned by
the government to conduct war against the enemy. Privateers were a means whereby a
young and relatively poor nation such as the United States could mount a sort of naval
guerilla warfare, or guerre de course in the terminology of the day, against a superior
force such as the Royal Navy. Americans used privateers extensively during the war of
1812, and the Maritime Provinces commissioned many privateers as well.'*
Conducting collusive captures took enormous coordination between American
privateersmen and Maritimes merchants, and speaks to a tight bond between the two
regions. While published court records are available in the United States that go into
great detail concerning this practice, American scholars have overlooked the issue; credit
is due to Canadian historian Faye Kert for rediscovering the practice.99 A number of
collusive capture cases went to the United States Supreme Court, all of them concerning
small privateers operating in northern New England waters. The waters of
Passamaquoddy, especially around Grand Manan, seem to have been the most popular for
conducting such operations. These collusive captures were often so blatant as to insult the
intelligence of the courts. For example, virtually all privateers operated on a shares
system whereby the crew received a portion of the proceeds from the vessels they
captured. If the privateer did not capture any enemy vessels, then the crew received no
prize money. But on board privateers that conducted collusive captures, the crews

received wages rather than shares. Typically the privateers involved in sham captures
were also very small; sometimes they were mere open boats. Collusive captures and
other misdeeds became such an infamous practice that President Madison revoked the
commissions of all privateers carrying crews of less than twenty.Io0

In the United States privateering was less popular the closer one traveled toward
the border. In eastern Maine the opposition was particularly bitter; one state legislator
even suggested that American privateers be burned at the wharf, and their crews tarred
and feathered. The streets of Eastport were reported to be unsafe for privateersmen even
in daylight.'0' The basis of this opposition was not political, ideological, or moral, but
Private armed vessels interfered with their livelihoods and trade, created an
enormous number of awkward problems for these isolated communities, and brought
about the possibility of British reprisals. These problems occurred in the Maritimes as
well, but their impact was less important both because the British navy provided better
protection and provincial politics were less discordant than in the United States.
The Venture incident was really a case of collusive capture gone awry. First the
Royal Navy suspected the vessel of being a smuggler, but had to let it go for lack of
evidence, and then the U.S. Army captured the craft. Meanwhile a small American
privateer called the Mary had been skulking about Passamaquoddy Bay, waiting for an
appropriate moment to make a sham capture of the Venture and its rich cargo. Virtually
everything about the Mary was suspicious. It was the only American privateer
commissioned in the Passamaquoddy district during the entire war. The vessel was tiny,
a mere six tons. Its captain was a former customhouse inspector at the Passamaquoddy
district who was sure to have known the best way to smuggle goods into the country.lo3

The two merchants who gave bonds for the Mary were two Eastport merchants, Jabez
Mowry and Benjamin Bucknam, both notorious smugglers who previously had been
outspoken opponents of privateering. The captain of the Mary had even bought his
gunpowder from colonial merchants in St. hdrews.'04
Collusive captures were perhaps the ultimate distortion of privateering and the
state's desire to wage war. Rather than hampering enemy trade, borderland residents
facilitated it through this deviant form of privateering. Far from acting as patriots, some
privateersmen actually acted as smugglers. The power of illicit trade thus twisted the
concept of warfare in the Bay of Fundy. Indeed, the pull of profit proved so strong in this
periphery that even Royal Navy captains participated in orchestrating collusive captures
off ~ a m ~ o b e l l o . ' ~ ~

Conclusion
War brought confusion and crisis to Passamaquoddy residents, who wanted no
part of the conflict. New Brunswick, despite its Loyalist heritage, did not spring to arms
against the American foe. In fact most people in the province seem to have been "welldisposed towards the United States." Despite modem feeling that Maritimers showed
their loyalty to Britain during the War of 1812, rigorous examination reveals little
enthusiasm for the war.'06 The situation was similar in Maine, which like much of New
England had deep misgivings about the war, especially given the overwhelming
superiority of the Royal Navy and the region's vulnerable coastline. For borderland
residents, moreover, the stakes were even higher; the state of war threatened the intricate
system of accommodation that defined local life.

Borderlands society attempted to suppress friction between British subjects and
American citizens. This tactic of accommodation took many forms, including formal and
informal transborder agreements to discourage violence, non-compliance of local militia
units to serve outside of their immediate comnlunity, personal agreements with the
enemy, and a continued tolerance for "enemy aliens" to live on either side of the border
as they chose. The background against which all these accommodations operated was a
continuation of illicit trade across the border.
In the end, the War of 1812 made little material difference to Passamaquoddy
residents. The British retained possession of Moose Island until 1818, when arbitration
by the King of the Netherlands restored the border to its pre-1814 form. Perhaps the only
tangible difference was that a commercial center sprung up in Lubec, Maine, during the
British occupation of Eastport. There Jabez Mowry and fellow smugglers resumed their
business, especially in the plaster trade. Less tangible was a renewed determination by
American, colonial, and imperial officials to assert their control over trade and the border.
While during the embargo and War of 1812 American officials faced hostile crowds of
smugglers, after the war New Brunswick learned how difficult it was to control the illicit
trade at Passarnaquoddy.
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CHAPTER 9:
THE PLASTER WAR

Introduction

It was the sort of report every colonial administrator dreaded receiving. In a letter
to Lieutenant Governor George Stracey Smyth, New Brunswick officials on the border
with the United States in the summer of 1820 reported "a state of actual and unqualified
Rebellion against His Majesty's Government of this ~rovince."' But Smyth was in a
ticklish situation; overt military action on the border might arouse the ire of the United
States, with whlch Britain had been at peace only a few years since the conclusion of the
War of 1812. Furthermore, Smyth had only a handful of troops in the colony, and they

were needed in the provincial capital at Fredericton where they had suppressed a riot only
~
that, prudent colonial administrators who wished to continue
a month b e f ~ r e .Beyond
their careers hesitated before reacting to reports fiom panicky officials.
Smyth knew that smuggling lay at the heart of this revolt, but like other colonial
administrators he knew that there was more to this problem than simply upholding the
majesty of the law. Stopping the smugglers and now rebels in the Passarnaquoddy region
was part of a bigger struggle in which the port city Saint John, New Brunswick,
attempted to assert economic dominance over the Bay of Fundy. In some ways this
struggle marked New Brunswick's departure fiom pre-capitalist economics into

capitalism. Canadian scholars such as Eric Sager, Gerald Panting, and T.W. Acheson
have outlined the process whereby Saint John merchants assumed control over the Bay of
Fundy's economic output even when they did not directly control the production
process.3 But the struggle to stop the plaster trade was more than an economic or
political contest, it was also closely related to the Loyalist identity of the province. More
than one observer noted that the smugglers involved in the plaster trade introduced
American ideas of free trade and democracy into the province.4
The year 1820 was an inlportant one for New Brunswick, and may be considered
the date in which it began to develop capitalist institutions, such as the Bank of New
~ r u n s w i c k .Would
~
the colony become more bbAmerican"(egalitarian, tied to American
markets), or would it retain a more "British" (hierarchical, tied to British markets)
character? The question was a crucial one in a province founded by American loyalist
refbgees after the American Revolution. The colony had always possessed some selfcontradictory attributes; a British colony, nlany of its inhabitants were native-born North
Americans, whether Acadian, pre-loyalist, loyalist, or later immigrants. While the colony
was part of the British mercantile system, from its very founding in 1784 it had trouble
divorcing itself from United States markets, especially American foodstuffs such as
flour.6 New Brunswick was a remote pioneer society similar to much of the United
States and British North America, yet it looked to British institutions as social models.
No small amount of confusion arose out of the question of New Brunswick's search for
its identity, and on occasion the contradictions within the province's loyalist society
resulted in violent confrontations, of which the Plaster War was but one.

Violent crowd protest was not unusual in the Atlantic Provinces in the nineteenth
century, in either urban or rural settings. Scholars have studied unrest in the region to
reveal patterns of ethnic tensions, class divisions, social injustice, labor relations, and
other issues.' An analysis of the so-called Plaster War contributes to this body of
knowledge by examining crowd protest as a reaction to the rise of capitalism in the
region.* The plastennen did not willingly give up the means of production to the Saint
John merchants; it was a struggle that occasionally broke into violence.

Background to the Plaster War
Stephen Humbert's problems were the result of a new provincial policy to take
control of the plaster trade. The plaster trade had been a mixed blessing to both New
Brunswick and Nova Scotia for decades. While it provided a valuable export to the
United States that supported many fanners, mariners, and small merchants, it also
encouraged large-scale smuggling as these same entrepreneurs returned from the border
with holds full of American produce illegally brought into the province without paying
the stiff customs duties placed on foreign goods.9 This problem was not small; economic
historians estimate that plaster was British North America's most valuable export to the
United States in the first decades of the nineteenth century.''
But why should plaster be such a widely smuggled item? The answer lies in the
needs of American agriculture. Plaster, usually known as plaister or plaister paris, is now
better known as gypsum, the material that fills sheetrock panels in home construction."
But in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries plaster was the first chemical
fertilizer, a miracle substance that when ground up and scattered over fields substantially

increased harvests, especially of wheat. Farmers in the American wheat-raising heartland
in Pennsylvania, Maryland, and Virginia demanded huge amounts of plaster, as did
farmers as far north as ~ a i n e . ' *The American market demanded plaster to support
commercial wheat farming, and consumer demand is an important aspect of the
smuggling dynamic. But supply, too, played a role in smuggling. Before the 1820s, the
only known source of plaster in North America was at the head of the Bay of Fundy,
mostly along the Fundy shore of Nova Scotia, but also in Westmorland County, New
Brunswick.
The scale of this trade was large in its day, neither British North America or the
United States customs officials recorded statistics concerning the gypsum trade. Colonial
customs administrators largely ignored the smaller coasting craft engaged in the plaster
trade, except to extract heavy fees from those engaged in it.13 American custom
regulations allowed plaster to enter duty free, and thus unrecorded. But New Brunswick
officials knew the trade was growing, and periodically estimated the size of the trade. In
1794, approximately 100 tons were exported via Passamaquoddy; by 1802 about 13,000
tons, by 1806, 50,000 tons, and by 1820 over 100,000 tons.14 In 1820, the average price
of plaster in Eastport was $2.50; in Boston at this time was about $3.12, and in
Philadelphia about $4.00.'~ In 1802, the Boston Gazette began to regularly report the
current price of plaster on a per ton basis, an indication of the growing importance of
plaster to the American market.
The fluctuating price of plaster also reflects the diplomatic difficulties between
British North America and the United States and even the state of world markets. Prior
to 1807, the Napoleonic Wars raging in Europe created a huge demand for American

flour, which in turn created a demand for gypsum from the Bay of Fundy even as it cut
off the traditional French supply. Prices rose steadily for gypsum with greater demand
until 1807, when a crisis in relations between Britain and the United States arose in the
aftermath of the Chesapeake incident. Jefferson's embargo fiather depressed both flour
and gypsum prices. When trade resumed in 1809, prices quickly rebounded, and in
response to the War of 1812 soared even higher, encouraging the plaster trade even when
it constituted trade with the enemy. The Nova Scotia Assembly even went to the length
of legalizing the plaster trade during the War of 1812.'~Plaster demanded the highest
prices at the end of the war, when British naval strength cut off supplies from the Bay of
Fundy. For a few months the price of a ton of plaster even exceeded that of a barrel of
flour.
Figure 9.1: Boston Plaster Prices, 1802-1820

Source: Boston Gazette. All prices reflect low wholesale prices in U.S. dollars as of June
1 for each year.

After 1815, plaster prices declined, reflecting the decline of flour prices after the
end of the Napoleonic Wars, and possibly the reappearance of French gypsum on the
market. By 1820, plaster sold for as little as $3.00 per ton. A closer analysis of the
Boston price of gypsum in 1820 reveals a surprise: New Brunswick's war on gypsum
smuggling was so ineffectual that it did not stem the supply enough to raise its value in
American markets, either in Boston or at Passanlaquoddy, where nine-tenths of the
gypsum entered the United States.
Comparing Eastport prices to Boston prices also reveals one of the sources of
profit in the plaster trade; the commodity itself was valuable, but transporting it reaped
just as much profit. Plaster bought at $2.00 per ton in Eastport was worth $1.25 more in
Boston, and yet more in Baltimore and Philadelphia. Transporting gypsum, or "the
carrying trade" in the parlance of the times, was worth potentially as much as the
material, a fact that the ambitious merchants of Saint John, New Brunswick were very
aware. 17

The Plaster Trade in Operation

The plaster trade operated in a pre-market mode whereby small independent
producers individually brought their product to market. The producers controlled the
production, transportation, and marketing of the product. While these small gypsum
quarries were not efficient in capitalist tern~s,they provided additional means to augment
the meager rewards of Nova Scotia agriculture. After 1805, plaster became an
increasingly important export item.

Table 9.1: Boston Plaster Prices, 1820

Date
-3.50
March 1820
A ril 1820
May 1820
June 1820
July 1820
August 1820
September 1820
October 1820
November 1820
December 1820

Plaster LowITon

Plaster HiddTon

$3.50

$3.62
$3.62

0
---

$3.50
$3.50
$3.50
$3.50
$3.50
$3.00
$3.00
$3.00

$3.75
$3.75
$3.75
$3.25
$3.25
$3.25
-

Source: Boston Gazette, 1820

Table 9.2: Eastport Plaster Prices, Summer 1820

Date
August 5,1820
August 26,1820
September 2, 1820

Plaster LowITon
$2.50
$2.00
$2.00

September 20, 1820

$2.00

Plaster HighITon

-$2.25
$2.25
$2.25
$2.25

0
Source: Eastport Sentinel, 1820

Gypsum is a soft rock usually found close to the surface, or even exposed on banks and
hillsides. Locals mined it using gunpowder, which was often bought illicitly at the
border. Farmers blasted the plaster loose and transported it by the cartload to small
vessels, where it was dumped into their holds, still in loose, rocky form. The vessel then
delivered the gypsum to Passarnaquoddy, where it was either lightered ashore in small
vessels and dumped into piles on shore, or transferred directly to an American vessel,
either by small boats or actually coming alongside, preferably under cover of night. Once
in America, the plaster was delivered still in its raw state, and finally at the retail level
was ground first in a stamping mill and then in a common gristmill into a fine powder,
placed in casks or barrels, and delivered to fanners for fertilizer or builders for plaster.18
Experts deemed six to eight bushels of plaster sufficient to fertilize an acre of wheat.19
While the gypsum trade was modestly profitable for those who lived in the Bay of
Minas area, their actions were those of a premarket people taking advantage of a local
resource, rather than of true capitalists. The gypsum trade was never very well
organized. Wealthier landowners, such as Thomas Chandler Haliburton of Windsor,
largely conceded control of plaster mining by leasing out their deposits to local farmers
who mined them part time.20 The quames themselves were small, described as "kettle
holes," and frequently abandoned for newer, easier to work sites.21 In order to reduce
competition among themselves, some gypsum producers chose to band together and hire
an agent to conduct all their buying and selling for them, although this does not seen1 to
be the rule.22 Furthermore, despite some offrcial feeling that the plaster should be
processed before exportation, the plastermen seldom ground and barreled their product;
John DeWolf built the first plaster mill in Nova Scotia in 1 8 1 2 . ~However,
~
despite their

lack of organization, these small producers were shrewd enough to appreciate cheap
labor, and during the Napoleonic Wars were able to hire a number of Bohemian and
Hungarian laborers. These laborers were termed "Gennans" by the locals, but it seems
more likely that they were Austrian soldiers captured by the French, but liberated by the
Royal Navy and set at liberty in ~ a l i f a x . ~ ~
The mariners who transported the plaster were the neighbors and kinsmen, and
undoubtedly in some cases the same individuals who quarried it.25 This was somewhat
unusual; generally cargo producers and ship owners were not the same individuals, but
the low unit value of plaster, combined with high freight rates - generally higher than the
value of the plaster itself - encouraged ship ownership by the plaster producers.26 The
vessels they operated were primarily small schooners of around forty tons burthen,
operated by a master and a few deckhands. This upset the merchant capitalists of Saint
John, who wanted to see the plaster carried in their larger vessels directly to market in
The small schooners went back and forth from the Minas
New York and ~hiladel~hia.~'
Basin to Passamaquoddy several times a year as convenient. Once at Passarnaquoddy,
they generally anchored in the waters between Moose Island and Campobello, deposited
their ship's paperwork with the customhouse officer there, and arranged to sell and
transfer their cargo either to the American shore, especially Allan's or Rice's Islands, or
directly into an American

OAen the plastermen conducted these transfers at

night, in contravention of both American and British laws, but the dark offered partially
cloaked their activities. Ideally, the two vessels moored alongside one another and

transferred their cargo from hold to hold. If that was not possible, the crew transferred
the cargo in small boats. Working in the dark was far more dangerous than during the
day; injuries and drownings were c o m n ~ o n . ~ ~
Assisting the plasternlen in these transactions were a number of merchants who
specialized in the plaster trade. Among the Americans were Jabez Mowry and the firnl of
Dana, Wheeler, & Bartlett. Among the New Brunswick merchants were the firm of
Andrews and Campbell of Campobello. Notably, the senior partner was Israel Andrews,
who lived in the same household as Thomas Henderson, the British customs officer who
d ~ junior
. ~ ~ partner, Colin
turned a blind eye to the smuggling trade at ~ a s s a m a ~ u o d His
Campbell, Jr., was the son of the region's creole surveyor and searcher of customs, Colin
Campbell, Sr. Clearly these two had little to fear from the local customs authorities.
Andrews and Campbell arranged for American provisions, gunpowder, sails, iron, tea,
and brandy, wine, and gin to be sent to Passamaquoddy in return for their plaster, timber,
and fish.)' The amount of plaster they moved was large. In July 1805, this firm alone
had five hundred tons of plaster on hand, and was daily purchasing more.32 While
immune from the local customs authorities, Andrews and Campbell did have to deal with
George Leonard's efforts to break up smuggling in Passamaquoddy Bay. In 1805,
Leonard seized the sloop Falmouth and one hundred and seventy tons of plaster on board
that belonged to Andrews and ~ a m ~ b e l lAndrews
.~)
also suffered arrest when HMS
Porgey attempted to halt smuggling at Passamaquoddy in 1807. A midshipman who
seized a plaster vessel Andrews happened to be on ordered the merchant into Porgey's
boat. Andrews replied that he would get into his own boat, upon which "the midshipman
damned him, and told him he should go into the cutter's boat-a

quarrel ensued, when

the midshipman knocked down Andrews, then put a pistol to his breast, and told him if he
did not immediately conlply, he would blow him

Andrews conlplied, and later

the commander of the Porgey released him.
Leonard was correct in that the plasternlen were indeed smuggling American
goods and produce illegally into both New Brunswick and Nova Scotia. Leonard
reported in 1803 that Americans paid for the plaster not with cash, but with "Teas and
coarse cottons imported from the East Indies by the Americans, adulterated brandies, and
other spirits, coarse shoes and Boots, and other articles, principally the manufactures of
the United States, received in return for the Plaister and Grindstones. These contraband
articles, thus received, are afterwards easily distributed by boats and small craft thro'
every part of this Province, and also thro' that valuable and populous part of the Province
of Nova Scotia lying upon the Bay of ~ u n d ~ . "By
~ ' the end of 1810, British officials
complained that the plaster trade was "most ruinous," and that it was "the means of
corrupting the morals of the diggers & carriers. It is a cloak for smugglers, and it takes
off the Farmer from improving and raising grain."36
By 1811, American customs officials became equally alarmed by the plaster
trade. Lemuel Trescott, the American customs collector at Passamaquoddy, reported the
following:
there never was a greater quantity Plaister carried to the
westward in one year than there has been this so far.-This
Plaister, the greater part of it, has been either taken from
British vessels in our waters in the night time, or taken on
board in the British waters, in either case the Americans
goes immediately to sea after obtaining their cargoes to
avoid the British Cutter on one side and the American on
the other.-I have done all in my power to check this
growing evil, but when it is considered that this Plaister on
the British side brings only 4$ the ton, it is worth 8$ in our

waters and when it is seen this District has in it men of
enterprise in pursuit of gain, and well versed in eluding the
officers of the Custom House, add to this, there now in this
place not less by estimation than one hundred Merchants
from New York and other places, after Plaister to lade their
vessels I fear it will be impossible to check the unlawhl
intercourse while the Plaister is freely admitted into all the
ports westward except yours.37
The problem was not so much the plaster itself, but that smugglers hid British
manufactured goods underneath the plaster to introduce them into the forbidden
American market. Newspapers lampooned merchant tailors, dry-goods merchants, from
Baltimore, Philadelphia, and New York rushing off to Boston where they claimed to buy
plaster, when in fact they were buying smuggled goods.38 This trade was entirely in
violation of the American non-intercourse laws that forbade all British and colonial goods
and produce from entering the United States, both the plaster and the dry goods. By
1811, Secretary of the Treasury Albert Gallatin issued a circular to all customs collectors
in the nation warning them to be especially vigilant when dealing with vessels from
Passamaquoddy, and even more so with those carrying plaster.39
During 1812, Trescott seized a staggering 2,684 tons of plaster on beaches,
wharves, and on board vessels at Passamaquoddy (see Appendix C). The problem
continued even after the declaration of war in late June. Col. George Ulrner found that
I soon found that a system was adopted by the citizens to
smuggle by ruse and with the knowledge of the Custom
House officers. A Quantity of Plaister Paris would be
landed by a British vessel in the night upon the American
shore, the Collector is informed of it, seizes it, the owner
call it four times what it is, appraisers are appointed to
appraise it, that it may be bonded and generally appraised
at a quarter of what it is worth, and so with every article
they judge upon.- A vessel comes in from the westward,
loaded with provisions, but enters twenty or thirty tons of
Plaister, and clears the same. Immediately after she enters,

heaves up her anchor and drifts to the British side, there
sells and takes a load of Plaister and English goods, &
proceeds to the ~ e s t w a r d . ~ '
Plaster was thus intimately linked with smuggling from the trade's inception through the
War of 1812. Prior to 1817, both the American and colonial govemments failed to
control the plaster trade. Accustomed to the use of a "neutral zone," official corruption,
and popular support, the plaster trade continued unabated at Passanlaquoddy.

New Brunswick's Plaster Law
There were several problems with the plaster trade for colonial administrators and
those with an interest in economic development. First, the plaster trade produced no
revenue for the colonial government. Outgoing products seldom had to pay an export fee
in mercantilist political economy; the idea was that exports would either be exchanged
for specie, or less ideally, foreign goods taxed at the customhouse on arrival.
Unfortunately the plaster trade does not seem to have produced much specie payment.
Instead plaster was traded for goods, such as American flour and provisions, tobacco,
rum, naval stores, or goods imported to North America in American bottoms, such as tea
'
goods entered the Maritime Provinces clandestinely without
and m ~ l a s s e s . ~These
paying imperial duties. The customs officer at Windsor, Nova Scotia, one of the great
centers of gypsum smuggling, collected a mere eighteen shillings and ten pence in duties
on imported goods between 1816 and 18 19.42
The Plaster War was partly the result of provincial govemments attempting to
assert their authority in new ways. Obviously the plaster traders resented this, but so did
imperial customs officers who fiercely defended their sinecures. New Brunswick's

Council and Nova Scotia's Legislative Assembly launched investigations into
customhouse corruption in 1820. The investigations produced some startling results. For
example, Windsor, Nova Scotia, may have produced only eighteen shillings in revenue
for the crown between 18 16 and 18 19, but it produced an estimated £3,000 in fees that
went directly into customs officials' pockets in the same time.43 Customs officers thus
opposed regulating the plaster trade, a fact that was to embarrass Stephen Humbert time
and again during the Plaster War.
The second problem with the plaster trade was that the profits in temx of
eighteenth-century political economy were squandered on small producers. The
merchants of Saint John wanted to control the plaster trade to capture its profits. This
would not only provide the modest profits offered by the gypsum itself, but the more
alluring gain from the carrying trade as well. There lay yet another allure to the gypsum
trade; if the Saint John merchants controlled the plaster trade, the immense traffic in
American goods, especially provisions, would be stripped from the plastermen and
placed in their hands. Saint John would become the marketplace for the entire Bay of
Fundy, concentrating wealth and mercantile power in the hands of the great merchants at
the expense of self-sufficient independent producers.44 For many years before 1820 Saint
John merchants expressed a desire to control the plaster trade through legislation. This
legislation attempted to forbid carrying plaster to any American ports east of either
Boston or Portland, thereby restricting the trade to the larger vessels only Saint John
merchants could afford to build, maintain, man, and insure.45 The plaster war was thus
truly a battle over the means of production, not just involving the vague economic forces
described in the works of Sager and Panting, but using fists, muskets, and cannon.

The third problem with the plaster trade was a perception that it induced
otherwise loyal provincials to conduct themselves in "the manners of sentiments of
modem

democrat^."^^

Even after the War of 1812, New Brunswick officials constantly

fretted over the "Americanization" of Charlotte

Smuggling, trading as one

wanted without regard for the state, was feared as a harbinger of egalitarian politics by
the political and economic leaders of New Brunswick and Nova Scotia-except,
apparently, when they engaged in it themselves, which was frequently.48 Plaster
smugglers certainly were not afraid to flaunt the authority of political appointees, as
Stephen Humbert found out to his dismay in 1820. In 1817, plastermen at St. Andrews,
New Brunswick, overwhelmed an official who attempted to interfere with their
smuggling. The hapless official not only had his boat taken from him, but it was
pointedly used to smuggle plaster as

Even the Royal Navy was not free from this

abuse.50 The plaster trade undoubtedly did undermine respect for authority; by 1820
Crown customs officers in Passamaquoddy seem to have given up attempting to regulate
the plaster trade, instead accepting the trade in order to skim off small fees for their own
enrichment.
Government and mercantile interests thus joined to curb the illicit plaster trade in
the name of good government and greater profits, using worries over provincial identity
and loyalty as a further excuse to implement the plaster laws. Stephen Humbert, a minor
government official, Saint John merchant, and loyalist is thus highly representative of the
sort of people concerned with controlling the plaster trade. Were he successful, Humbert
had a great deal to gain from New Brunswick plaster regulations.

Humbert's Dilemma Begins
Stephen Humbert's problems began even before he left for Passamaquoddy. New
Brunswick's Lt. Governor charged Humbert with enforcing a new set of laws passed by
the provincial assembly that regulated the plaster trade at Passamaquoddy, a commerce
that was well known to encouraging smuggling fiom the United States into the
province." New Brunswick's 1820 plaster law appointed a "preventative officer" with
wide powers to control this trade, especially as it existed in Charlotte County, which
abutted the border with Maine in the United States. Humbert accepted his appointment
as the provincial preventative officer, had his son John appointed as his deputy, and
converted his forty-ton vessel into a government cutter by hoisting a distinctive red
burgee with the word "preventative" stitched on it.52 Yet even before Humbert set sail
for Passamaquoddy, plaster smugglers had seriously embarrassed him by kidnapping his
son and assistant John.
The kidnapping was not a plot against Hunlbert, but it was a painful experience
nonetheless. The incident began innocently enough; in a spate of dirty weather a Nova
Scotia schooner loaded with plaster (or a "plasterman," a term describing both the vessels
and the individuals engaged in the plaster trade), took refuge within Partridge Island in
the outer reaches of Saint John harbor after having lost its rudder. Hunlbert and his son
boarded the schooner to ensure its compliance with the new plaster law, The master
however refused to cooperate by providing his ship's papers, and the preventative
officers managed to take the vessel into custody only after some resistance.

Humbert acted well within the law when he seized the schooner, which turned out
to be the Mary, a forty-ton coasting schooner from Windsor, Nova Scotia, a community
notorious for its smuggling. The schooner's captain violated three legal requirements of
provincial and British law. First, the vessel's master refused to present his papers as
required by New Brunswick's plaster law. Second, the vessel's name did not appear on
its stem as British navigation law required. Third, the master had actually lied about his
intentions to report to the preventative office and attempted to escape by sailing out of the
harbor. Hurnbert placed his son John on board with orders to secure the Mary by
remaining on board with another guard. The elder Humbert then set sail for
Passamaquoddy to attend to other duties. That same night, the plaster smugglers
overwheln~edJohn and the other guard, and escaped from Saint John with the
preventative officers as their prisoners. The smugglers inflicted no further violence on
the two officials, instead choosing a practical and effective alternative. They dumped
John Humbert and his assistant on the shores of Nova Scotia, some twenty miles below
Annapolis. Out of their jurisdiction, lost and without nearby help, the preventative
officers had to begin the long and embarrassing process of finding their way home.53
The kidnapping of Humbert's son was but the first of a series of embarrassments
for the preventative officer. Even as Hurnbert's son landed on a bleak shore in another
province, the elder Hurnbert faced peril in his own duties. Within minutes of anchoring
his vessel with its distinctive flag in Passamaquoddy Bay, a sailor on a nearby plastern~an
fired a musket at Humbert's craft. The shot missed, but naturally it alarnled Hurnbert, in
no small part because he apparently was not armed himself. Furthermore, the plastern~an
lay in American waters, outside of Humbert's jurisdiction. An inforn~antsoon told

Humbert why the shot was fired. The captain of the plasterman Shannon, James
McArthur, challenged his crew to fire at the preventative vessel, promising to "treat one
of his men [give him a drink] if he would fire at that D . . .D flag." McArthur then
boasted of his act in front of several witnesses in the local customs office, including the
area's deputy customs officer (who notably was not the informer who told Humbert what
tran~~ired).'~
Faced with violent resistance, Humbert acted with prudence. Instead of creating
an international incident by entering American waters, Humbert bided his time, waiting
until McArthur re-entered New Brunswick waters a few days later and seizing the
Shannon off Head Harbor. McArthur was not prepared to give up so easily. He refused
to show his ship's papers, and would not give up the Shannon 's tiller. McArthur and
Humbert scuffled briefly for control of the helm; the plasterman retained control of the
helm, but steered for Humbert's office at Indian Island, possibly at gunpoint.5' Humbert
secured the vessel at the customs wharf on Indian Island, seizing the vessel for violations
of New Brunswick's plaster law. But the law left McArthur free to do as he pleased; the
law only provided that the Shannon be arrested, and so McArthur borrowed the deputy
collector's boat and went to Eastport, Maine, in the United States to seek help.
McArthur soon returned, leading about fifteen men from Eastport with the
intention of repossessing the Shannon. McArthur had a pistol in his coat, as did the men
accompanying him. Hunlbert was well prepared; he had a local constable with him, and
had hired and anned extra men to back up his crew of four. Hard words followed; the
constable stepped forward to arrest McArthur, who drew his pistol and fled to the cabin
of the Shannon. McArthur's confederates engaged in more hard words, but balked at

initiating violence, and eventually returned to Eastport. McArthur in the meanwhile was
cornered in the Shannon's cabin. A man pointed a musket down the scuttle and said:
"you damned rascal come up." Finally Humbert's men beat in the cabin door and
arrested McArthur. McArthur somehow escaped the constable, and fled for the shelter of
Eastport.
McArthur, who was nothing if persistent, continued to make trouble for Humbert
from the safety of Eastport. First, he immediately lodged a legal complaint against
Humbert with a New Brunswick justice of the peace. The justice was David Owen, the
proprietor of Campobello. Owen's sympathies lay with the plaster smugglers, for he
hoped that the plaster trade would bring prosperity to him at last. Furthermore, Owen
had a long-standing grudge with the colony's loyalist elite, and this opportunity permitted
him to strike back. Owen hrther complicated matters by sending a copy of McArthur's
protest to imperial officials in London.
Bolstered by Owen's support, McArthur then again recruited armed confederates
to rescue his vessel from Humbert, hoping to ambush the preventative men as they
escorted the Shannon to Saint John for adjudication. Another informer told Humbert
what to expect; the preventative officer responded by hiring ten extra men, placing two
small cannon on his own vessel, loading them with twice the usual shot and ammunition,
and armed his men with a motley assortment of other weapons. Humbert managed to
avoid direct conflict by sailing through a dangerous and little-used channel, and arrived at
Saint John the next day. On arrival Humbert made a hasty report to the provincial
attorney general before taking the next steamboat to Fredericton to make a report in
person to the Lieutenant

overn nor.'^

Humbert's Dilemma Continues

Humbert's hasty retreat to the provincial capital seems to have yielded some
results, although strictly speaking not those he desired. What Humbert initially sought
d ~ . ~he
~ received instead
was the deployment of British soldiers to ~ a s s a m a ~ u o d What
was a promise to ask the British naval commander at Halifax for a vessel to patrol
Passamaquoddy, and a promise from the Lieutenant Governor and Attorney General to
investigate into the conduct of the customs officers who were actively hindering him.
Humbert returned to Saint John and recruited additional men for his own cutter, and set
sail for Passamaquoddy once again at the end of June.
Humbert's efforts at Fredericton produced few results. The sloop of war HMS
Bellette did indeed arrive at Passamaquoddy to assist him, but the vessel's commander
did not seem inclined to take much interest in his mission, and spent only a few days at
Campobello, where most plaster vessels unloaded into American ships.58 Attorney
General Thomas Wetmore's investigation into the conduct of the customhouse officers
yielded no results. Henry Wright, the province's top-ranked customs officer, stood
behind the conduct of Robert Annstrong, the deputy collector at Indian Island, who also
happened to be his son-in-law.59 Humbert was essentially on his own; the inaction of the
Bellette, the opposition actively fostered by the customs officer on Indian Island, growing
opposition in the provincial press, and his inadequate force only served to encourage the
plastermen.60

The plastermen's resistance increased as the summer passed. Humbert made a
few seizures, but fog hampered both himself and the plastermen; there simply was not
much traffic on the water due to lack of visibility and light winds. Drier weather in
August brought shipping back. Humbert attempted to intercept vessels, but found it
impossible in the face of armed resistance. When Humbert approached suspected plaster
vessels, the crews appeared on deck brandishing muskets to keep him away. On occasion
Hunlbert found boats full of men pursuing him, and he reported that all the plaster vessels
had anned themselves, some with cannon, an act he considered "open ~ebellion."~'
The scale of the violence was not insignificant. It ranged from epithets to bullets
and hurled rocks. When Humbert approached the forty-odd plaster vessels off Lubec in
mid August, crewmen from seven or eight of the smuggling craft opened fire with
muskets, forcing him to anchor. The following day Humbert spied two plaster vessels
approaching Lubec through the difficult westem channel. He pursued in an open
rowboat, forcing one of the smugglers aground on the American shore, and boarding the
other just a few feet off shore. A crowd of about sixty Americans in sympathy with the
smugglers mustered on shore and combined with the plastermen to force Humbert off the
smuggling craft. Using axes, handspikes, fish shovels (which look a great deal like a
hayfork), and throwing stones, the crowd forced Humbert to retreat after one of the
rioters stabbed one of his men in the arm with a fish shovel. Fearing more gunplay,
Humbert returned to his cutter and retreated to Indian Island. The next day Humbert
watched while ten plaster vessels sailed from Lubec, lashed together in one enomlous
raft. Not possessing force sufficient to take on the combined crews, Humbert had to
content himself with picking off a straggler. The day after that, another raft of nine brigs

and schooners sailed unopposed. Humbert returned to Saint John despondent,
complaining about the lack of support he received from the captain of Bellette and the
active interference he received from the customs officer on Indian Island. He requested
that either the governor give him the support he required, or release him from his duties.62
On his arrival at Saint John he reported to Lt. Governor Smyth that the plastemen were
"in a state of actual and unqualified Rebellion against His Majesty's Government of this
Province," and requested a military force to quell the opposition to the plaster laws.63

The Plastermen
Who were these rebels who so brazenly defied the plaster regulations? Most of
the plastemen were from the Fundy shore of Nova Scotia, especially from communities
on the shores of Minas Basin, such as Cornwallis, Falmouth, and

or ton.^^

Many were

"planters," New Englanders who settled in Nova Scotia in the wake of the Acadian
expulsion, or, more likely by 1820, their

descendent^.^'

Crown officials had some idea of whom they were dealing with. The Halifax
customs collector had his own opinions about who and what these plastermen were. To
him they were an "unprincipled multitude" engaged in a "lawless intercourse" that drew
together a "banditti" from both the British provinces and the United States at
Passarnaquoddy. The collector declared the plaster trade "ruinous to the fair trader, &
destructive of the interests & morals of the inhabitants." The collector seemed to accept
that the plastermen attempted to terrorize the sub-collector at Windsor; what shocked him
was that the plastemen attacked the customhouse by petitioning the Assembly, and even
voted for representatives based on their hostility to the customs e~tablishment.'~

The collector was not alone in condemning Hants County's Planter population.
Members of the mercantile and religious elite also criticized the plastermen. Merchants
bridled at the thought of countrymen engaged in commerce, and consistently argued that
the plasternlen were ruining themselves by speculating in plaster and neglecting their
farms. Some plastermen mortgaged their homes to buy vessels to transport gypsum to
Passamaquoddy, and ended up in debtor's prison when their venture failed.67 When the
plastermen smuggled in West India, East India, and American goods on their return
voyage from Passamaquoddy, they also threatened the profits of the "fair trader" who
obeyed the law because the untaxed smuggled goods were cheaper. An additional threat
posed by the plaster trade was that the repeated violation of the laws introduced moral
depravity, and trade with Americans infected the plastermen with "Yankee principles."
Merchants wanted the plastermen to stay on their farms, and leave mercantile pursuits to
those who knew them best.68
The Anglican religious establishment also viewed the plastermen with suspicion.
The Minas Basin region was also the core of the radical evangelical movement; Henry
Alline himself, Nova Scotia's most famous religious dissenter came from that area.69
The religious fervor of Nova Scotia's Yankees challenged the ability of the colony's elite
to impose British and Anglican senses of order, creating a new conception of the bonds
linking individuals, families and communities together.70 Radical evangelicals had little
use for government, no sense of civic humanism, and possessed an assertive individuality
that dispensed with the deference required in a British-ordered society.71

Little wonder then that the colonial elites regarded Planters with suspicion, or that
plastermen had little use for authority figures. But plaster smuggling was not primarily a
means of social protest, but a means of survival for small producers. The state of Nova
Scotia agriculture before 1820 was not good in terms of practices or productivity, a
condition compounded by extremely bad weather patterns after 18 15. Acquiring a
modest "competency" as an independent yeoman farmer required diversification,
including engaging in wage labor.72 Self sufficiency was a common dream for Maritime
farmers, but self help was probably a better description of how ordinary people survived
in pre-industrial Nova Scotia.
The economic concerns of the plastermen were not the same as the paternalists,
who sought gain to reinforce social hierarchy, or that of the capitalists who viewed the
world in terms of profit.73 The plastemlen defied the political economies of mercantilism

- in its death throes by 1820 - by trading outside of the closed loop of colonialmetropolitan trade. The plastermen clearly sought out a profitable trading relationship
when they smuggled, but they did not follow the economic liberalism of Adam Smith that
depersonalized and demoralized economic relationships. Famlers viewed the chubby
coasting craft they built to carry gypsunl as a vital aspect of maintaining their
independence and local economy, whereas merchants viewed their ships as capital, a
source of profit that had little to with community values.74 The plastermen, on the other
hand, believed that since they produced the plaster they should be the direct beneficiaries
of the gypsum trade, and claimed freedom from the unpopular Plaster A C ~ . ~ '
Luckily for the plastermen, they had allies in their struggle against the dominance
of the Saint John merchants, including the inhabitants of Charlotte County, New

Brunswick, Crown customs officers in New Brunswick, and American merchants in
Lubec and Eastport. These allies actively supported the plastermen, adding their numbers
to the crowds that defied Humbert and interfering with the preventative officer's abilities
to enforce the plaster law.
Charlotte County's Loyalist population profited from the plaster trade, too, and
had no desire to see the trade fall into the hands of the Saint John merchants. Wealthy St.
Andrews plaster merchants such as Harris Hatch were community boosters who wanted
to make their port community a major competitor with Saint John. The plaster merchants
of St. Andrews had fought their own plaster war in 1817, overwhelming provincial
officials and the Royal Navy vessel dispatched to suppress smuggling through crowd
~ proprietor of
violence on an only slightly smaller scale than that used in 1 8 2 0 . ~The
Campobello Island, as previously considered, also supported the plastern~en,and soundly
cursed the Saint John merchants who thwarted hls ambitions.77 Men of substance were
just as likely to smuggle as poor ones, and the "crowd" often found allies among the
powerful. Men like Hatch and Owen wanted to prosper, but were motivated by an older
paternalist vision that resented and resisted the new market forces of capitalism.78
A more surprising ally of the plaster smugglers were the New Brunswick customs
officers, the very officials dedicated to stopping smuggling. But the province's customs
officers only concerned themselves with imperial statutes, and did not feel bound to
enforce provincial laws, such as the Plaster Act. Furthermore, New Brunswick's top
customs officers were fending off a provincial investigation into customhouse fraud and
corruption in 1820, and thus were not inclined to assist Humbert's efforts.79 The customs
officer at Passamaquoddy, Richard Armstrong, resented the provincial inquiry into his

conduct and profited fiom the plaster trade by collecting a small fee fiom plaster vessels
that entered his jurisdiction. The plastermen gladly paid this fee because it gave their
activities a veil of legitimacy. Armstrong's office on Indian Island was commonly
crowded with the masters of plaster vessels, who even boasted there about their defiance
of the plaster law. Armstrong also warned plastermen when Humbert arrived in the bay,
on occasion lent his boat to the plaster smugglers, and wrote venomous reports about the
preventative officer, accusing him of "timidity and incapacity."80
The American merchants and others engaged in the plaster trade at
Passamaquoddy also aided and abetted the plastennen. Eastport and Lubec residents
several times displayed a willingness to cross the boundary line with the intent of
inflicting violence on the preventative officer, arming themselves with fish shovels,
pistols, and even cannon. Plastermen sought out and received shelter on the American
side of the border, within sight of Humbert but outside of his jurisdiction.
The American residents of Passamaquoddy also effectively prevented United
States customs officers from assisting the preventative officer. The United States
customs collector at Lubec had promised Humbert that he would not allow plaster vessels
to enter American waters, and deployed the local revenue cutter to keep provincial
shipping in British waters. As a result the American populace tunled on the collector and
the crew of the U.S. revenue cutter. The local American newspaper published angry
letters about the collector, and even printed an advertisement posting a reward for the
capture of the revenue cutter's crew, who were described as pirates and desperadoes.
During the American collector's frequent absences, his subordinates ignored the
plastermen and permitted the illicit trade to continue ~nhindered.~'

Yankees may have allied themselves with the plastermen, but did that mean that
the Planter population of Hants County was infected with a leveling American ideology
that threatened the colonial social hierarchy? Given their resounding rejection of the
American Revolution, alliance with Charlotte County loyalists and New Brunswick's
custom house officers, there can be no grounds for supposing that the plasternlen were
son~ehowbecoming political radicals. When plastermen took up arms to defend their
illicit trade they did not adopt a political ideology or a corpus of anti-capitalist beliefs, but
rather utilized pragmatic tactics that answered their immediate needs.82 This rejection of
state authority, reflected in their evangelical religion, was the result of the very localized
worldview of a people hlly engaged in the struggle to achieve an independent
competency that provided subsistence for their families.

Conclusion
Humbert returned to Passamaquoddy one last time to try to stop the plastermen.
In late September 1820, he returned to Indian Island and awaited the arrival of HMS
Bellette, which now had strict orders to support Humbert. Most of the plaster vessels lay
within admittedly American waters close to Lubec, Maine, but in one of his few victories,
Humbert had secured the promise of the American customs collector not to interfere
when Humbert boarded provincial vessels, even if they were in United States waters.83
On September 29, Humbert seized one of the smuggling craft for violating the plaster
law, and anchored it under the stern of Bellette to prevent any rescue attempts by the
plastennen. The next day the plasterrnen were prepared to resist, anchoring as close as
possible to the American shore at Lubec. There the smugglers landed a cannon, stacking

bars of pig iron next to it for shot to defend their fleet of twenty-odd craft. Undeterred,
and supported by two boats from Bellette's, Humbert boarded a small plaster vessel. The
smugglers acted not by opening fire with their cannon, but used an infinitely more subtle,
acceptable, and effective means of resistance. The smugglers, knowing that Humbert
acted out of his jurisdiction when he seized the vessel the day before, had an American
magistrate issue a warrant for his arrest. As Humbert attempted to seize another
plasterman in Lubec harbor, a boat with a magistrate and a deputy sheriff put off from
shore with the intent of arresting the preventative officer and putting him in the jail in
Machias, Maine. Humbert retreated to British waters to guard the vessel anchored near
Bellette, but perceiving that the plastermen were going to attempt to rescue it, took shelter
on the warship. The captain of Bellette mounted a cannon on his poop deck aimed at the
captured smuggler and placed an armed guard to watch the craft.
By four o'clock the next morning, the plaster smugglers successfully spirited
away the guarded vessel. Compounding Humbert's difficulties, Bellette's commander
informed him that the warship was getting under way for Halifax, and would not return
that year. Bellette sailed at ten a.m.; the vessel was hardly out of sight at noon when
three boatloads of plastermen came to Indian Island and took by force a suit of sails
Humbert had seized from another plaster vessel. The preventative officer lacked the
force to stop them, both in terms of numbers and armament. Fearing that a mob would
destroy his boat and cutter, Humbert sent them back to Saint John, but remained on
Indian Island a few days more before returning to report his complete defeat at the hands

of the plaster smugglers.84 As a final humiliation, plastennen entered fabricated
complaints at the Indian Island customhouse against Humbert for smuggling American
foodstuffs into the province.85
Humbert's defeat was also a defeat for Saint John merchants, as the plaster trade
continued to elude their grasp. The means of production in this case remained in the
hands of independent small producers. The plaster smugglers continued their old ways
long enough to enter Canadian lore through Haliburton's Sam Slick tales, but the trade's
profits declined as American farmers found domestic sources of gypsum, or moved west
to more fertile regions.86 The plastermen also pursued an aggressive political agenda,
electing fellow plaster traders such as Richard Cunningham of Windsor to the Nova
Scotia Assembly where he busied himself defending the plaster trade. A number of
petitions by the plastennen to the Nova Scotia Assembly pressured the New Brunswick
The
' Plaster Act forced plastern~ento engage in
Assembly to reconsider the Plaster A C ~ . ~
the provincial politics they had previously shunned. Accusations of the plastermen's
"Yankee tendencies" appear to be the hyperbole of a colonial leadership still traumatized
by the American Revolution. Far from indicating Planter disloyalty, the plaster trade
forced them into engaging with the provincial government on a political rather than an
antagonistic level.
Few of the Saint John merchants seem to have suffered by their defeat in the
Plaster War, they quickly moved on to concentrate their abilities on the already profitable
timber and shipbuilding trades, and eventually succeeded in becoming the marketplace
~ .New
~ ~Brunswick Assembly reacted to Humbert's defeat
for all the Bay of ~ u n d The

by quietly repealing Plaster Act early in 182 1. After 1820, the Assembly concentrated its
energies on preserving the privileged status of New Brunswick timber within British
markets and continued its assault on customhouse fees.
The Plaster War shows that the road to Canadian capitalism was a rocky one.
Small producers on the resource frontier actively sometimes resisted the attempts of large
merchants to make them economically subordinate, and sometimes the small producers
won their battles. The plastermen did not challenge the entire system of provincial
property and power. Instead, they attacked only those specific aspects that aggravated
them, suggesting that their crowd protest was really a function of moral economy, rather
than a revolutionary m~vement.'~These contests were not only political, or economic,
but violent physical confrontations in which the small producers displayed unity, bravery
and intelligence to overwhelm a seemingly formidable state apparatus.
On a regional level, the Plaster War is an example of how locals accommodated
and supported others who were combating regulation. Passamaquoddy was truly a
smuggler's haven. Not only did locals tolerate illicit trade, they turned out in crowd
actions to defend it, grabbing whatever weapons were on hand. Shouts, fists, tools, and
even cannon made clear where the sympathies of borderlands residents lay. They may
have been eager to accommodate one another's needs, but when pushed they were fully
capable of joining together against state intervention into their lives.
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CONCLUSION:
THE MEMORY OF SMUGGLING

'Squire Weston's History
In common with other New England communities in the second quarter of the
nineteenth century, one of Eastport's civic leaders wrote and published a history of the
community in 1834. Jonathan Delesdemier Weston, the community's leading attorney,
composed a sweeping history that included native Americans, French explorers, Acadian
settlers, the Revolutionary War, the War of 1812, and of course infomlation on Eastport's
founders. Weston was undoubtedly an excellent choice to write Eastport's history. As a
lawyer, Harvard graduate, and member of the Maine Historical Society, Weston
understood that the statements he made at the Lyceum would shape local consciousness
for a long time.' Weston was also deeply involved with the conlmunity's early years
himself, as one of its first attorneys, magistrate, sometimes legislative representative, and
assistant in gathering depositions for the border commission that convened to adjust the
border between New Brunswick and the United States after the War of 1812.
Unfortunately for Weston, whose health was failing, he was unable to present his history
personally. Instead, he arranged to have his son deliver his history in two lectures at the
Eastport Lyceum in April 1834, and it was published shortly before he died on October 3,
1834.2

The Lyceum itself was located in Trescott Hall, a public venue named in honor of
one of Weston's deceased friends and a fellow local worthy, Lemuel Trescott. The
Lyceum's mission was to educate the people of Eastport, especially those young men who
were to be the next generation of leaders. Weston praised this institution as an asset that
diffused information and created "a taste for reading in the community."3 The pamphlets
and books they read at the Lyceum connected the Passamaquoddy region to the world,
and above all to the American urban centers that published them, allowing the readers to
absorb current ideas.4
Not surprisingly, when addressing the pre-War of 1812 period, when Eastport was
a leading smuggling haven in North America, Weston began to stray from a strictly
truthful interpretation of events. Indeed, conceded Weston, there had been smuggling on
a large scale, but it was conducted mostly by adventurers from outside the con~munity
who introduced vicious habits to the community, which suffered thereby in terms of

moral^.^

While he admitted that there were smuggling problems during the embargo and

War of 1812, he made no mention of the "Plaster War," nor the rampant smuggling of the
1820s and 1830s. Weston seems on the surface to have been a man of upstanding morals
himself; a community leader, owner of pews in both the Baptist and the Congregationalist
churches in town, a man trusted and esteemed by nearly all in the community. Given
Weston's credentials and the Lyceum's mission, it is little wonder that he blamed
smuggling on strangers and discouraged the local youth from taking part in illicit trade.
Judge Weston's moral faqade, just like his defense of Eastport's populace, is
decidedly thin in spots. He may never have been an active smuggler, but he clearly
expedited smuggling in Eastport. Evidence includes Weston's 1814 commission as the

vice-consular agent to Sweden at Eastport, which places him at the center of the
questionable "neutral trade" that masked smuggling during the war.6 During the war,
Weston defended himself from accusations that he actively collaborated with the British
occupation forces.' In November 1830, he was involved in a strange incident whereby
one Thomas Bibber took by force a boat that had previously been seized from him by
customs authorities. The new owners of the boat took it to Eastport one day, where
Bibber saw it and wrested it from the new owner, one Captain Hook of the British 34th
Regiment. Bibber then dragged the boat up the streets of Eastport, assisted by a yoke of
oxen and numerous locals, while a crowd assembled to enjoy Hook's discomfort. Capt.
Hook looked to Eastport's assistant customs collector for assistance in getting back his
boat. However, that official was Jonathan D. Weston, who also served as Bibber's
attorney and had advised him to seize the boat. Weston offered no support to the hapless
British officer. Eastport's magistrates also proved no help; they insisted that Bibber's
actions were justifiable. Hook had to find his own way back to Saint ~ n d r e w s . ~
More ironic yet is that Trescott Hall was named after another leading Eastport
resident who expedited smuggling, Lemuel Trescott. Trescott died in possession
fantastic wealth for that time and place: $31,279.30, no small proportion of it in cash.9
Thus we have Weston twisting the facts about Eastport's smuggling past, in a building
constructed in the memory of a corrupt customs officer, to an audience that undoubtedly
knew a thing or two about smuggling on a first-hand basis.

Smuggling after 1820
Smuggling was becoming more brazen and more violent in the 1820s and 1830s,
especially in New Brunswick. In 1822, two smugglers badly beat a customhouse officer
at Saint John. Later that year there was a gun battle between smugglers and the
provincial revenue cutter in the Bay of Fundy that reportedly resulted in several deaths.''
The following year there was more violent resistance, and troops from the 74thRegiment
had to defend customhouse authorities from a crowd armed with boathooks and
bludgeons." In August 1824, an American captain forced the crew of the provincial
revenue cutter to leap back into their boat from his vessel, which they had attempted to
seize.12 Timber smuggling continued at Saint Andrews; one English timber ship escaped
a vigilant customs officer in October 1824, only after pointing a loaded gun at him. The
captain apologized for the use of force, but explained that he had to because he feared the
power of the Saint Andrews merchants engaged in the trade.13 In 1827, an American
captain struck a customhouse officer on a wharf in Saint John after "damning the
Custon~sand the laws."14
Particularly striking are the number of crowd actions involving smugglers
disguised as Indians in the l83Os, especially in the Calais-St. Stephen area. In January
1830, New Brunswick customs authorities seized some American contraband in a barn in
St. Stephen. While transporting the goods to a secure warehouse, about twenty-five
armed men, disguised as Indians with blacked faces, red shirts over their clothes, and
black hats with feathers in them, attacked the officials and carried the goods across the
Milltown bridge to American territory. In mid-December 1830, about twenty armed men

disguised as Indians broke into a St. Stephen store that contained contraband seized by
New Brunswick customs officials, and carried it across the river to ca1ais.l' In 1832,
another crowd disguised as Indians rescued contraband goods from colonial customhouse
officers and brought them to the American side of the border.16 However, these
"Indians" did not just attack colonial customs officers. In July 1837, about forty men
dressed as Indians seized two American customs officials at Calais, and took them across
the border into New Brunswick in a wagon. As the wagon wheels rolled, one of the
"Indians" sharpened his bayonet on it to intimidate the officers." When they reached the
woods they terrorized the officials, demanding to know the identity of an informant.
They also threatened to burn down the house of one of the customhouse officers.'* As
late as 1846, armed smugglers at St. George's chased away at gunpoint an overly curious
customs ~ f f i c e r . ' ~
The disguises are themselves significant. Alan Taylor, in his study of squatters on
the Maine frontier, found that the disguises not only assured anonymity, but also
provided a sort of theater that terrified the intended victims.20 While by 1830 this sort of
theatrical protest had largely been abandoned by pioneering squatters, borderland
smugglers picked it up in the Calais-St. Stephen area.21 They may well have been
influenced by the mid-Maine squatter protests; many American settlers in Charlotte
County were from the very region where these struggles had been fiercest (see Appendix
D). Notably, these smuggling Indians practiced the same restraint as the squatter Indians,
frequently threatening violence, but seldom acting on those threats.22 Reluctance to
engage in killing and the use of disguises marks these smugglers as "social bandits": selfhelp activists acting with the approval of the community in breaking the law in accord

with traditional values that were at odds with the state.23 The transition to capitalism was
one of the factors that encouraged social banditry.24 At Passamaquoddy, the smugglers
effectively defended their "right" to trade across the border, and consistently intimidated
those who opposed them. Informers were treated harshly; one man went so far as to
publish a statement - sworn to by revenue cutter and customhouse officers - that he was
not the infornler in one seizure.25
The plastermen, too, continued their smuggling and their violent defense of that
trade. On August 8, 1833, New Brunswick customs officers seized the Nova Scotia
plasterman schooner Shannon in the waters between Canlpobello and Eastport. The
stated reason for the seizure was that the vessel had cleared for a return voyage to Nova
Scotia in ballast without a cargo, but revenue officers discovered a cargo of contraband
American goods onboard consisting of tea and gunpowder, and therefore impounded the
vessel. The following day, as the four customhouse officers sailed the Shannon to St.
Andrews for adjudication, one or more boats put off from Eastport, seized the vessel, and
brought it to Union
The community managed to display a remarkable case of collective amnesia
regarding this event. The British vice-consul for the region arranged for a local lawyer to
collect depositions regarding the event. The results of his inquiries varied dramatically
(see Table 10.1). Notably, this investigation was conducted by Jonathan Weston's son,
also an attorney and the man who read his father's history to the audience assembled in
Trescott Hall in April 1834. Yet none of these events found their way into Weston's
history, and undoubtedly he would have become quite unpopular had he actually
expounded upon the scale of smuggling at Passamaquoddy.

Table 10.1: The Shannon Incident, 1833

I

Testimony of New Brunswick
customhouse officials
1. Shannon boarded and seized by 50-60
armed men in three boats
2. Shannon did not enter Eastport harbor
until past 4:00 pm
3. The 50-60 men on board cheered and
fired their guns until anchored
4. A crowd on the wharves in Eastport
abused and insulted them
5. At least 3 or 4 of the armed men were

I Americans

Testimony of American witnesses

( 1. Shannon boarded by one boat with five

I

or six men
2. Shannon anchored in the harbor before
1:00 pm
3. No firing or cheering, and the captors
left the schooner in one small boat
4. Less than a dozen men on the wharf,
and nobody said anything to the captured
officials
5. No American citizens were concerned
directly or indirectly

1

I

Source: Manning, Diplomatic Correspondence, vol. 2: 256.

Memory in a Borderland
Weston's history, including its errors of omission, exemplified a borderland
perspective through its interplay of local and global interests.27 For Weston, born
immediately after the Revolution to a father who had fought in it, but living in a
Jacksonian milieu where nationalism and manifest destiny were becoming increasingly
the order of the day, explaining his community's relationship with the old loyalist foes
offered some difficult challenges. Weston overcame these problems by downplaying
conflict. Instead he concentrated on a theme sure to please most: the future prosperity of
the community and its recent advances toward that goal. This satisfied locals, who were
eager to have their community's praises sung. It also met national expectations, because
financial success was rapidly becoming a quality Americans attributed to themselves,
especially in the commercial ~ o r t h . ~ *

Weston's history also fit neatly into a wider pattern of community histories
written by local worthies in the early nineteenth century. These works celebrated the
success of communities as building blocks in creating national prosperity. In some
measure, Weston was also healing the wounds of the War of 1812 and the British
occupation of Eastport from 1814 to 1815, when the community as a whole had been
demonized in the national press, especially Nile 's Weekly ~ e ~ i s t eAs
r . early
~ ~ as 1818,
immediately after British troops evacuated Moose Island, its American residents
attempted to redeem the character of the area by addressing the idea that Eastport and
Lubec thrived only because of smuggling. A newspaper article attempted to correct this
idea with a rather wan conclusion: "But this notion is not altogether correct."30 This no
doubt left the readers to conclude on their own that it was not altogether incorrect, either.
More usefully, the article stated, "Near to every boundary line, that is where the fag ends
of two governments meet, there is, and always has been and ever will be that sort of
unshackled traffic; which in Boston, and N. York and Philadelphia would be called
smuggling." The article's author, who may well have been Weston himself, blamed the
region's problems on outsiders, for "whenever there has been a prospect of making
money by an illicit trade, thither speculators and smugglers have straightway resorted, to
the injury of the character of both

frontier^."^'

Weston's history was thus a form of

boosterism, designed to heal the wounds of the past and pave the way for a prosperous
future. Weston selectively created a local identity, and exercised the discretion required
of lawyers such as himself.32

The same principle operated on the New Brunswick side of the border. An
anonymous article published in a Saint John newspaper claimed that Charlotte County's
bbproximityto the American lines, and the uninhabited state of our coast and of the
County generally, render the temptation to smuggle too strong to be easily resisted." The
borderland spirit expedited smuggling. The anonymous author complained, "A British
subject assisting an American to evade the laws of the U. States today; and in his turn
assisted to-morrow by an American," and described how people on both sides of the
border combined in a smuggling trade that brought most of the colony's West India
goods through Passamaquoddy. 33
Lorenzo Sabine, a fellow Eastport resident of Weston's, also wrote history in the
mid-nineteenth century.34 But Sabine was a better scholar and more interested in
examining the conflicts raised by living on the border. Sabine admitted that locals
engaged in smuggling, although he cautioned, "As the world knows, the tales of
smugglers and fishermen are always long and frequently adorned."35 Sabine was also
aware of the many contradictions brought out on the border. As a young clerk to an
Eastport merchant, Sabine had noticed the enthusiasm with which Loyalists smuggled,
and their practice of throwing contraband tea overboard to avoid confiscation of both
cargo and vessel. Sabine thought this practice humorously akin to the Boston Tea Party
of 1 7 7 3 . ~ ~
New Brunswick writers also commemorated and mythologized their past in this
period. In contrast to American ideals of liberty and independence, New Brunswick's
ideology typically extolled the prosperity and order inherent to British colonial society.37
On May 18, 1833, New Brunswickers celebrated the fiftieth anniversary of the first

landing of loyalists at Saint John. Among the speakers were some of the original
loyalists, including Supreme Court Justice Ward Chipman. Chipman had suffered cruelly
during the Revolution and found refuge in New Brunswick after the war. Yet Chipman,
who had sent his own son to Harvard, participated in several border commissions, and
who was accused of engaging in smuggling himself, had a conciliatory message for his
audience that was devoid of anti-~mericanism.~~

In Charlotte County, formal historical consciousness developed much later;
community histories did not appear until after Confederation in 1867. But more casual
inquiries sometimes touched on the smuggling issue. One of the earliest statements made
by a local was in 1835, when an old Loyalist named Peter Clinch wrote that smuggling
was one of the region's major trades, "which some are in the habit of styling
Contraband-but

which we call free trade. Our geographical position exposes us to great

temptations in this respect."39
None of these histories emphasized the differences between American citizens
and colonial subjects. Because Maine and New Brunswick were culturally very similar,
even in terms of religion, then the consciousness of their distinctiveness could easily be
lost. In this sort of milieu, national declarations become changeable, shaped according to
the current state of affairs.40 In some ways a much better place to look for declarations of
ideology is not the allegedly factual community histories, but in the realm of fiction. In
novels and short stories, authors could safely rise above the immediate community's
consciousness and make sweeping declarations with little fear of unpleasant
repercussions. For Passamaquoddy, the fictional adventures of "Sam Slick," a Yankee
clockmaker who frequently traveled to Nova Scotia from his Connecticut home, offers an

intriguing glimpse into how Maritimers felt about the region. Written in 1835, these
stories invariably connected Passamaquoddy with smuggling, and the ruinous temptation
for Nova Scotians to engage in the plaster trade.41
The suppression or absence of nationalistic prejudice is perhaps more
understandable in the Maritimes. These colonies had no or little affiliation to one
another, usually had limited contacts with distant Britain, and were often dominated by
elitist cliques that did their best to control the political, economic, and social agendas.42
In the United States one might to expect a more bombastic attitude, especially during the
heady Jacksonian era, but this does not seem to be the case for Passamaquoddy. In part
this was a result of the War of 1812, during which the British military occupied all of
eastern Maine, thereby muting Yankee pretensions to manifest destiny long after the war
ended. Direct conflict did not arise between Maine and New Brunswick until the late
1830s with the events leading up to the so-called "Aroostook War" of 1 8 3 9 . ~ ~
Selective memory at Passamaquoddy did not lay in the public sphere alone.
Individuals and families twisted events as well. This is best illustrated in the death of
William Newcomb in 1796. Newcomb attempted to rescue a schooner seized for
smuggling by New Brunswick custon~sofficers. On the night of October 2, 1795,
Newcomb and eight to eleven others attempted to take the schooner back from the
authorities, and fired at the men guarding the vessel. The guards "being hard pushed and
fired at with three musquets, were unavoidably obliged to defend themselves," returned
fire and shot Newcomb dead on the vessel's forecastle. A New Brunswick court
subsequently acquitted the guards of murder charges.44 Yet the published Newcomb

family genealogy makes no mention of his death, while faithfully recording its date.45
Clearly someone in the Newcomb family decided that William's violent death was
unseemly, and actively changed the record.

The Transition to Capitalism
While local historians celebrated Passamaquoddy's transition fiom a frontier to a
settled region with modem railroads, steamboats, banks, insurance companies, and other
hallmarks of capitalist enterprise, smuggling continued. How are we to understand the
pre-capitalist rituals of smugglers dressed as Indians with the community's increasing
engagement with a market economy?
The answer seems to be that the agendas of the traditional, pre-market society in
Passamaquoddy fused with those of the aggressive capitalists. Conmunity goals of selfhelp mixed rather easily with capitalistic individualism at Passamaquoddy, in part
because the loser in smuggling was not an individual, but the state. At Passamaquoddy,
crowd actions that defended community values might have taken place on behalf of
capitalist ventures, in contrast to E.P. Thompson's statement that the moral economy was
a continuously regenerating anti-capitalist critique.46 This was particularly noticeable in
the 1833 Shannon incident, in which the entire community either maintained silence or
altered events to stymie customs authorities that interfered with smuggling. Furthermore,
the smugglers who styled themselves "free traders" could also claim to be at the forefront
of early nineteenth-century economic thought, which increasingly insisted on reducing
trade barriers, such as British preferences on New Brunswick timber. However, these
same "fiee traders" were above all pragmatic and self-serving in their approach. Saint

Andrews timber merchants had long benefited from illegally shipping American timber
to Britain while claiming it was from New Brunswick. When these colonial preferences
were endangered, Saint Andrews merchants engaged in boisterous protests that peaked
with the burning of a British member of parliament in effigy and the fiery destruction of a
boat in the harbor.47 Furthermore, when the United States and Britain finally agreed to
open colonial ports to American vessels in 1830, the long sought-after "free trade" and
reciprocity some merchants wanted, it yielded new opportunities to smuggle because
tariffs remained high, especially on manufactured goods. Other merchants, especially
New Brunswick's timber barons, opposed free trade and non-timber based industrial
development.48 Merchants wanted both protection from foreigners at home, and
unrestricted access to foreign markets. When they could not trade honestly, they easily
made the transition to illicit trade, and laborers, fishermen, and others seemed glad to
assist for a cut of the profits. In part, this may have been a result of the occupational
pluralism practiced by borderland residents; they had to weave together a number of
occupations to provide themselves with a living.49 Eventually the call for free trade
overwhelmed the protectionist ideals, culminating in the Reciprocity Treaty of 1854,
which pem~ittednatural products to cross the border duty-free.

In Passamaquoddy the backdrop to both smuggling and the transition to
capitalism was the almost complete failure of the state to control the border. After 1818,
there was usually an American garrison at Fort Sullivan in Eastport and a British garrison
at Fort Tipperary in Saint A n d r e ~ s . ' The
~ British and American navies and revenue
cutters increasingly patrolled the border to suppress smuggling and regulate fisheries, but
with little result, for they could not distinguish colonial fishermen from their American

co~nterparts.~'
The number of customs officers on both sides grew, and in 1821 Saint
Andrews finally became a customs district in its own right, distinct from Saint ~ o h n . ' ~
Yet despite the growth of state intervention, resistance continued. The British, colonial,
and United States governments failed to adequately cope with or control the growing
numbers of impoverished Irish immigrants flooding through the region on their way to
American urban centers, and on occasion unscrupulous shipmasters unceremoniously
dumped entire shiploads of foreigners at Passamaquoddy, and left them to fend for
them~elves.'~Criminals, deserters, and debtors continued to slip across the boundary, as
they did all along the United States-British North American border.54 Moreover,
contraband unrelentingly moved across the border.

In a bigger context, smuggling at Passamaquoddy brings into question statements
that American capitalists operated within a strictly American milieu and spurned British
norms, and that New Brunswickers remained independent of American influences and
clung to purely British markets." American and colonial economies always remained
intertwined, for capitalism tends to ignore borders. From an early date this meant that
American corporations penetrated New Brunswick. One example was the Aetna
Insurance Company, based in Hartford, Connecticut, which advertised in Saint John
newspapers in the 1830s.'~ More troubling for New Brunswick was the neighboring
republic's siren call of prosperity. In the 1850s many young people left for California
and New England cotton mills actively recruited the colony's single women as a cheap
source of labor." The strength of these cross-border flows of commerce, goods, and
people meant that informal, and often illicit, exchanges continued at the border.

Conclusions

Smuggling was an international phenomenon, as the illicit trade at
Passarnaquoddy demonstrates. In part, smuggling was a reaction against changing
regulation and the rising power of the nation-state. The rise of market capitalism
disrupted traditional economies, completely rearranged the social order, and broke down
the trade barriers erected by mercantilist policies. As such, smuggling reflected and
furthered the social upheavals that grew in intensity in the 1830s and 1840s.
The Euro-American settlers who displaced the Native American presence soon
found they had more in common with each other than they had with their respective
metrapoles. Rituals of allegiance continued on both sides of the border, but with some
startling deviations. Calais saluted the Fourth of July with gunpowder borrowed from St.
Stephen's armory; and Calais children insisted on taking a half-day off from school on
Queen Victoria's birthday.58 These popular demonstrations indicate the subtle and
benign power of the borderland attitudes of Passamaquoddy residents.
More alarming were the street rituals of smugglers as they intimidated and
assaulted both colonial and federal customs authorities. The white "Indians" who struck
terror in the hearts of customs officers indicated the disdain, and even contempt, that
borderland peoples felt for the state. This sentiment was common throughout North
America, but on the border, where governing agencies were weak, it further undermined
the already feeble authorities. Furthermore, representatives of state power often
sympathized with the local populace. They often subverted the laws themselves, thus
benefiting the periphery at the expense of the center. The increased politicization of
officeholding in New Brunswick under the guise of "responsible government" and in the

United States as part of "Jacksonian democracy," seems to have worsened the problem.59
It was not until after Canadian Confederation in 1867, and the American Civil War, that
bureaucrats became more professional and detached from local interests.
The borderland population continued to build transborder ties, based on family,
trade, and a shared culture. At times this sentiment was strained, as during the
"Aroostook War," but friendly relations were the norm. Governments at times
unwittingly encouraged cross-border ties, as with the reciprocity agreements of 1830 and
1854, which substantially freed trade from bothersome tariffs. But at other times
governments suddenly attempted to close the border. Meanwhile, the borderland
populace consistently insisted on de-emphasizing the importance of the border; it was the
various governments that frequently changed their policies. This complex set of
borderland attitudes encouraged outsiders, including criminals and economic adventurers,
to come to Passamaquoddy. Conversely, it also attracted state agencies, such as military
units, revenue cutters, and customs officers. The borderland populace developed ways of
dealing with both, essentially rejecting troublemakers and co-opting outsiders' values to
their own advantage. Frequently this meant paying lip-service to the state even as locals
'undermined its local representatives. The smuggling trade reveals the effectiveness of
locals in so doing.
Jefferson's embargo, remembered locally as the "Flour War," was one
manifestation of the local ability to overwhelm and subvert government agencies that
interfered with smuggling. Notably, competing governments undermined their
counterpart's efforts to control the border, as when British imperial and colonial
governments actively worked against Jefferson's embargo. The War of 1812 saw a

repeat of the embargo, but with an even larger military intervention. As occurred during
the embargo, a considerable number of adventurers appeared at Passamaquoddy. Their
often troublesome presence is one indicator that the local views concerning illicit trade
were held by many others in North American society, some of them destined to become
the leading lights of nineteenth-century commerce in both British North America and the
United States. The third conflict, known as the "Plaster War," revisited many of these
themes, but on this occasion colonial smugglers defied British and colonial authorities
and defeated elite Saint John merchants who aspired to economically dominate the
region. Accustomed to operating under the privileges of the mercantilist system, they
found themselves ill-equipped to fight the economic principles of free trade that the
American government advocated. Nor did New Brunswick's merchant community forget
this bitter lesson about American economic power. The result was a deep insecurity
about their reliance on British trade preferences.60 Despite frequent lip-service to British
mercantilism, the size of the American economy and its cheaper foodstuffs forced
colonial businessmen to compromise their principles, even if they had to engage in
smuggling.
Smuggling was thus an ongoing problem at Passamaquoddy, one that is still not
resolved, and may never be so long as a border runs through the region.6' Nor have
borderland attitudes diminished in the region. Native Americans, Mainers, and New
Brunswickers each continue to reassess their relationship with the invisible line through
Passamaquoddy Bay that separates Canada from the United States. Both Canadian and
American governments maintain numerous officials and agencies to control the border
which remains contested around Machias Seal Island. The benefits of capitalism have

proved elusive to the region, which is now an impoverished comer of Maine and New
Brunswick, which are respectively a poor state and province in national contexts.
Poverty and the region's geography have combined to make drug smuggling a common
practice into the twenty-first century. Passamaquoddy residents retain a strong regional
identity that spans the border, assisted by trans-border cultural groups such as the Border
Historical Society, the Quoddy Regional History Board, and the Tides Institute, with its
~ ~ is left to wonder what the smugglers themselves, the
logo "Region ~ a t t e r s . "One
rogues of 'Quoddy, would have made of these formal efforts to institutionalize crossborder bonds.
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APPENDIX A: United States Vessel Tonnage, Passamaquoddy Customs District, 1796-1821
Table Al: Registered, Enrolled, and Other Tonnage at Passamaquoddy.

I

Year

I

Registered
Permanent

Enrolled

I Vessels under 20 tons I Aggregate ( Coasting I

Temporary Permanent Temporary Coasting

Cod
Fishery

Cod
Fishery

I

Year

Registered

Enrolled

Vessels under 20 tons Aggregate Coasting

Cod
Fishery

Cod
Fishery
24.24
433.64
53.84
4,538.20
295.05
162.83
246.69
498.66
3,280.93
1818
99.27
5,142.16 701.62
269.64
82.68
3,461.11
638.06
162.83
1819
527.69
182.71
5,508.10
795.44
119.69
3,586.94
815.32
162.83
319.22
503.90
1820
~~~~~
323.46
5,835.02 774.52
132.20
904.38
351.84
3,348.47
935.15
162.83
1821
Source: American State Papers. Documents, Legislative and Executive, of the Congress of the United States. Class IV: Commerce and
Navigation (Washington, DC : Gales and Seaton, 1 832).
Permanent

Temporary Permanent Temporary Coasting

APPENDIX C: Customs Seizures, 1812-1814
Table C1: Collector Trescott's Schedule
Date Seized
April22, 1812
April22,1812
April24, 1812
April25,1812
April 27, 1812
April 27,1812
April27, 1812
May22, 1812
May 22,1812
May22,1812
May22,1812
June 6,1812
June 11,1812
June 20,1812
June 24,1812
August 12, 1812
August 13,1812
September 1,1812
October 9, 1812
October 28, 1812
November 4,18 12
November 13, 1812
November 25,1812
December 7, 1812

Seized Items
80 tons plaster
74 tons plaster
2 15 tons plaster
80 tons plaster
60 tons plaster
60 tons plaster
200 tons plaster
60 tons plaster
460 tons plaster
125 tons plaster
125 tons plaster
moses boat & 1 hhd. rum
Schooner Experiment & lading
skiff& 4 bales of blankets
125 tons plaster
Sloop Sally of Portland & 84 bbls. flour
78 casks & bales of goods
1,426 grindstones
Sloop Rover, and tackle etc.
300 tons plaster
250 tons plaster
1800 bushels salt
1000 bushels salt
470 tons plaster

Where Seized
Robert Little's wharf
Daniel Swett's beach
S. Rice's beach
Pleasant Point
Bates Island
Dudley Island
S. Rice's Island
Robert Little's wharf
S. Rice's Island
Pleasant Point
Pleasant Point
Schooner Experiment

-

Schooner Cleopatra
Sloop Sally

Sloop Rover
S. Rice's Island
Paul Johnson's wharf

-

Kendal's store
Solomon Rice's Island

Claimant

-

Baker and Chaney
Baker and Chaney
Jabez Mowry
Robert Little
Solomon Rice
Daniel Power
Wm. Woodbury

-

Dan'l Powers

-

S. Tony
Jabez Mowry

-

Isaac Lalunan or C. Cuny
Dana, Wheeler, & Bartlett
Dana, Wheeler, & Bartlett
Rob't Duck
J. Mowry

123 tons plaster
40 tons plaster
46 grindstones, 20 tons plaster
Schooner Success and cargo
Schooner True American and cargo
Sloop Betsey and cargo
12 tons plaster, 102 grindstones
46 grindstones, 20 tons plaster
yawl boat & 1,000 lbs. beef
reach boat & 3 bbls. flour, 5 bbls. apples
43 packages British manufactured goods
94 crates & parcels earthenware
3 bbls sugar
2 "harnpton built boats," 130 bushels salt
40 tons plaster
1 bbl. foreign rum
6 oxen
1 cask "foreign rum,"1 cask coffee
4 oxen
12 oxen
4 oxen
"two mast boat called Black Snake," 1
hhd. molasses
14 oxen
October 20,18 13
1 barrel "foreign rum"
October 30,1813
November 8, 18 13 1 barrel 'Yoreign rum"
November 13,1813 200 tons plaster
December 6,18 13 "reach boat & cargo," 10 bbls. apples
December 16,18 13 "whale boat & cargo," 4 boxes candles,
125 sable skins, 5 otter skins
January 5,1813
January5, 1813
January21,1813
February 11,1813
February 11, 1813
February 11, 1813
March 12,1813
March 29,1813
March 30,1813
March 30,1813
April4,1813
April4,1813
April 7, 1813
April9, 1813
April 24,1813
May 5,1813
August 14,1813
August 27,18 13
September 8, 1813
September 12,1813
September 29, 1813
October 2, 1813

Solomon Rice's Island
Schooner Hazard
Schooner Stork
Schooner Success
Schooner True American
Sloop Betsey
"at or near Egar's beach"
S. Rice's Island

-

Sloop Sally of Freeport

Thomas Wisgate, master
Jonathan Bray, master
Isaac Snow, master
Elisha Blake, master
Ephrairn Tibbets, master
J. Mowry
J. Mowry

-

Gillpatrick

-

-

-

Shackford's Head

Samuel Wheeler

-

Leighton's boat

December 17,1813
December 23, 18 13
January 14, 1814
January 15,1814
January 17,1814
January 19,1814
March 27, 1814
April 13,1814
April 24,1814
May 21,1814
June 2,1814
June 12,1814
June 16, 1814

boat Boxer and cargo
1 hhd. molasses
Schooner ~tlantic'
1 hhd. molasses
190 tons plaster
40 tons plaster
6 boxes tin*
"Richardson's boatw*
"two masted boat" & Sbbls. rum*
1 hhd. foreign rum*
sundry goods*
2 boats & cargoes, 5 casks saddlery ware*
"1 barrel pimentom*

Schooner Atlantic

-

Little River

-

"Richardson's boat"

-

town landing
J. Kendal's

*Captured with Eastport by the British.
Source: "Items of Seizures not settled at the Treasury Dep't Oct. 1, 1814, taken fi-omCollector Trescott's schedule March 2, 1815
at Wiscasset," Thomas G. Thornton Papers, Maine Historical Society, Portland, Maine.

' Restored to owners

APPENDIX D: Americans in Charlotte County
Table Dl: U.S. Citizens who Swore an Oath of Loyalty to King George 111,1810-1817
Date of
Oath
3129118 10

Name ofSettlers

Occupation

Family

Time in
NB
9 months

Last Place of
Residence
Palermo, ME

Place of Nativily

Cert$ed by

Henw Witcher

Farmer

Love1 Lang

Joiner

Israel Gliding
Rueben Witcher

Farmer
Farmer

Wife & 2
children
Wife & 4
children
None
None

Deerfield MA

C. Hatch, Esq.

12 months

Lincolnville, ME

Hamptm, (NH?) Dan'l Hill

5 months
9 months

Patrick Town, ME
Palermo, ME

Millford
Palermo, ME

6 months

Patrick Town, ME

Newcastle, ME

20 months

Free Town, ME

Cape Ann, MA

C. Hatch

4 months

North Yarmouth,
ME
Reading, MA

Lynsborough (7)

Thos. Wyer, Esq.

Farmer

Wife & 4
children
Wife & 11
children
Wife & 2
children
None

Cert. fiom C.
Hatch
~ a n ' fi i l l

David Leighton

Shoe Maker

William Garcelon

Farmer

Amos Ordway

Joiner

Ebenezer Rolf

Reading, MA

N. Frink & C.
Hatch

Charles Gleding

Farmer

None

12 months

Trader

7 years

John Menil (7)

Baker

3 months

Belfast, ME

Portland, ME

Joseph Raymond

Farmer

12 months

Union River

Middleburgh?

Arnmon Rice

Trader

8 months

Buxton, ME

Middleburgh?

David Basset

Farmer

2 years

Lisbon, ME

Elias Jacobs

Joiner

Wife & 3
children
Wife & 2
children
Wife & 6
children
Wife & 4
children
Wife & 5
children
Wife & 1
child

Vassalborough,
ME
Cushing, ME

LC

Thomas Burton

Vassalbourough,
ME
Saco, ME

2 years

Portland, ME

Bridgewater,
MA
Wells, ME

5 years

66

Joseph Porter &
Peter Crisly
James Beny &
Wm. Monro
Colin Campbell
J. Berry & G.
Gilchrist
J. Dunn
J. Dunn, J.
Beny, & G.

Oath
41211811

Elias Steams

Trader

Enos Varney

Farmer

Robert Brockway

Farmer

Benjamin Tollet

Farmer

Samuel Earle

Trader

R. Brockway

Mill Man

Thomas Davis

Farmer

David Peasley

Farmer

Joseph Stevens

Farmer

Freeman Hyde

Farmer

Daniel Stone

Mill Man

Samuel Lovejoy

Laborer

William Chalmers

Farmer

Levy Weston

Doctor

George Martin

Joiner

Leonard Bartlett

Mill Man

Wife & 1
child
Wife & 3
children
Wife & 3
children
None
Wife &3
children
Wife & 5
children
Wife & 3
children
Wife & 4
children
Wife & 1
child
Wife & 1
child
Wife & 5
children
Wife & 7
children
None
Wife & 2
children
None
Wife & 5
children

NB
2 years

Residence

Waltham, MA

Gorham, ME

7 years

Rochester, NH

Rochester, NH

8 years

Walsingham, MA

12 months

Augusta, ME

Walsingham,
MA
Redfield (7)

12 months

Berwick, ME

Eastport, ME'

7 years

Washington, ME

Washington, ME

4 years

Washington, ME

Clermont, NH

2 years

Whitefield, ME

Whitefield, ME

2 years

Durham, NH

Lee (?)

6 years

Woodstock, NH

Strafford, NH

24 years

Scarborough, ME

Machias, MEZ

2 years

Arnherst, MA

Kennebeck, ME

3 years

Woolwich, ME

Ill.

5 years

Hopkinton, MA

Hopkinton, MA

2 years

Southerland (7)

6 years

New Milford

Gouldsborough,
ME
Ball Town (?)

' Places
These places seem to be reversed; Earle's last place of residence was probably Eastport, his birthplace Berwick. Earle varies as Earl.
probably reversed.

z

Dr. Caleff & J.
Campbell
H. MacKay, Esq.

N. Gilman & D.
Hall
T. Wyer & J.
Campbell
H. MacKay, Esq.

J. Dunn & B.
Johnson
P. Crisly & N.
Frink
H. MacKay

A. Humphrey &
M. Shaw
D. Scofield & D.
McFarlane
Messrs. Andrews
& Clarke
N. Johnson & J.
Lanners
S. Conuck & N.

Date of
Oath
9114118 13

Name of Settlers

Occupation

Family

Jonathan Robinson

Mariner

Aaron Upton

Trader

James Stewart
William Todd

Trader
Trader

James J. Bixby
D. Weatherby

Trader
Farmer

Steven Mitchell

Painter

Wife & 1
child
Wife & 5
children
None
Wife & 8
children
None
Wife & 1
child
None

William Crabtree

Carpenter

John Blyth
John Elliot

Time in
NB
4 years

Last Place of
Residence
Bradford

14 years

Place of Nativity

Certified by

Hallowell, ME

"

Ware, NH

J. Porter & J.
Cristy

Billerica, MA
North Yarmouth,
ME
Litchfield
Acton, MA

66

5 years
2 years

Ill.
Gosstown

4 years
3 years

Litchfield
Drysden (?)

2years

Eastport ME

None

5 years

Lewiston, ME

N. Yarmouth,
ME
Lewiston, ME

Carpenter

None

4 years

Machias, ME

Machias, ME

None

2 years

Boston, MA

Boston, MA

66

Andrew Buntin

School
Master
Farmer

Wife & 1
child

3 years

Penobscot

Dunbarton

Thomas Waldron

Joiner

4 years

Dover, NH

Dover, NH

P. Richardson
S. Bucknam

3 years
9 years

Litchfield
C. River (?)

Bath ME
P. River (?)

66

Daniel Robinson

Farmer
Ship
Builder
Joiner

Wife & 1
child
None
Wife & 9
children
None

A. Smith, J.
Connuck, & T.
Moor
J. Porter & P.
Crisly

6 years

Sanborn

Portsmouth, NH

Joseph Porter &
P. Cristy

Benjamin Henderson
James Ash

Farmer
Farmer

5 years
21 years

bL

Mariner

10 years

Lisbon
Gouldsborough,
ME
Claremont

Lisbon
Cobscook

Steven Ford

Claremont

Jacob Hanks

Farmer

None
Wife & 6
children
Wife & 3
children
Wife & 1
child

9 years

Beltcher (?)

Portland, ME

J. McIntosh and
N. Johnson
H. Mackay & P.
Clinch

66

J. Parker & N.
Lindsay
66

P. Crisly & N.
Lindsay
T. Porter & P.
Crisly

66

H. MacKay

Date of
Oath
12113118 14

Name of Settlers

Occupation

Family

Henry Sherland

Tanner

None

Daniel Sherman

Farmer

Wife & 3
children

11 years

Daniel Gray

Farmer

None

5 years

Lisbon

Lisbon

Benjamin Byram

Baker

None

4 years

Belfast, ME

Aaron Rogers

Trader

7 years

Bath, ME

Daniel Scott

Mill Man

17 years

Machias

Machias

Lewis Vining

Farmer

10 years

Stueben

Ball Town

John Huff

Farmer

7 years

Anmdel

Augusta

David Potter

Farmer

7 years

Washington

James D. Scott

Mill Man

15 years

Machias

Machias

James Hall

Farmer

6 years

Damariscotta

Damariscotta

Samuel Gardner

Farmer

4 years

Penobscot

Rochester

S. G. Town

Trader

Wife & 2
children
Wife & 3
children
Wife & 3
children
Wife & 2
children
Wife & 1
child
Wife & 4
children
Wife & 2
children
Wife & 12
children
None

North Yarmouth,
ME
Bnmswick, ME

4 years

Deer Isle, ME

David Howes

Mariner

4 years

Buckstown, ME

Cape Cod, MA

J. Garcelon

Mariner

6 years

Lewiston, ME

Lewiston, ME

Daniel Whitney

Farmer

20 years

Little River, ME

Little River, ME

Daniel McCurdv

Camenter

Wife & 5
children
Wife & 1
child
Wife & 5
children
Wife & 7

Time in
NB
2 years

3 vears

Last Place of
Residence
Kennebeck, ME

Place of Nativity

Certifed by

Acton, MA

J. Porter & P.
Clinch
D. McLauchlan,
T. Wyer & A.
Grenlaw
J. and W.
Hitchings & W.
Moor
J. Campbell &
D.W. Jack
C. & H. Hatch &
C. Campbell
H. MacKay Esq.

Bridgewater,
MA

H. Mackay & P.
Clinch
H. Mackay

J. Campbell &
D. McLauchlan
J. Campbell &
D. McLauchlan
T. Wyer & J.
Campbell
J. Porter & P.
Cristy
66

Date of
--Oath

Name of Settlers

Occupation

B. Bordman

Farmer

Daniel Woodcock

Farmer

John Smith

Farmer

L.S. Sherman

Carpenter

Family

children
Wife & 1
child
Wife & 11
children
Wife & 2
children
None

Time in
NB

Last Place of
Residence

Place of Nativity

6 months

Penobscot, ME

Lynn, MA

4 years

Jonesborough, ME

7 years

Machias, ME

Islebourough,
ME
Machias, ME

3 years

Bangor, ME

London

Certifed by

J. Porter
J. Campbell &

H.Hatch
N. Farrow

Farmer

Benjamin Robinson

Joiner

N. Waldron

Farmer

Daniel Hall

Farmer
Farmer

I

12months Lynn, MA

Exeter, NH

Wife& 6
children
Wife & 1
child
None

12 months

Brunswick, ME

Barrington, MA

2 years

Brunswick, ME

Topsham, ME

5 years

Machias, ME

Wiscasset, ME

J. Porter & N.
Lindsay

8 years

Pittston, ME

New Glouster,
ME
Ill.
Berwick, ME

66

7 years
2 years

Trader

Nick Hall
John Walker

Farmer
Farmer

None
None

2 years
3 years

HC. Barton
Thomas Ash

Fanner
Farmer

N. Varney

Farmer

None
Wife & 1
child
None

Fanner

Henry E P P ~ ~
James Bracket

Farmer
Carpenter

Tyler P. Shaw

J. Porter & T.
Moore
H Hatch, T.
Wyer & D.W.
Jack
H.Mackay

2 years

Wife & 5
children
Wife
Wife & 5
children
None

James Hams

Islesborough, ME

Bristol, ME

Wife & 1
child
None

Union River
Vassalborough,
ME
12 months Northport, ME

Newbury, MA

H. Mackay
66

H.Mackay & T.

2 years
3 years

Brunswick, ME
North Yarmouth,
ME
Winslow, ME
Sullivan, ME

WYW
Brunswick, ME
H Mackay
North Yarmouth,
ME
Winslow, ME
Sullivan, ME

12 months

Fairfield

Dachester

66

J. Porter & W.
Moor

Date of
Oath
12/12/1816

Name of Settlers

Occupation

Family

J. Murphey

Farmer

12/12/1816
12126118 16

J.Jackson
Asa Benson

Farmer
Farmer

Wife & 9
children
None
Wife

12/30/1816
1/7/1817

Ill.
G.Lynch

Farmer
Farmer

1112118 17

J.D. Woodbery

Carpenter

1/16/1817

J. S. Williams

Farmer

Time in
Last Place of
NB
Residence
14 months Lincoln

Place of Nativity

Certijied by

Lincoln

J. Campbell & C.
Hatch
"
J. Porter & P.
Cristy
H. Mackay
J. Campbell & C.
Hatch
H. Mackay & J.
Campbell
J. Porter & T.
Moor

14 months
3 years

Green, ME
Hampden, ME

Bnmswick,ME
Middleburgh

Wife
None

3 years
12 months

Ill.
Provincetown, ME

Ill.
Wareham, MA

Wife & 6
children
None

12 years

Ware, NH

Ill.

7 months

Redfield

Redfield

St. Andrews 16thJanuary 181 7
I certify that the foregoing is a correct list of the names of persons to whom the Oath of Allegiance has been administered by me.-In
virtue of a commission given me for that purpose under the hand and seal of the Honble. Martin Hunter Esquire, Dated at Fredericton
this seventh day of March, 1810.Robert Pagan J.P.
Commissioner

Source: "Return of Persons who have come fiom the United States of America to Reside and Settle in the Province of New
Brunswick, to whom the Requisite Oaths have been administered by Robert Pagan appointed Commissioner for that purpose in the
County of Charlotte," PANB RS 7, "Executive Council: Papers, 1784-1877: Naturalizations."

APPENDIX E: Enemy Aliens, Eastport
Table El: Deputy Marshal's Records of Enemy Aliens, Eastport, 1812

-Name

-

-

Age

O'Donald, Michael
---Parker, Timothy

----Pendlebury,

Years
in
U.S.

Family
size

35
.75
3
53-2 --5
24
1
3

EE

- ----

--

Thomas
Strut, George
Txlor,
William
-Van Buskirk,

- --

Trade

--

victualer
laborer
-

--

23 16 0
40
23
11
50
6
10

-

cordwainer
-fisherman
Y
cooper
-

-

Took
Oath

1810
Census

no
yes
no

no
no-no

-

no
T
yes

-

p
p

-

-

-

-

35 Heads of households
208 Enemy aliens total

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

---

Yes

-

no
E
yes

Abraham ---------9 - laborer
yes
no
- 50 _ 2
-Wa%r,James
5
blacksmith
y
e
s
yes
-ley,
J o q h 34
2
--6
Woodwith,-James
34
6
--Seamseamanan!F.Yes---Woodworth,
64
6
5
victualer
yes
yes
Samuel
--

Mats.
Militia

s
--

-_

--

-

-

-

Source: Returns of enemy aliens fiom Eastport in the District of Maine extracted fiom
the returns of enemy aliens by Maine's U.S. Marshall, Thomas G. Thornton in the
autumn of 1812, found in National Archives RG 59, M-558, "U.S. Department of State:
War of 1812 Papers." Statement of aliens taking oaths of loyalty to the U.S. in January,
1813, found in William King Papers, Maine Historical Society. Militia rolls in "Edridge
Collection," Eastport Sentinel, February 20, 1907.
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